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Scientists across the life sciences routinely appeal to notions of “innate” or 
“genetic” traits to explain developmental phenomena, and the idea of “innate” differences 
among people has figured prominently in some explanations of observed social inequality. 
This dissertation is an analysis of these concepts, which proceeds in two parts. Part I 
explores various philosophical issues related to the use of innateness as an explanatory 
concept, while Part II examines controversial claims that genetic differences among racial 
groups account for observed social inequality. I argue throughout that much disagreement 
about innateness arises from innocuous differences in explanatory goals and interests 
among different scientific research programs. Nevertheless, some proponents of genetic 
racial differences rely on understandings of “genetic” traits that conflict with the moral 
commitments of a just society. 
Part I begins with arguments for a contextual and pragmatic approach to scientific 
explanation: in order for an explanation to be a good one, it must cite causes that are 
relevant to our interests in the explanatory context. I then apply this framework to biology 
and psychology, showing how different contexts call for different interpretations of 
 
 
innateness. I conclude Part I by responding to arguments that aim to establish a single 
meaning for “innate”/“genetic” across all explanatory contexts.  
Part II examines the use of “innate” and “genetic” concepts in developmental 
biology and population genetics, and applies the lessons of this examination to debates 
about alleged racial differences in genes for intelligence. I show that “hereditarians,” who 
argue for innate racial differences, employ an explanatory framework that abstracts away 
from substantial complexity in developmental interactions between genes and 
environments. While this framework is adequate for certain purposes, it is poorly suited to 
designing interventions capable of eliminating racial IQ differences and attendant social 
inequality. I propose an alternative, mechanistic framework that promotes understanding 
of developmental complexity and design of effective interventions. I argue that a full 
commitment to racial equality demands that we adopt this latter framework, and to the 
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 CHAPTER 1: CAUSATION AND EXPLANATION 
1.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I lay out the general theoretical approach I will take to the notions 
of causation and explanation in the context of scientific inquiry, which will set the stage 
for more detailed discussion of explanation in biological development in Chapter 2. Insofar 
as innateness claims are commonly offered and understood as claims about what caused a 
trait’s presence, and insofar as innateness claims are meant to be in some way explanatory, 
it is crucial that we clearly specify our theoretical commitments when it comes to these two 
notions.  
Following Davidson (1967), among others, I distinguish causation as a 
metaphysical relation from causal explanation, the practice of providing causal 
information as a way of making sense of phenomena of interest, and I argue that our 
explanatory practices are underdetermined by the metaphysical causal structure of the 
events we seek to explain.1 I will explore two approaches to causal explanation, broadly 
construed: one is grounded in a counterfactual (and specifically, manipulationist) 
interpretation of causation, and the other is grounded in a mechanistic analysis of the 
production of phenomena of interest.2  
                                                 
1 As will be explained in Section 1.5 below, this idea of “causal explanation” is a fairly weak notion—much 
weaker than the more robust notion of causation itself.   
2 Note that there are differences among proponents of the mechanistic approach in how they view the 
relationship between mechanistic explanation and notions of causality, and some would perhaps object to 





I will argue for the utility of both of these types of explanation, in that either of 
them might be the most appropriate explanatory strategy in a given circumstance. Thus, I 
defend a context-dependent (and specifically contrastive and pragmatic) approach to 
causal explanation. I will, however, argue that particular features of specific lines of inquiry 
can impose constraints on the kinds of explanatory strategies that will be appropriate in 
that domain.  
The accounts of causation and of causal explanation defended here are familiar ones 
from the philosophy of science. Thus my aim here is not to develop new approaches to 
these much-discussed philosophical issues. Rather, my primary goal is to explicate the 
contrastive/pragmatic account of causal explanation in such a way that it is consistent with 
common-sense causal intuitions and everyday explanation. Doing so will serve two 
purposes. First, showing how my account comports with everyday explanatory practice 
will render the rather weak metaphysical notion of causation I offer less unsatisfactory than 
it otherwise would be. More importantly for the purposes of this dissertation, however, the 
discussion here will set the stage for later exploration of the role that different explanatory 
interests play in debates about innateness. 
I begin in Section 1.2 by making explicit some very broad aspects of the general 
attitude I will be taking towards scientific investigation and explanation, which will inform 
the subsequent discussion in this and later chapters. Section 1.3 describes the two 
approaches to causal explanation (namely, the counterfactual/manipulationist approach 
                                                 
counting mechanistic explanation as a type of causal explanation in the weak sense intended here—the 





and the productive/mechanistic approach) we’ll be considering, while Section 1.4 provides 
a more thorough treatment of the manipulability approach. I close in Section 1.5 by 
integrating these various explanatory strategies into a general contrastive/pragmatic 
approach to explanation. The following chapter applies these various approaches to 
biological development and the question of “genetic causation.” 
1.2 The aims and limits of science: science as cartography 
1.2.1 A modest realism 
It will help to begin by making explicit the general attitude towards scientific 
inquiry adopted in this chapter, and indeed, throughout this dissertation. At the heart of this 
attitude is the idea that science is something done by and for us. That is, I take the purpose 
of scientific inquiry to be the fulfillment of various human-centered purposes, 
encompassing both idle curiosity about the universe around us and our practical interests. 
While I do not deny that there is a mind-independent world, or that humans can and do 
gain knowledge about that world through scientific inquiry, I take the particular shape of 
human scientific practice—the questions it formulates, its procedures for answering them, 
and the answers it provides—to be a reflection of the kinds of creatures we are. Creatures 
with an entirely different set of needs and interests, even if they shared the general impulse 
to understand and manipulate the world around them, would likely go about it in very 





This conception of science has been helpfully illuminated by way of an analogy 
between scientific inquiry and cartography.3 Maps can be accurate representations of 
reality in that they can depict the relative sizes, shapes, and locations of various 
topographical features of an area. Yet maps are necessarily selective in which features of 
an area to depict and how to depict them; Lewis Carroll has artfully parodied the idea of a 
“perfect map”: a map that recapitulates every feature of the world in perfect detail is simply 
the world itself. Creating maps thus requires us to select from among the many different 
possible ways of representing the features of an area, a process that will reflect the interests 
of the mapmaker and those who will be reading the map. The map will therefore represent 
those features of the landscape that we find interesting, notable, or practically useful, and 
the variability of our interests entails that different maps will be appropriate for different 
purposes and on different occasions.  
My claim is that science works the same way: just as there are multiple distinct yet 
accurate ways to chart a landscape with a map, so there are multiple distinct yet accurate 
ways to describe the world through science. In conducting scientific inquiry, we will 
continually make decisions not only about which phenomena to study, but also about when 
science has adequately explained the phenomena that interest us. I am deeply skeptical that 
there is any way of characterizing how such decisions are—or should be—made that does 
not make a fundamental appeal to human concerns and interests (where, again, these 
                                                 
3 Philip Kitcher (2001, Chapter 5) has given the most thorough and enlightening presentation of this analogy, 
though see also Garfinkel (1981, pp. 146–147). Hempel (1960) attributes the original comparison to Max 





concerns and interests encompass both our desire to control and manipulate the world 
around us as well as sheer curiosity). 
The perspective adopted here stands in opposition to views which hold that there is 
exactly one correct and complete way to describe the world (as it exists independently of 
human experience), and that science is in the business of generating that one description. 
Since this is not a dissertation about varieties of scientific realism, I will not spend time 
here explicitly defending my modest realism from its more ambitious competitors (though 
see Kitcher, 2001, for a detailed defense of a view sufficiently similar to my own). This 
note is meant to flag and make explicit an admittedly contentious theoretical assumption 
that underlies a great deal of what follows. Some of the arguments offered below, however, 
will help make clear why I find this view compelling.  
1.2.2 Explanation as understanding 
My conception of science as a kind of human-centered activity extends to scientific 
explanation as well: explanation is done by and for us. This idea fits naturally with the view 
that the hallmark of good explanations is that they facilitate understanding (De Regt & 
Dieks, 2005; de Regt, 2009; Gopnik, 2000). As a result, I would argue that what makes 
something explanatory is that it feels explanatory to us. Explanations, therefore, are a kind 
of psychological entity, and what facts explain which other facts is contingent and 
contextual—contingent upon the sorts of creatures we are and the kinds of curiosity we 





phenomenon, and the production of this phenomenological state in us is the hallmark of 
explanation.  
The view expressed here might seem to conflict with the idea that explanatory 
relations exist “out in the world,” a view sometimes called the ontic notion of explanation 
(Craver, 2007; Salmon, 1984, 1989). However, when understood properly these notions 
can be made compatible. Craver distinguishes between explanations as representations 
(texts, pictures, models, and so forth)—the kind of thing that facilitates understanding and 
so satisfies my own criteria for explanatory success—and ontic or objective explanations: 
Other times, the term explanation refers to an objective portion of the causal 
structure of the world, to the set of factors that bring about or sustain a 
phenomenon (call them objective explanations). What explains the 
accident? The ice on the road, the whiskey, the argument, the tears, and the 
severed brake cables. . .Objective explanations are not texts; they are full-
bodied things. They are facts, not representations. They are the kinds of 
things that are discovered and described. There is no question of objective 
explanations being “right” or “wrong,” or “good” or “bad.” They just are. 
(2007, p. 27) 
As we can see, Craver’s notion of objective explanations simply entails that there 
is an objective causal structure to the world, and that constructing adequate “explanatory 
texts” depends (at least sometimes) on discovering this structure. I do not deny any of this. 
I merely emphasize, in addition, that just as we must selectively represent certain features 
of a landscape in our maps, so must we selectively represent certain features of the causal 
structure of the world in our explanatory texts. The notion of explanation as understanding, 
which I endorse here, simply expresses a particular view of why representations of certain 





constitute satisfactory explanatory texts: satisfactory explanatory texts are those that 
facilitate understanding.4 Since for the most part we will be concerned with what Craver 
calls “explanatory texts,” I will confine use of the term “explanation” to these 
representations, understood as descriptions of the world that facilitate understanding and 
serve to make puzzling phenomena intelligible. 
Of course, much more needs to be said in terms of fleshing out the idea of 
explanation as understanding. Most notably, there will have to be some further constraints 
on good explanations beyond simply inducing the phenomenology of understanding in 
someone, somewhere. Clearly the phenomenology of understanding can be misleading: we 
might experience such a phenomenology even in response to a proposed explanation that, 
were we were paying closer attention, we would recognize as inadequate, and we should 
not be bound to accept the validity of a creationist’s explanation for the presence of fossils 
simply because “God put them there to test our faith” feels like a good explanation to many 
people. But, as with the realism/anti-realism debates touched on above, a full consideration 
of the relevant issues would take us too far afield. Therefore, I trust that the notion of 
explanation as understanding will be sufficiently intuitive to allow us to proceed within 
that framework. 
 
                                                 
4Note that I do not mean to imply that Craver would deny that our explanatory interests must be taken into 
account when moving from objective explanations to explanatory texts—indeed, Craver endorses this 





1.3 Two approaches to causal explanation 
1.3.1 Distinguishing dependence and production 
We are apt to apply the word cause in a wide variety of circumstances, and much 
philosophical work has been dedicated to systematizing our causal judgments, such that 
there are now a number of theories of what causation is.5 Not surprisingly, however, for 
each theory that has been offered as providing necessary and sufficient conditions for 
causal relations to hold, counterexamples have emerged, such that each theory does a good 
job of accounting for our causal intuitions and our explanatory practices in some range of 
instances, but fails elsewhere. This is a problem if one is committed to the view that we 
need a complete and universal analysis of causation in order to say how we can engage in 
causal explanation at all. However, in keeping with the pragmatic and pluralistic approach 
to explanation pursued here, I prefer to think that there is nothing wrong with utilizing 
certain notions of causation in some circumstances, and other notions in other 
circumstances. I will develop and defend this thought—that different causal notions are 
explanatorily useful in different contexts—below, but for now let us continue exploring 
some of the basic features that seem to be common to our many explanatory practices. 
As noted above, we are apt to apply the word cause quite widely, and there are a 
number of features of events—and the way we conceptualize the relations between 
events—that seem central to our sense of what it means for two events to be causally 
                                                 
5I should note that the ensuing discussion concerns token causation—that is, causation as a relation between 






related. For present purposes, I will focus on two of these features: on the one hand, the 
idea of counterfactual dependence seems fundamental to our understanding of causation 
(e.g., had the CEOs not signed the contract, the corporate merger would not have occurred; 
hence the signing caused the merger), and on the other hand, paradigm cases of causation 
typically involve spatiotemporally continuous processes linking the events, such that the 
cause produces the effect (e.g., the many causal interactions on a billiard table).6 
Often enough, dependence and production occur together, such that, for events c 
and e, e counterfactually depends on c, and, in addition, there is a spatiotemporally 
continuous chain from c to e (consider again the billiard table, with c as the cue striking 
the cue ball and e as the eight ball falling into the corner pocket). However, it is easy to 
show that dependence and production come apart, and that treating either as a necessary 
and sufficient condition for a causal relation to hold between two events forces us to 
embrace bizarre results7. Dependence tends to fail in cases that involve “preemption”: Billy 
and Suzy each throw a rock at a glass bottle. Suzy’s rock gets there first and the bottle 
shatters, but it is not the case that the shattering of the bottle depends on Suzie throwing 
the rock—for if she had not thrown, or had she missed, Billy’s rock would still have 
smashed the bottle. And yet we are strongly inclined to say that Suzie’s throw, not Billy’s,, 
caused the bottle to shatter (i.e., Suzy’s throw produces the shattering event).8  
                                                 
6 By spatiotemporally continuous process I mean something like Salmon’s “mark transmission” or Dowe’s 
“conservation of conserved quantities,” which are discussed in Chapter 2.  
7 Much of the discussion here follows Hall (2004). 
8The presentation of this example is meant to shed light on the general nature of the problem for supposing 
dependence is necessary and sufficient for causation, and so my description of it overlooks some nuances. 
For instance, the causal analysis of cases like this will of course depend on how events are individuated—
i.e., one might argue that the shattering resulting from Suzy’s throw is not the same event as the shattering 
resulting from Billy’s. However, the example can be formulated (see Hall, 2004) in such a way that one 





Production, on the other hand, struggles with cases of “double prevention,” or an 
event c's prevention of some other event b which, had it occurred, would have prevented 
event e. Here imagine that Billy and Suzy are fighter pilots, and that Suzy successfully 
carries out a bombing mission, while Billy shoots down the enemy who, were it not for 
Billy's rescue, would have shot down Suzy. The bombing thus depends counterfactually 
on Billy's firing upon Enemy, and many would surely find it intuitive to say that Billy’s 
firing was a cause of the bombing.9 But suppose the dogfight between Billy and Enemy 
takes place hundreds of miles from Suzy and the bombing, such that there is no 
spatiotemporally continuous series that connects the dogfight and the bombing (indeed, 
Suzy might not even be aware of Billy's actions, or even of Enemy’s existence). Billy’s 
action (intuitively) helps cause the bombing, but doesn’t produce it. Thus, just as it seems 
there can be causation without dependence, so too there can be causation without 
production. 
Thus, in what follows I will explore two explanatory strategies, one (broadly) 
grounded in notions of counterfactual dependence (the manipulability theory of causation), 
and the other (broadly) grounded in attention to productive relations (the mechanistic 
approach to explanation in biology, to be presented in Chapter 2). 
                                                 
9There is a general question here about whether absences and omissions (e.g., Enemy’s failing to shoot down 
Suzy) can be causes. Philosophers have debated the issue, but it doesn’t matter for our purposes here, since 
the debate is really about whether absences and omissions have “genuine causal powers” and can be 
genuine constituents of the causal structure of the world; it is universally agreed that absences and 
omissions are explanatorily relevant. Our concern here is with the latter. (For discussion, see Barros, 2013; 





1.4 The manipulability theory of causal explanation  
The manipulability theory relies substantially on Judea Pearl’s (2000) work, but has 
been given its most thorough philosophical defense by Jim Woodward (2003).10 According 
to Woodward, causation is to be understood in terms of manipulability: at its core, the 
theory states that a causal relation holds between two variables11, x and y, iff a change in 
one results in a change in the other. “Changing” a variable amounts to performing a (usually 
hypothetical) intervention that sets one of the variables to a particular value, and looking 
for a change in other variables (in effect asking: what if things had been different?) 
I believe Woodward’s view has a number of virtues that make it a very useful 
analysis of causation in many circumstances. Needless to say, the question of what is the 
best overall philosophical analysis of causation is a matter of some contention. While I 
cannot here provide a full defense of the manipulability theory against all of the objections 
that have been raised against it (e.g., Hiddleston, 2005; Strevens, 2007), I will briefly 
highlight a few of its advantages. First, note that Woodward’s is not a reductive account of 
causation, and as such it makes no attempt to remove causal notions (e.g., a change in one 
variable results in a change in another) from the analysis of other causal notions. Some 
may find this non-reductivity unsatisfying; however, in eschewing issues of reduction, 
Woodward’s approach has the quite useful feature of allowing us to see how scientific 
inquiry can generate robust systems of explanation even without a fully reductive analysis 
of causation. A second advantage is closely related to the first: as will be outlined below, 
                                                 
10All references to Woodward are to Woodward (2003) 
11Strictly speaking, Woodward conceives of properties as the causal relata, but usually speaks of relations 





Woodward’s manipulability theory eliminates the need to appeal to laws for explanatory 
power (relying instead on the notion of invariance—to be explained below), thus providing 
an elegant account of how generalizations can be explanatory even if they fail to be laws 
(the latter notion being, of course, a thorn in many a philosopher’s side).  
As an intuitive example, consider the following: suppose that the variables x and y 
correspond to my having a disposable $50 and my going to a Jethro Tull concert, 
respectively. Each of the variables has a range of possible values. In the present case, each 
variable is binary: I either have $50 or I don’t, and I either attend the concert or I don’t. 
Imagine that the value of both variables is “0” (i.e., I don’t have the money and don’t attend 
the concert); the manipulability theory says that if there is a causal relationship between x 
and y, we should be able to change the value of one of the variables by changing the value 
of the other. So we could perform an intervention on x in order to set its value to “1” (i.e., 
someone gives me $50). If this manipulation leads to a change in the value of y (I go to the 
concert), then there is a causal relationship between x and y; if the value of y remains 
constant even after the intervention on x, then no such relationship exists.12 (Note also that 
this intervention has revealed only that the causal arrow goes in one way—x is a cause of 
y—but we could easily consider the opposite intervention to see if y is a cause of x.) Of 
course, there is room for considerably greater complexity: relations may hold among more 
than two variables, variables may take any number of values, discrete or continuous, 
                                                 
12As will be explained more fully below, it must be assumed that all other causal factors are held fixed, i.e., 
that the generosity of the person who gives me $50 does not inspire me to do something magnanimous 





manipulations of one variable may lead to an increase or decrease in the value of a variable 
it causally influences, and so on.  
There are a great many technicalities in Woodward’s manipulability account, but 
here I review only two of them that will prove important later. Firstly, note that in 
Woodward-style causal systems, an intervention on a particular variable may be made (and 
indeed, should be made) while holding the values of all other independent variables 
constant. That is, we can manipulate x and y independently only if x is not a cause of y and 
y is not a cause of x. But importantly, when there are multiple variables linked in a causal 
chain, an intervention on any variable affects all the variables “causally downstream” of 
the manipulated one. To see this, consider the causal system in Figure 1.1: 
 
Figure 1.1: Woodward-style causal model 
As we can see, there is only one intervention we can make (on Z) that would affect 
no other variables in the system, and only one other intervention (on Y) that would only 
affect one other variable. Any other single manipulation we might make (on X, Q, or P) 
will change the values of more than one variable. We cannot change the value of X or Q, 
for example, without changing the value of Y. Thus, it is impossible to consider the causal 
effect of X on Z independent of Y, for Y causally depends on X. In order to assess the 
relationship between X and Z, we must consider the effects of X on Y.  






Secondly, causal relationships do not necessarily hold under all conditions—that 
is, whether or not a causal relationship holds between two variables may depend on the 
values of other variables. Woodward’s term for this is invariance, and causal relations can 
be more or less invariant with respect to the range of conditions under which they hold. 
The notion of invariance proves particularly useful in meeting one of the main challenges 
to causal theories like manipulability. Because the manipulability theory maintains that 
causal relations between variables hold in virtue of what would happen to one variable if a 
manipulation were to be performed on another, it belongs to the class of counterfactual 
theories of causation (to be contrasted with, for example, causal process theories like those 
of Salmon, 1984 and Dowe, 2000). As a counterfactual account of causation, Woodward’s 
manipulability theory faces a similar prima facie problem to that which plagues other such 
accounts: counterfactual accounts do not provide an obvious way of singling out one cause 
(i.e., what we might wish to call the cause) among the many things upon which a state of 
affairs might counterfactually depend (cf. Lewis, 1973). For instance, if I strike a match 
and it ignites, then my striking the match caused the ignition, because the ignition 
counterfactually depends on the striking (alternatively: an intervention on the striking 
variable results in a difference in the ignition variable). But by parity of reasoning, the 
presence of oxygen in the room caused the ignition as well, and, to say the least, it is not 
obvious how to tweak such theories so as to yield the “right” result of saying that the 
striking of the match occupies a special causal role that other causes do not. (I will return 





This is where the notion of invariance comes in. Again, causal relationships can 
hold more or less invariantly, and we can see how this might relieve the tension stemming 
from our recognition that oxygen in the room was a cause of the match’s ignition and our 
simultaneous sense that the match was a special kind of cause (which might be labeled in 
a variety of ways: “triggering cause,” “critical cause,” “preponderant cause,” and so 
forth)—though the tension is perhaps not completely eliminated; see Section 1.6. The 
presence of the oxygen, we think, can be “held constant,” and when we do so, the causal 
relationship between the match and the ignition is highly invariant (there are some values 
of some variables—wetness of the match, for example—that will disrupt that relationship, 
but these will be comparatively few). But in order to identify the oxygen as a “special” 
cause in this sense, we must hold the striking of the match constant. This amounts to saying 
that oxygen is a “special” cause of ignitions only when we can assume that matches are 
routinely struck, but the presence of oxygen varies. While there exist such contexts (e.g., 
employees at a match-production company that tests the hardness of match heads in a room 
that is supposed to be free of oxygen might well cite the presence of oxygen as the cause 
of an ignition), they are comparatively rare.13 Thus, the invariance condition allows us to 
say that under “normal” conditions, the match causes the flame in a way that the oxygen 
does not.  
This discussion of the counterfactual nature of the manipulability account, with its 
concomitant issues of invariance and “normal” conditions nudges us from the realm of 
causation to that of causal explanation, which I address in the next section. 
                                                 





1.5 Explanation: contrastive and pragmatic 
1.5.1 Contrastivity 
I will be assuming, in what follows, that a very large chunk of scientific explanation 
consists of causal explanation. I do not mean to claim that explanations can only be 
scientific if they are causal (much less that even non-scientific forms of explanation must 
be causal in order to be legitimate), but it would appear that most workaday scientific 
explanation is in some way aimed at describing the causal structure of the world. 
Importantly, philosophers of science routinely draw a distinction between causation and 
causal explanation (Beebee, 2004; Davidson, 1967; Woodward, 2003). Causation here 
refers to an ontological relationship that holds between things in the world (where “things” 
are, on various accounts, properties, events, states of affairs, or variables—I continue to 
use the latter term). As noted above, any counterfactual account of causation (like the 
manipulability theory discussed above), appears committed to the idea that there are a great 
many such relationships that hold between any particular variable and various antecedent 
variables. That is, there are many causes of the value of any particular variable e, because 
there are many other variables c1. . .cn that, had they been different (i.e., had we intervened 
on them), would have resulted in a different value for e.14 Causal explanation, then, refers 
to our practice of citing some, but not others, of these many causes when answering such 
                                                 
14In the next section I will take up the question of whether counterfactual theories are committed to counting 
every variable upon which an outcome counterfactually depends as a cause of that outcome—for now I 
assume that it does, as this assumption will allow us to gauge the effectiveness of the contrastive/pragmatic 






explanatory questions as “Why does e have the value that it does?” or “What explains the 
value of e?” Unlike causation, which is, again, held to be an objective metaphysical relation 
that holds in the world, causal explanation appears to crucially involve pragmatic—rather 
than merely theoretical—components, in the sense that the choice of some causal factors 
over others reflects our own interests and the explanatory contexts we inhabit, rather than 
any objective feature of the causal structure of the world.  
The notion of causal explanation, as distinct from causation, can be helpfully 
illuminated using cases involving omissions: suppose a lazy gardener fails to water his 
employer’s plants, and the plants die. On a manipulationist approach to causation, the 
gardener’s failure to water the plants counts as a cause of the plants’ death iff there is some 
intervention on the variable corresponding to whether or not the gardener watered the 
plants (a variable that, let’s suppose, takes one of two values: 0 = no, 1 = yes) that would 
have changed the outcome (i.e., resulted in the plants continuing to live). Since this 
condition is, by hypothesis, met (i.e., had the gardener watered the plants, they would have 
lived), the gardener’s failure to water the plants is a cause of their dying. But, the familiar 
story continues, there is also an intervention on the variable that represents whether I 
watered the plants that would have changed the outcome, and the same is true for you, your 
barber, and Ronald Reagan’s reanimated corpse (i.e., had any of us watered the plants, the 
plants would have lived). Hence, all of our failures to water those plants count as causes of 
the plants’ death. 
This “causal promiscuity” is generally thought to be unavoidable on any account 





commit us to the existence of infinitely many bizarre causal relations, there is no reason 
our causal-explanatory practices need be contaminated by these rather disorderly elements. 
For our explanatory practices will reflect our practical interests, our judgments of 
relevance, and even our normative commitments (regarding, for example, who is 
responsible for keeping the plants alive).15 Hence, in the vast majority of cases, citing the 
gardener’s failure to water the plants will be regarded as an informative and appropriate bit 
of causal information, while pointing to Zombie Reagan’s negligence will not.  
On this account, then, causal explanation is a thoroughly pragmatic affair. There is, 
of course, some debate regarding just to what extent our explanatory practices are 
determined by such pragmatic considerations and how much they are constrained by the 
real causal structure of the world (again, this will be addressed in the next section). 
Nevertheless it is widely agreed that somewhere along the line our goals and interests will 
work their way into our practices of seeking and identifying causal relationships.  
As a number of philosophers (e.g., Dretske, 1972; Garfinkel, 1981; Van Fraassen, 
1980) have pointed out, one of the chief ways in which we often go about highlighting the 
causal factors that are relevant to us is by making explanations (and explanatory questions) 
contrastive. Indeed, some (Garfinkel, 1981; Northcott, 2008; Van Fraassen, 1980) have 
argued, persuasively in my view, that explanation is fundamentally contrastive, even if it 
doesn’t always appear to be.16 To say that explanations are fundamentally contrastive 
                                                 
15 This last point will be especially important in Part II of the dissertation. 
16 Northcott (2008) actually argues that not only is causal explanation contrastive, but so is causation itself; 
i.e., causation is not a 2-place relation but a 4-place one, with all causal relations having the form [c rather 






amounts to saying that, contrary to the way they are sometimes phrased, explanations do 
not offer an account of why some phenomenon occurred simpliciter, but rather why some 
outcome rather than any of some relevant class of alternative outcomes was realized.17 
(Note the term relevant: it is a basic feature of contrastive approaches to explanations that 
the selection of a contrast class will reflect our interests and our judgments of relevance.) 
On a contrastive notion of explanation, a key step in any explanatory project is determining 
what comprises the relevant class of alternative outcomes (often called the “contrast class” 
or “contrast space”), for the selection of a contrast class will constrain the sorts of 
explanations that can be offered to the explanatory question, in ways described below.  
Garfinkel (1981) provides a helpful discussion of the relation between contrast 
classes and explanation, taking as a starting point a humorous (and apocryphal) anecdote 
involving the bank robber Willie Sutton. A priest visiting Sutton in prison is said to have 
asked Sutton why he robbed banks, to which Sutton supposedly replied, “Because that’s 
where the money is.” The disconnect between the information requested by the priest and 
that provided by Sutton illuminates the role contrastive focus plays in explanation, as well 
as the importance of stating contrast classes explicitly wherever possible when framing and 
                                                 
17 There are in fact two ways of construing this “contrastivity condition.” In what follows I do not distinguish 
between the two construals, since the difference appears to be merely a verbal issue regarding the use of 
the term “explanandum.” But for completeness' sake: the contrastivity condition can be construed either 
as a constraint on how explananda must be stated, or as a constraint on how explanatory questions must 
be framed. That is, different ways of accounting for the contrastivity condition in a theory of explanation 
may or may not subsume the contrastive focus under specification of the explanandum. One might insist, 
then, that explanations can only be offered for explananda that are expressed as disjunctions of the 
observed and alternative outcomes (i.e., questions must be of the form, "why ‘x rather than y, or z, or w,. 
. .’?”), or one might prefer to allow that the explananda of scientific questions themselves may be stated 
atomistically, but insist that explanatory questions, in order to be complete, must contain a contrastive 
clause that includes the relevant alternatives (i.e., “why ‘x’ rather than ‘y’ or ‘z’ or ‘w’. . .?” Again, the 





communicating explanatory questions. For the priest, the relevant alternative is robbing 
nothing, while for Sutton it is robbing something other than banks. Notice that Sutton’s 
answer is not necessarily wrong as a response to the question as stated, because it is, 
presumably, true that if banks did not contain large quantities of money, Sutton would not 
rob them. Rather, Sutton’s response simply reflects a different explanatory focus from the 
one the priest is assuming. (An alternative way to put this is that Sutton and the priest 
diverge on the issue of what is contained in the class of relevant contrasts for the state of 
affairs Sutton robs banks). Thus, Sutton’s explanation would be a perfectly good one if he 
were asked the same question by a fellow thief with a penchant for robbing hot dog stands.  
Closely related to the contrast classes that figure prominently in the present notion 
of explanation is another widely-discussed phenomenon, that of background assumptions 
(what van Fraassen, 1980, and Garfinkel, 1981, call “presuppositions”). Given the 
ambiguity of "why?" questions (here conceived as requests for explanations; van Fraassen, 
1980) revealed by the Sutton story, what counts as an acceptable answer to such a question 
will be constrained by what we take to be “given” in the explanatory context, or as it’s 
sometimes expressed, what we take to be the background conditions for our explanatory 
endeavors, or what we think we can hold fixed for our explanatory purposes. Such 
conditions can be (and sometimes are) expressed as “given that…” clauses. For example, 
the question Willie Sutton cheekily attributes to the priest can be stated: “Given that you 
are going to rob something, why do you rob banks?” And, had the priest been aware of the 
kind of wiseacre he was dealing with, he might have phrased his question thusly: “Given 





This highlights an important feature of background conditions (as expressed by 
“given that…” clauses), namely, that they determine what the contrast class of relevant 
alternative outcomes will be taken to be. The “given that…” clause of Sutton's reading of 
the priest's question (as formulated explicitly above) indicates that for Sutton, the relevant 
alternatives to his robbing banks all involve him robbing other things. By contrast, the 
implicit “given that…” clause of the priest's question indicates that the alternative outcomes 
within his explanatory framework involve Sutton robbing nothing. Whether they are made 
explicit or not, the background assumptions that we bring to an explanatory project 
determine what the contrast space of alternative outcomes is, which in turn determines 
exactly what explanatory question we need to ask and what will count as a good 
explanation for the phenomenon of interest.  
I close this exposition of this contrastive theory of explanation with one caveat: 
while explicitly defining contrast classes for phenomena we wish to explain can go some 
of the way towards guiding our causal-explanatory practices through the thicket of 
counterfactual dependencies, they cannot go all the way. That is, even once we have 
identified what we take to be the relevant alternatives to our explanandum, we will still 
face pragmatic choices in deciding which of the many variables that, had they taken 
different values, would have yielded one of the alternatives in our contrast space. Van 
Fraassen (1980) offers the example of the question “Why is this conductor warped?” 
Possible contrast classes for the state of affairs assumed by the question (this conductor is 
warped) include conductors other than this one being warped (e.g., “Why is this conductor 





However, even once it is made explicit what is the relevant range of alternatives, 
there is still considerable room for pragmatic considerations to inform what sorts of 
answers are appropriate and informative. For suppose it is stated that the contrast class for 
the question is the conductor retaining its shape. Depending on the context, the asker of the 
question might still be seeking any of a number of different types of information: perhaps 
she seeks information about who is responsible for the state of affairs (in which case “The 
technician did not employ the proper procedure” might count as a good explanation) or 
instead about the physical/mechanical conditions involved (here “There was moisture on 
the switches” might be the best explanation available). 
The upshot of all this is that pragmatic considerations infuse our explanatory 
practices at multiple junctures. This, in turn, means that there will be much work to be done 
in teasing out just what contextual and pragmatic considerations are in the background of 
any particular line of empirical investigation (and whether these same contextual features 
are shared among different theorists in a field). And in particular, as regards the subject of 
this dissertation, we will want to probe the features of the explanatory contexts in which 
claims about innateness or about genetic causation are made. I will begin such an analysis 
shortly in Chapter 2, where I examine some of the causal facts of biological development 
(and in particular the causal role of genes), but first I will comment on the question—
alluded to earlier—of whether we ought to endorse the view that there are no metaphysical 
distinctions to be made among the many causes of a particular event. That is can we really 





conditions and omissions upon which an event counterfactually depends? Is it really just 
pragmatics all the way down? 
1.6 Are causal relations really that unconstrained? 
I have said that the practice of causal explanation—of citing certain states of affairs 
(and not others) as causes or explanations of other states of affairs—is an ineluctably 
pragmatic enterprise. That is, if we want to know which of the many things that count 
(metaphysically speaking) as causes of a particular event or state of affairs is properly 
regarded as the cause, the answer is not provided by the metaphysical relationships between 
the different events. Rather, my account holds, selecting one cause over others is a choice 
that depends on our interests, goals, normative commitments, and so on. Even if this is 
right, however, we might still ask the question: is there any role for metaphysics—rather 
than just pragmatics—in determining which causes are “better” candidates for the role of 
cause than other candidates? 
We can distinguish a range of positions as to the answer to this question: two 
extremes and a variety of intermediate stances. At one extreme there is the claim that for 
every event, there is exactly one cause that occupies a metaphysically privileged position—
it is, “from the point of view of the universe,” the cause. This position I take to be 
discredited by the foregoing discussion of Woodward’s manipulability approach to 
causation (a counterfactual account): if causation is a metaphysical relationship involving 
counterfactual dependence, we seem to be stuck with some degree of causal promiscuity, 





explaining the demise of the flowers in terms of the gardener’s negligence or the 
unseasonably warm weather, would we really want to commit ourselves to one of these 
being the real cause?) At the other extreme, however, we have the view that every zany, 
bizarre counterfactual upon which a given event depends counts equally as a cause of that 
event. Thus, from the point of view of the universe, the destruction of the cathedral in 
Dresden during the Allied bombing was every bit as much caused by the absence of flying 
kangaroos snatching the Allied bombs from midair as by the Allied commanders’ order to 
drop bombs on Dresden. According to this view, our decision to cite the command—rather 
than the absence of the kangaroos—as the cause of the destruction is merely a reflection of 
our interests and our subjective judgments of relevance.  
Occupying the space between these two extremes are a number of possibilities. One 
might suggest, for example, that the factors upon which a given event counterfactually 
depends partition into two classes: those that are metaphysically relevant and those that are 
not. This suggestion would likely hold, for example, that events like the order to conduct 
the bombing and the pilots' pulling the triggers fall into the category of relevant causes, 
while the absence of flying kangaroos does not. This view could then concede that within 
the class of metaphysically relevant causes, our pragmatic concerns determine which we 
choose to focus our attention on and/or select as the cause (when, for example, we are 
deciding who is a potential target of an indictment for war crimes). But, this view would 
hold, it would be a mistake for us to direct our focus to the kangaroos, for a belief that the 
presence or absence of flying kangaroos is causally relevant to the destruction of the 





Alternatively, one might suggest that the metaphysics of causation allow for 
assigning degrees of relevance, such that some counterfactual dependencies are more 
relevant than others in the causal history of an event, and so constitute objectively (but only 
ceteris paribus—see below) better candidates for causal explanation. This view could 
stand on its own, holding that from the point of view of the universe, all counterfactual 
dependencies are causes (including the kangaroos), but that some are only infinitesimally 
relevant. Or it could be combined with the bifurcation view, such that some dependencies 
are simply outside the range of metaphysically relevant causes, but within the relevant 
range there are gradations of relevance, with some causes being prime candidates for causal 
explanation and some just barely meeting the threshold for relevance. Either way, such a 
view would again countenance a role for pragmatic considerations: causal metaphysics 
provide certain constraints and/or guidelines for causal explanation, but we are at liberty 
to choose from among the list of plausible candidates depending on the pragmatic 
considerations at play (perhaps with the proviso that the larger the deviation from the top 
of the list, the stronger must be the pragmatic reasons that count in favor of explaining a 
particular event in terms of a particular cause). 
How might we go about spelling out the criteria by which some causes are more 
metaphysically relevant than others? One possibility is presented by David Lewis's (1973) 
account of causation, which relies on a possible-worlds approach to counterfactuals, 
complete with a metric for determining the closeness of various possible worlds to the 
actual world (thus allowing for the selection of the cause—the cause that is absent in the 





constructing a coherent metaphysical-relevance view in terms of the proximity of different 
possible worlds seem to me rather dim (for largely the reasons laid out in Woodward, 
2003).18 
As we can see, the theoretical options for describing the relationship between 
metaphysical and pragmatic constraints on causal explanation are many, and the choice 
among these options will depend on some fairly arcane philosophical considerations. 
Fortunately, however, I think that that for our purposes here, settling the question of 
whether or not there are any metaphysical constraints on our causal explanations is 
inessential. In the end, I’m happy to remain agnostic on the question of whether there is a 
coherent way of spelling out a “metaphysical relevance” view, for the essential point for 
my purposes is that with regard to the sorts of causal questions that concern us (e.g., the 
destruction of the cathedral and, in subsequent chapters, the ontogeny of biological and 
psychological traits), it seems clear that there is some range of possible explanations in any 
particular case among which we might choose on pragmatic (contextual) grounds, as I will 
now explain.  
Consider first the case of the destruction of the cathedral in Dresden. Notice, first 
of all, that ordinary discourse permits a certain degree of imprecision here. When presented 
with the question “What caused the destruction of the cathedral?” or “Why was the 
cathedral destroyed?” it seems appropriate to respond “the Allied bombing.” The 
                                                 
18 Briefly, Lewis’s account proposes that, in order to identify the closest possible world in which a 
hypothesized cause is absent, we should imagine a “small miracle” that simply erases the hypothesized 
cause from existence. As Woodward points out, there are multiple ways of envisioning such miracles and 
hence multiple close possible worlds to consider, none of which is obviously closer to the actual world 





appropriateness of this response, however, merely reflects the fact that this explanation is 
sufficient for many of the explanatory contexts we ordinarily inhabit. But for serious 
investigators of the event—historians, architects, ballistics experts, just-war theorists, and 
so forth—further questions will remain as to why the cathedral was destroyed at the precise 
time and in the precise manner that it was, and whether anyone is legally or morally 
culpable for the destruction. And here one might cite the pilots' pulling of the trigger, the 
Allied commanders' issuance of orders, the temperature resistance of various building 
materials, the technician who pulled an overnight shift after detecting a problem with the 
bomb-release mechanisms of several planes, or various of Hitler's strategic decisions that 
left the city without sufficient air defenses to ward off the attack. All of these, it seems to 
me, are perfectly good explanations for the destruction of the cathedral given the right 
explanatory context (i.e., they are all good answers to the questions “what caused the 
destruction of the cathedral in Dresden?” or “why was the cathedral in Dresden 
destroyed?”).  
Perhaps this set of explanations is in some way metaphysically “privileged” over 
explanations involving flying kangaroos, and perhaps not. But importantly, it seems to me 
it would be difficult to maintain that any of the above explanations are metaphysically 
privileged over the others in the set, such that we could say, for example, that the historian's 
focus on who gave what orders is somehow less metaphysically accurate than the architect's 
concern with design features of the cathedral. I contend that once we move beyond the 
realm of everyday, informal causal ascriptions (e.g., “the cathedral was destroyed because 





explanations, there will be some class of dependencies—things we might have manipulated 
in order to change the outcome—that share roughly comparable, and significant, degrees 
of metaphysical respectability. And as we will see in the next chapter, this dynamic holds 






 CHAPTER 2: EXPLANATION AND BIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the implications of the account of causation and explanation 
developed in Chapter 1 for the study of biological development. I will argue that, based on 
the account of causation and explanation I have offered, it is theoretically baseless—if not 
outright incoherent—to describe the emergence of a particular trait—psychological or 
otherwise—in a particular individual as “caused more by genetic than environmental 
factors” or “more genetically than environmentally determined.” As with the bombing of 
Dresden, our everyday causal talk tends to uncritically accept explanations for 
developmental outcomes that appeal to genes as “critical” or “preponderant” causes. But, 
again as with the Dresden bombing case, I wish to argue that such naïve appeals to genes 
as causes mask considerable causal complexity inherent in biological development, and 
rely on an oversimplified notion of causal explanation. A close examination of the details 
reveals the same sort of complicated causal story—and attendant context-dependence of 
the appropriateness of various explanations—as we saw in the case of the Dresden 
bombing.  
This is a claim about the causal metaphysics of organismal development. However, 
in spite of the causal parity between genetic and extra-genetic factors in development, I 
argue that in many cases citing genetic factors (to the exclusion of environmental ones) can 





the best explanation for a particular trait. Nevertheless, given the kind of complexity we 
are likely to observe in biological systems, calling a trait “genetic” will often obscure rather 
than illuminate the causal structure of developmental processes. As an alternative, I suggest 
that a mechanistic approach (which need not identify uniquely influential causes or 
apportion causal responsibility) will supply superior explanations for many phenomena of 
biological development, though again this “superiority” is defeasible in that it will not 
necessarily hold in all explanatory contexts. 
It’s important to note at the outset that my remarks about genes and development 
in this chapter are restricted to the development of biological—as opposed to 
psychological—traits; Chapter 3 takes up the latter. (Some may balk at the idea that there 
is a clear distinction between the two types of traits, but I will present arguments in the 
ensuing chapters that not only can such a distinction be drawn, but that drawing it is 
essential to making sense of the explanatory practices of those studying biological and 
psychological development.) 
2.2 Explanation and complexity in biology 
Let’s begin by reviewing the kinds of causal scenarios covered in the last chapter 
that demonstrate the independence of production and dependence as types of causation, as 
well as the need to include both in our explanatory repertoire. There is production without 
dependence when Billy and Suzy both launch their rocks at a bottle but Suzy’s gets there 
first (overdetermination). Likewise, there is dependence without production when Billy 





Importantly, the kinds of problems for both dependence and production approaches to 
causation revealed by the exploits of Billy and Suzy do not arise only in the rarefied air of 
philosophical discourse, populated by known counterexample-philes. Rather, these same 
issues arise in many genuine cases of scientific investigation and explanation, particularly 
in areas highly germane to the project of this dissertation, viz., gene expression in 
biological systems. Two examples will illustrate. 
Overdetermination occurs in cases of genetic redundancy and robustness. One of 
the most powerful methods in the toolkit of molecular geneticists is the “knockout (KO) 
experiment,” which involves inactivating (one or both copies of) a gene and observing the 
phenotypic outcomes. Thus, KO experiments allow us to determine the functions 
performed by particular genes by showing us what happens when they are prevented from 
performing those functions.1 Varying degrees of developmental disruption (including 
death) are observed in KO experiments, but in some cases there appear to be no phenotypic 
differences at all.2 This could simply mean that the knocked-out gene simply has no 
appreciable effect, except that in many such cases, specific functions (often important ones) 
for the relevant proteins have already been established on independent grounds. It turns out 
that biological systems can often compensate for an inactivated gene in a variety of ways. 
Sometimes there are simply redundant copies of the same gene that become active when 
                                                 
1In speaking of the “functions” of a gene, I do not mean to endorse the idea of evolutionarily proper functions 
of the sort defended by Millikan (1989); I have in mind, rather, causal-role functions in Cummins’ (1975) 
sense. 
2There is some disagreement concerning just how robust developmental pathways can be in the face of a 
gene knockout. And clearly, if we individuate our events very finely, it will not be the case that the 
developmental outcomes arising from activation of the “backup” genetic pathway are “the same” as if the 
primary pathway had performed its function. I’m assuming that there’s an explanatorily interesting degree 
of abstraction at which the outcome does not depend on the particular (primary) genetic factor initially 





one is knocked out, but sometimes the gene is embedded in a complex network of 
mechanisms that allow for the same output to be produced even if the primary pathway is 
disrupted (Greenspan, 2001). These sorts of causal networks, which are ubiquitous in 
biology (Edelman & Gally, 2001), exhibit a form of overdetermination: in most cases a 
specific gene initiates a causal sequence that eventuates in a particular phenotypic outcome, 
but if this gene is inactivated, a different causal sequence will be initiated that produces the 
same result. So even if we have identified a causal chain from gene to phenotype, it may 
not be the case that the phenotypic outcome counterfactually depends on the activity of that 
gene. 
A real-life case of double prevention can be found in the metabolization of lactose 
by E. coli. Francois Jacob and Jacques Monod (1961; see also Morange, 1994, Chapter 13) 
first modeled the mechanism by which the metabolization of lactose in E. coli takes place. 
According to the Jacob and Monod model, the metabolization of lactose occurs via the 
activities of a trio of enzymes (which are coded for by structural genes3 known as lacZ, 
lacY, and lacA) that are produced by E. coli only when lactose is present. Under ordinary 
circumstances (i.e., when lactose is absent), a protein present in the E. coli nucleus binds 
to the regions of DNA containing lacZ, lacY, and lacA, thereby repressing or inhibiting the 
activity of these three genes. This protein is therefore called a repressor protein. In lactose-
rich environments, however, allolactose (an isomer of lactose also present in such 
environments) binds to the repressor protein and prevents it from performing its usual 
                                                 
3Genes can be separated into two types: structural genes and regulatory genes. Regulatory genes code for 
elements (proteins or RNA) that themselves regulate the expression of other genes. All other genes (e.g., 





inhibitory role. When the usual inhibitory activity of the repressor protein is disrupted by 
the allolactose molecules, the structural genes (lacZ, lacY, and lacA) that produce the 
lactose-metabolizing enzymes become active, synthesizing the appropriate enzymes and 
enabling the metabolization of lactose.  
Now, suppose we are interested in explaining the presence of the lactose-
metabolizing enzymes. Their presence owes to the fact that the repressor protein is no 
longer serving as a preventative agent, because the repressor protein is itself prevented 
from acting in a preventative role. Hence: double prevention.4 The upshot is that while 
explaining the presence of the metabolizing enzymes seems to require citing the presence 
of allolactose, there is no spatiotemporally-continuous chain linking the allolactose 
molecules to the synthesis of the amino acids that make up the enzymes. 
There are two lessons I think we should draw from these two examples. The first is 
that, as Mitchell (2009) has emphasized, biological systems are complex in a way that 
complicates, if not precludes, traditional causal thinking (Mitchell stresses this particularly 
in relation to examples of genetic robustness). Much of the importance of this point will 
emerge in later chapters.  
The second lesson is that in cellular biology, just as in philosophical thought 
experiments, sometimes thinking of causal relations strictly in terms of dependence or 
strictly in terms of production fails to capture the relevant aspects of the causal structure 
of the phenomena we investigate. Again, this result would be deeply problematic if we 
                                                 
4 If it helps, here are the equivalencies between the present example and the case of Billy and Suzy the fighter 
pilots: presence of metabolizing enzymes = Suzy’s bombing; repressor protein = Enemy; presence of 





were inclined to think that all causal explanation must fit a singular mold. But given a 
pluralistic and context-dependent conceptualization of causal explanation, this is precisely 
what we should expect. And fortunately, we have at our disposal an explanatory strategy 
(the mechanistic approach) that allows us to incorporate both of these types of causal 
relation into an integrated description of how and why the observed phenomenon arises. 
2.3 The mechanistic approach to explanation 
The mechanistic approach to explanation bears some relation to the causal process 
view of causation (Dowe, 1992; Salmon, 1984), in that it focuses on the processes by which 
phenomena are produced. Despite this similarity, the mechanistic approach contains 
distinct advantages that enhance its suitability for the purposes of analyzing biological 
phenomena  
The first advantage that mechanistic analysis brings over the causal process view is 
that mechanistic explanations need not satisfy Salmon’s strict constraint of spatiotemporal 
continuity. Thus while it is doubtful that Salmon’s or Dowe’s views could account for the 
explanatory relevance of allolactose to the presence of lactose-synthesizing enzymes in E. 
coli (since there is a break in spatiotemporal continuity between the former and the latter, 
just as there is a break between Billy’s firing and Suzy’s bombing), a mechanistic analysis 
of the phenomenon can simply incorporate the complete sequence of events beginning with 
the binding of allolactose molecules to the repressor protein and ending with the presence 





 Secondly, while there are some variations of the mechanistic approach that are 
couched in causal terms (e.g., Glennan, 1996), the mechanistic strategy can be fruitfully 
pursued even if it is not construed as a theory of causation, as has been demonstrated by 
Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000; henceforth MDC). Rather than seeking to identify 
particular elements as causes of a particular phenomenon, the mechanistic strategy in the 
MDC tradition explains phenomena by describing the activities of the components of a 
mechanism from start to finish (where “finish” means, roughly, the emergence of the 
phenomenon of interest). This flexibility with causal analysis makes the mechanistic 
approach particularly well-suited to explaining double-prevention phenomena like the 
metabolization of lactose—more so than similar “productive” views that are couched in 
explicitly causal terms. An approach (like that of Salmon or Dowe) that ties explanation to 
causal analysis in terms of spatiotemporally continuous processes forces us to rule out the 
activity of the allolactose. Since the mechanistic approach is not concerned with separating 
causes from non-causes, however, it faces no difficulty in including the activity of 
allolactose in its explanation of the phenomenon. The mechanistic approach gives us the 
freedom and flexibility to include in our model those entities and activities that seem 
important for our understanding of how the phenomenon comes about.  
An immediate worry one might have about the mechanistic approach to explanation 
is that insofar as the mechanistic approach merely describes the events that lead up to the 
phenomenon of interest, this approach cannot be explanatory at all. That is, one might insist 
that describing events is one thing, and explaining them quite another. However, this worry 





explanation is to specify the explanandum—the phenomenon of interest—at the outset. 
This ensures that the explanans (the entities and activities that produce the phenomenon) 
differs from the explanandum, and so a mechanistic explanation is not a mere redescription 
of the phenomenon to be explained.  
Secondly, I would argue that any philosophical theory of explanation must be 
grounded in actual scientific practice (cf. Craver, 2007). In particular, absent evidence to 
the contrary, we should assume that scientists working in a particular domain do in fact 
provide explanations for the phenomena they investigate, and that the things that they treat 
as explanations actually do constitute explanations. And as MDC point out, attention to the 
explanatory practices of cellular and molecular biology reveals that explanation in these 
domains very often, if not always, proceeds via the modeling of mechanisms. Thus, we 
have good reason to believe—and little reason to doubt—that the mechanistic strategy 
provides us with good scientific explanations, at least within the context of the explanatory 
projects with which many biologists routinely concern themselves. 
2.4 Causation, explanation, and context in biological development 
In this section I expand the discussion of pursuing explanation in the face of 
complex biological systems, and I further develop the argument that traditional causal 
analysis is unsuitable for many explanatory contexts in the study of development, and that 
mechanistic approaches offer a promising strategy for meeting the explanatory needs of 





2.4.1  Context matters 
Let’s begin with some general observations about the role of context in explaining 
biological traits. I demonstrated in Chapter 1 how the bombing of Dresden Cathedral 
admits of multiple causal explanations, depending on what explanatory question is being 
asked. Now consider the project of explaining why humans have two eyes at the front of 
the head. As with the Dresden case, ordinary language allows for some imprecision: for 
casual observers it is perhaps sufficient to say that humans have two eyes “because of the 
genes they carry.” And this informal explanation is fine as far as it goes, but note that it 
leaves out a great deal about which genes are causally relevant to the building of eyes as 
well as how they do it and what we might do to manipulate the outcome. So we might 
reasonably expect a genuine scientific consideration of the question to demand more. And 
here again, the appropriateness of different explanations will depend on precisely what 
question is being asked and for what purpose.  
The reason for this interest-relativity is that, as we saw in the previous chapter, 
seemingly-innocuous “why” questions can exhibit considerable ambiguity insofar as they 
are consistent with multiple sets of presuppositions and multiple contrast classes. Cowie 
(1998) provides a useful illustration: a geneticist might seek to explain why humans 
typically have two eyes—rather than eight—by appealing to the genetic differences 
between humans and jumping spiders, and to explain why these eyes are on the front of the 
head—rather than on the sides or back—by appealing to the genetic differences between 
humans and birds. An epidemiologist, in contrast, might seek to explain why humans 





elongated eyes towards the side of the face that are characteristic of fetal alcohol 
syndrome—by appealing to the (usual) absence of alcohol from the prenatal environment. 
Again, neither of these explanations seems metaphysically privileged—neither researcher 
is necessarily “missing” something about the causal structure of development—it is simply 
that the researchers are engaged in different projects and asking different questions (more 
specifically, their questions presuppose different background conditions and hence include 
different contrast classes).  
2.4.2  Causal analysis and gene-environment interaction5 
As a further example, I present below a series of discoveries concerning the 
development of sexual behavior in male rats. As we will see, the interplay between genetic 
and extra-genetic factors in this instance is quite complex, in such a way as to frustrate 
attempts to apportion causal responsibility to genes and environment. However, by 
presentation of this example I do not mean to suggest that all cases of biological 
development are similarly resistant to simple causal analysis—many are plausibly not. 
Rather, I present the example as a sort of illustrative worst-case scenario: to the extent that 
biological development turns out to be like this in general (and I will comment below on 
how prevalent this sort of developmental story is likely to be), the general utility of 
apportioning causal responsibility to genes and environments in the explanation of 
biological traits will be minimal. 
                                                 
5 The term “gene-environment interaction” here is intended in the everyday sense of causal interaction, not 
the sense of statistical interaction between genetic and non-genetic variance that arises in quantitative 





Developmental psychobiologist Celia Moore has provided insight into the complex 
interplay of genotypes and environments in laboratory rats (C. L. Moore, 1984, 1992). 
Mother rats routinely engage in licking of the genital areas of their pups, and the amount 
of licking provided has been shown to vary with the levels of various hormones secreted 
by the pups. Thus, insofar as the amount of maternal licking is an environmental stimulus, 
different pups within the same litter can be exposed to substantially different environments. 
The important thing to notice is that the nature of the environmental conditions depends on 
variable genetic factors: the neonatal environment a pup experiences depends on the 
activity of its genes (i.e., the amount of licking a pup receives varies with the degree to 
which the genes that control its hormone levels are expressed). (Even these genetic factors 
are not, of course, free from extra-genetic influence; pups gestated by mothers in a 
crowded, stressful environment exhibit diminished expression of the relevant hormone-
controlling genes, and thus elicit less maternal licking by adoptive mothers than do 
controls.)  
These environmental differences—differences in levels of maternal licking—are 
associated with differences in a wide range of behaviors in pups, many persisting into 
adulthood. One notable finding is that gene expression in the spinal cord of male pups is 
substantially influenced by levels of maternal licking, and the ability to perform various 
sexual behaviors in adulthood depends on proper development of spinal cord nuclei. Thus, 
male pups who receive inadequate amounts of licking show a variety of abnormal sex 





How should we classify the development of sexual behavior in male rats? Is it 
genetically-caused or environmentally-caused? As a first pass at answering this question, 
we can approach the problem by specifying the causal relationships among the different 
aspects of development, and analyzing them according to the manipulability approach 
described Chapter 1. Here we have a causal system comprising five variables: the prenatal 
environment (P); genes that regulate production of hormones that elicit maternal licking 
(H); maternal licking (M); genes controlling development of spinal cord nuclei (N); and 
finally sexual behavior in maturity (S). For simplicity’s sake, let us assume that each 
variable has only two values (stressful or not for the prenatal environment, on or off for the 
genes, present or absent for licking and for normal sexual behavior). Of course the 
relationships among these variables are, in reality, more nuanced, but the basic causal 
structure shown Figure 2.1 below still holds. Our graph looks like this (for clarity, the 
genetic variables appear in boxes, the environmental variables are encircled, and the 
behavioral outcome is in regular type): 
 
Figure 2.1: Causal model of rat pup development 
 
In pursuing a Woodward-style analysis of the system, we can begin by inquiring as 
to the outcomes of performing interventions upon the different variables. Suppose we 
intervene upon N (disrupting gene expression in the developing spinal cord of a normal 





male pup). As a result of this intervention, the pup displays abnormal sexual behavior. 
Hence, N counts as a cause of S, so perhaps we should count sexual behavior as a “genetic” 
trait, since we have identified a direct causal relationship between a genetic factor and a 
trait of the organism. 
The problem with this suggestion is that N, while representing a genetic factor, is 
directly caused by an environmental variable (maternal licking); this relationship can be 
ascertained by imagining an intervention on M, which would change the value of N (licking 
causes gene expression in the spinal cord). Furthermore, this sort of pattern (whereby 
environmental stimuli trigger gene expression that yields physiochemical changes) is 
rampant in biology. To cite but a few examples, the effects of exercise on physiological 
systems are mediated by the expression of genes that effect adaptational changes (e.g., 
running long distances triggers expression of genes that build additional capillaries to carry 
blood to muscles in the legs), as are the effects of stressful situations on the body’s response 
to future stresses (see, e.g., Sabban & Kvetňanský, 2001). And, in a recent finding, Tung 
et al. (2012) identified a series of genes that wreak long-term changes to the immune 
systems of macaques (e.g., causing chronic generalized inflammation) in direct response 
to being introduced to a new social group (and hence occupying the lowest rung of that 
group’s hierarchy).  
It seems safe to say that none of the traits identified above (capillarization optimized 
for endurance running, responses to stressors that emerge late in life and are contingent on 
past stressors, and chronic inflammation) should receive unqualified classifications as 





make a difference to the emergence of the trait by performing interventions on the genome 
after the environmental stimulus has occurred but before the trait has emerged. Thus, it 
cannot be the case that any time genes are a proximal cause of the emergence of a trait, the 
trait is (uniquely) genetically caused. Rather, as these examples demonstrate, when the 
gene expression that causes the emergence of a trait is itself caused by environmental 
stimuli, labeling the trait “genetic” obscures, rather than illuminates, what seem to be the 
relevant features of the trait’s causal etiology.  
Now let us consider H and M. Can either of these be given a privileged explanatory 
role? Both intuitively and formally, the answer seems to be no. Intuitively, the presence of 
the environmental factor, maternal licking (M), depends on the presence of particular 
genetic factors for hormone secretion (H) (this is in contrast to other environmental stimuli, 
such as the presence of oxygen, water, or predators, which the organism has no role in 
creating), and the influence of genes on S is mediated by an environmental factor (M). And 
if we consider making interventions in the system, we see that with respect to the value of 
S, intervening on H and intervening on M yields precisely the same result.6 Thus, it appears 
that applying a manipulationist causal framework to this system simply cannot identify any 
of the variables—genetic or environmental—as a privileged cause of the behavioral 
outcome S. The upshot is that in cases of this sort there is no way to escape causal parity 
between genotype and environment when the detailed developmental story is considered. 
                                                 
6 I am ignoring certain subtleties here regarding the individuation of events (or variables or states of affairs—
whatever are considered to be the causal relata). The precise behaviors exhibited by rats subject to 






Here we can see the utility of the mechanistic approach to explanation for 
application to this sort of case. A mechanistic analysis of the present case would include 
not only a linear sequence of causally-relevant variables, but also an account of how these 
components interact: if effect, this amounts to “filling in” the arrows of the above diagram 
(which merely indicate causal relevance) with descriptions of the activities enacted by the 
relevant entities. Again, mechanistic analysis need not be causal analysis in the sense of 
enumerating the causal antecedents of an event and/or singling out one cause as a 
metaphysically privileged “critical” cause. Characterizing the mechanism by which rat 
pups come to exhibit particular sexual behaviors makes no requirement that we distinguish 
between causes and non-causes, let alone that we single out a particular cause as the cause. 
Rather, the mechanistic approach licenses us to describe in detail how the components of 
the developmental system—broadly construed—interact with one another, just as I have 
done above. Such a mechanistic description of the system, it seems to me, constitutes a far 
better explanation of the phenomenon than we are likely to get by attempting to apportion 
causal responsibility to the different components of the system.  
Again, however, the superiority of the mechanistic story does not hold in an 
absolute sense, since the appropriateness of any explanation is governed by features of the 
explanatory context. But nevertheless there are several reasons why it seems legitimate to 
consider the mechanistic story a superior explanation most of the time. First, recall that I 
have characterized explanation as largely a matter of facilitating understanding. It seems 
clear that one who knows not just which genetic variables and which environmental 





components interact, understands the rats’ development more fully, and is also better 
poised to make sense of the pattern of experimental results (e.g., the long-range dependence 
of sexual behavior on prenatal environment). Second, knowing the mechanistic details of 
this developmental process affords a wider range of prospects for manipulation and control. 
So while a mechanistic explanation of the rats’ development is perhaps not 
inherently superior to labeling the traits “genetic” or “environmental,” it seems safe to say 
that the mechanistic approach provides distinct advantages in what are quite likely to be 
the most common explanatory contexts. Thus, it remains the case that whether something 
counts as “genetically caused” is, strictly speaking, a matter of the explanatory context—
in this case, how much we are “zooming in” on the mechanistic details or abstracting away 
from such details (i.e., “holding them fixed”) to consider more course-grained facts about 
associations between, e.g., particular alleles and particular eye colors. But nevertheless, we 
can still say that for a great many (perhaps most) explanatory purposes in the context of 
developmental biology, we are better off not trying to apportion causal responsibility. 
Rather, it seems our biggest explanatory payoff will come from detailed mechanistic 
accounts of the entities and activities that produce the phenomenon. In effect, the ontic 
nature of developmental processes—as complex, mutually-influencing systems—fixes the 






2.5 The fate of “genetic” traits 
For all I have said about the futility of attempting to partition genetic and 
environmental causes of development, and of labeling the outcomes of complex, interactive 
developmental processes as “genetic traits,” I acknowledge it would be a black mark on an 
account of explanation in biological development that it precluded such common-sense 
truisms as eye color is a genetic trait in humans. We should therefore see what can be said 
within the present framework by way of accommodating these sorts of statements. 
2.5.1  Some traits are genetic (in most contexts) 
To begin, it’s worth pointing out that at some level of analysis, every instance of 
biological development—including eye color—will exhibit a kind of causal parity between 
genetic and extra-genetic factors. This is more than the well-worn point that every trait 
results from both genes and the environment, which often amounts to nothing more than 
the claim that the presence of some-or-other genetic or environmental conditions is 
necessary for trait development. Rather, I am here pointing out that by “zooming in” far 
enough on the details of biological development—by attending to the ways that nucleotide 
strings and protein molecules interact with cellular machinery, the mechanisms regulating 
gene expression, and so forth—we will reach a point where genetic factors (i.e., DNA 
strands) and extra-genetic ones are simply interacting and mutually-influencing 
components of a complex causal system. So at some level of analysis even eye color will 
have a causal story resembling that of sexual behavior in rats, and there may well be 





Is this sufficient to rule out classifying eye color as a genetic trait? It depends how 
the claim is interpreted. If the claim eye color is a genetic trait is interpreted as a claim that 
those causal antecedents of eye color that reside within the genome occupy some sort of 
metaphysically privileged place in the causal etiology of the trait, then I think the claim is 
simply false, for all the reasons laid out in the previous chapter and in this one. But this 
does not mean that the claim, interpreted more weakly, is explanatorily illegitimate; indeed, 
as should be clear from the preceding discussion, I think that the search for such 
“metaphysically privileged” causes anywhere in science is a fool’s errand and presents too 
high a standard for explanation.  
The lessons learned in the Dresden case will apply here as well. Denying that the 
metaphysics of causality specify a unique cause for any event (since there will be multiple 
variables upon which any event counterfactually depends—or alternatively, multiple 
interventions that would have modified the outcome, à la Woodward), does not mean 
anything goes. To say that within a certain range the choice of which causal factor to cite 
as the explanation of a given phenomenon is a pragmatic one is not the same as saying the 
choice is arbitrary and/or completely relative. In other words, choices of explanatory 
contexts are subject to some degree of rational criticism. And this cuts both ways: while 
someone who declares that sexual behavior in rats is genetic is clearly missing something, 
we can similarly point out that someone who insists that blue eyes cannot be said to be 
genetically caused—because the HERC2 gene must interact with non-genetic elements in 
order to influence eye pigment—is being obtuse (even if the claims of both these 





The claim about metaphysical parity among an event’s causes defended throughout 
the last two chapters is a pretty weak one: there will be more than one possible causal 
explanation for any given event, among which we must choose on pragmatic grounds. But 
while the constraints are ultimately pragmatic—i.e., dependent on the explanatory 
context—there is likely to be large overlap in the pragmatic features governing the 
appropriateness of different explanations on different occasions, and this will be truer of 
some causal relations than of others. In other words, and to apply the point to the present 
case, it's quite plausible that many of us will go through our entire lives without ever setting 
foot in an explanatory context in which facts about a creature's genotype do not constitute 
a good explanation for its eye color (or indeed, in which it makes more sense to describe 
an ignition as being caused by the presence of oxygen than by the striking of a match). But 
this does not, again, metaphysically privilege these explanations. 
So is eye color “caused by the genes”? Yes, if only in the minimal sense that genes 
are among the causal antecedents of an individual's eye color being what it is. But by the 
same token, strictly speaking eye color is caused by environments as well (in particular, by 
extra-genotypic factors within the developing organism, with which DNA segments 
causally interact), and there may well be contexts (e.g., among scientists studying the 
molecular and cellular mechanisms by which the iris comes to have a particular melanin 
concentration) in which these factors constitute the most salient causal antecedent to an 
individual's eye color. But for most everyday as well as scientific purposes, it will be 





if it is still inappropriate to say that their eye color was caused more by their genes than by 
any environmental (extra-genotypic) factors. 
2.5.2  How do we tell which traits are genetic? 
We have looked at different sorts of cases in biological development, and I have 
concluded that sometimes it is legitimate to give an explanation for a trait couched in 
genetic terms (eye color), and sometimes it is illegitimate (sexual behavior in male rats). 
How are we to tell one case from the other? 
My view on this is that since the legitimacy of an explanation is determined by the 
explanatory context, which is in turn determined by our explanatory interests, there is little 
that can be said in general by way of an answer to the question of how to tell if a trait can 
be “legitimately” described as a genetic one—our explanatory interests, again, vary 
substantially from case to case and it’s not clear that this variation is particularly 
systematic. But, very roughly speaking, we can say that when a trait is like eye color, in 
that there is a (relatively) direct causal path from genotype to phenotype, and where the 
link between genotype and phenotype is (to use Woodward’s term) invariant across a wide 
range of environmental conditions that are of interest to us, then the trait is, all else equal, 
a good candidate for being described as “genetic.” Traits that are more like the rat pups, 
where these conditions do not hold, we are better off foreswearing the “genetic” label. 
Now, just how these two types of traits, and the multitude of cases that would fall 
intermediate between them, are distributed in nature is a wide open empirical question and 





Systems Theory” (DST) in biology (Gottlieb, 1995; Gray, 1992; Meaney, 2001b; Oyama, 
Griffiths, & Gray, 2003; Oyama, 2000) are fond of citing cases like the rat pups and 
declaring that the notion of a “genetic trait” is hopeless; others point out that relatively few 
such cases have been discovered and described in detail, and argue that a few examples of 
interestingly complex developmental processes do not undermine the common scientific 
practice of studying development under the assumption that genes are, for all practical 
purposes, relatively self-contained and independent causal factors (Sesardic, 2005). 
Despite the rhetorical posturing on this issue, it seems clear that we are nowhere 
near being in a position to say very much about the epistemic question at hand—our 
understanding of biological development lacks the degree of breadth and detail that would 
be required to start sorting developmental processes into “rat pup” and “eye color” bins 
and then counting the results. But a few remarks can be made. One is that developmental 
systems researchers like Celia Moore (of rat pup fame) and Gilbert Gottleib (1991) have 
certainly enhanced our understanding of particular developmental processes and modes of 
coaction between genes and environments through detailed experimental work. Hence, 
DST’s embrace of causal parity in epigenesis seems, at worst, one of several successful 
research paradigms in biology.  
Another point is that interactive systems like those observed in the rat pups may 
turn out to be much more prevalent than we would have thought, because as it turns out 
such systems are often quite good at hide-and-seek. Many cases of mutual causal influence 
among genes and environments reflect highly stable relationships, with developmental 





environments for themselves as of similar genes building similar traits (a phenomenon 
sometimes known as “niche construction”). Thus, there may well be any number of 
“relevant” environmental variables (i.e., variables that, if manipulated, would make a 
difference to developmental outcomes) that exhibit almost zero actual variation in natural 
environments, but this only because the genotypes of the organisms have a hand in fixing 
the values of these environmental variables. For instance, it is unclear how much actual 
variation exists in natural populations of rats vis-à-vis maternal licking, but even if there 
were none (because of the absence of variation among pups in the genes that stimulate 
licking), our understanding of the development of the male rats’ sexual behavior would be 
significantly impoverished if no one had ever thought to investigate the relevance of 
maternal behavior, and the trait were simply labeled “genetic.” The lesson to be learned 
here is that the absence of “natural” variation in a population—and even a strong 
correlation of particular genes with universally-manifested traits (as discovered through 
experimental manipulations)—does not necessarily mean that the trait is best classified as 
“genetic” (e.g., on the analogy with eye color). Detailed experimental work is needed to 
uncover the relevant mechanisms.7  
Finally, as several psychologists and philosophers have pointed out (Griffiths & 
Machery, 2008; D. S. Moore, 2008), many of the ways in which genes and environments 
influence one another are subtle and often non-obvious (though they might make sense in 
                                                 
7 Clearly this point can be pressed too far if one insists—no matter the available evidence—that labeling a 
trait “genetic” is illegitimate (or at least premature) because some heretofore unconsidered environmental 
variable may be playing a role. However, once the developmental mechanisms have been explored 
experimentally and reasonable attempts to detect gene-environment interactions have been made, the case 





hindsight). For example, the posture of a mother rat while nursing her young (prone or 
arch-backed) turns out to have dramatic effects on the expression of genes regulating 
various aspects of the pups’ neural development, which in turn influence a number of adult 
behaviors (Meaney, 2001a). Thus, it is easy to see how we might mistakenly think that 
once we have observed a consistent relationship between a genotype and phenotype, 
invariant across manipulations of a number of the more intuitively plausible environmental 
variables, we could conclude that the emergence of the trait given the genotype is invariant 
across all but the most ancillary background conditions. As the preceding examples show, 
however, we may well have significantly underestimated the pervasiveness of the sorts of 
complex gene-environment interplay that frustrate attempts to identify genes that serve as 
explanatorily privileged causes. 
To summarize the points raised in this section: we can, in principle, distinguish 
between traits that are “genetic” and those that aren’t (though the difference, being rooted 
in pragmatic considerations, may seem unduly unprincipled to some). However, we may 
not be in a position to say which is which for a great many traits of interest (and moreover, 
at this point it’s difficult even to guess at the relative frequencies of tractable cases like eye 
color versus more unruly ones like the rat pups). These considerations, I think, recommend 
a general policy of caution and an openness to revision in the application of the label 
“genetic” to biological traits, but nonetheless we can, sometimes at least, legitimately 





 CHAPTER 3: INNATENESS IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE 
3.1 Introduction: aims and approach 
The notion of innateness is thought to play a crucial role in a number of well-
developed theories in cognitive science, but there is no consensus on the matter of what 
innateness is. In other words, cognitive scientists—especially developmental psychologists 
and linguists—routinely claim that certain features1 of the mind are innate, but it is not 
immediately apparent what these claims amount to. There are a number of proposed 
analyses of innateness on offer, but again, no consensus on which of these theories—if 
any—best captures the use of the term in nativist research programs in cognitive science. 
Thus, cognitive science (and the philosophy thereof) are in need of a theory of just what 
we commit ourselves to when we describe some psychological trait as innate.  
This chapter aims to provide such a theory. My approach takes for granted that the 
notion of innateness performs some explanatory work in contemporary psychological 
theory (as its practitioners clearly believe), and so I will seek to discover what innateness 
claims amount to by looking at how the concept is employed in the explanatory projects of 
mainstream cognitive science. I conclude that the best analysis of innateness as an 
explanatory concept in cognitive science can be found in a family of views that count innate 
                                                 
1 Since a precise account of what sorts of mental entities are potential satisfiers of the predicate “x is innate,” 
is beyond the scope of this chapter, I will employ—interchangeably—a variety of catch-all terms: 
cognitive/psychological features, traits, structures, and so forth. Here I rely on the reader’s intuitive sense 






traits as those that arise in the absence of certain kinds of information processing on the 
part of the organism. The most prominent recent exemplar of this kind of view is Samuels’ 
(2002) Primitivism account (i.e., innate traits are those that are psychologically primitive). 
The present work defends the general approach exemplified by Samuels’ account, while 
also refining the primitivist theory so as to resolve problems with Samuels’ formulation.  
The account offered in the present chapter should be of interest both to specialists 
in cognitive science and to anyone with an interest in the scientific study of human nature. 
The account is important for three specific reasons. Firstly, my account of innateness 
provides a coherent foundation for the scientific study of human nature. One of the most 
successful research programs in all of cognitive science has been the identification of a 
wide variety of early- and universally-developing human psychological traits (Carey & 
Spelke, 1996; Feigenson, Dehaene, & Spelke, 2004; Landau & Gleitman, 2009; Scholl & 
Leslie, 1999; Spelke & Kinzler, 2007; Wynn, 1998). This research program (referred to 
herein by the broad term “nativist cognitive science,” or, where appropriate, the narrower 
terms “nativist psychology” and “nativist linguistics”) is conceived of by its practitioners 
as the search for human nature, in that it seeks to uncover both that which is distinctively 
human about the human mind, and that which is universally shared among members of our 
species. This research program constitutes our best hope for a scientific account of human 
nature, and understanding human nature therefore requires understanding how innateness 
is understood in nativist research. 
Secondly, even though the account of innateness offered here is confined to 





account of innateness across different scientific fields. This broader account, developed 
throughout the first four chapters of this dissertation, demonstrates that although the 
various phenomena referred to as “innate” across different scientific fields and different 
explanatory contexts are disunified—the term picks out different phenomena in different 
contexts2—each of these phenomena have a legitimate role to play in certain explanatory 
projects. The complete account in which the present work is situated thus makes sense of 
a wide swath of scientific discourse that would otherwise appear inconsistent or 
unintelligible.  
Finally, my account of innateness provides a response to those (e.g., Oyama, 2000) 
who argue that because (as they claim) the notion of genetic determination is incoherent 
(or at least ill-defined), the nativist research program in cognitive science is fundamentally 
misguided. I share much of this skepticism about the idea of genetic determination, but 
importantly, in this chapter I show how the notion of innateness utilized in nativist 
psychology and linguistics can be spelled out without reference to genes or genetic 
determination. Thus, I set nativist cognitive science (i.e., the scientific study of human 
nature) on firm theoretical footing, independent of whether the idea of genetic 
determination can be given a coherent and useful scientific interpretation.  
Here is a road map of the chapter: Section 3.2 lays out some preliminary matters, 
including some assumptions I will be making—but not defending at length—regarding the 
nature of explanation in cognitive science, as well as some constraints on an adequate 
notion of innateness for cognitive science. Section 3.3 sets out the Primitivist account and 
                                                 





refines the version offered by Samuels. Section 3.4 takes a close look at the role played by 
innateness in some actual recent nativist theorizing, specifically the construction of a 
Poverty of the Stimulus Argument for innate syntactic competence, and also analyzes the 
debate that has ensued between nativist and anti-nativist camps about that argument. It is 
in the course of this analysis that I defend the claim that the Primitivist view best captures 
the notion of innateness utilized in cognitive science.  
3.2 Preliminaries 
3.2.1 Assumptions 
 Insofar as my argument is concerned with providing an analysis of 
innateness in cognitive science, it will help to begin by identifying some basic theoretical 
commitments I adopt regarding this branch of science. There is insufficient space here to 
defend these assumptions (though of course I think they can be defended); I lay these out 
primarily because the Primitivist view of innateness I defend is, I think, significantly more 
transparent and more compelling in light of these assumptions.  
 
Assumption 1: Psychology does not reduce to biology (or to physics). 
I adopt a non-reductive view of science, and of psychology in particular. For 
essentially the same reasons originally set out by Fodor (1975), and elaborated by Rey 
(1997), I take it that psychology is a “special science,” in the sense that there are interesting 





are regularities in the behavior of intelligent creatures that could not be satisfactorily 
explained without reference to intentional states. In short, certain phenomena for which we 
desire scientific explanations must be given psychological explanations.  
 
Assumption 2: The “psychological level” is characterized by intentional states. 
I also adopt an account of cognition that takes the intentional or representational 
nature of mental states to be what is distinctive of the psychological level (Harman, 1990; 
Rey, 1997). According to this representational account, phenomena at the psychological 
level are constituted by representational states that are causally efficacious in the behavior 
of the organism.3 Mainstream cognitive science, I take it, is in the business of generating 
scientific explanations by developing theories about the principles that govern the 
functioning of these states and their role in generating behavior. To give a “psychological 
explanation” for something is to explain it by appeal to the representations that constitute 
or cause it. Similarly, a “psychological process” is a process that involves the activity of 
intentional states. 
 
                                                 
3 This should not be taken as an endorsement of the view that non-physical mental substances or properties 
are causally efficacious. Rather, the causal efficacy of mental states is perfectly consistent with those states 
being entirely physical, even if they do not reduce to physiological states. Mental states can be physically 
realized by, for example, computational or connectionist systems (Churchland, 1996; Fodor, 1975; Marr, 
1982; Rey, 1997; Smolensky, 1988). Indeed, much of the description of mental operations throughout this 
paper is couched in computational terms; however, I am entirely agnostic about how best to characterize 
the physical realization of mental states (i.e., in computational or connectionist terms)—any computational 






Assumption 3: Linguistics is a branch of psychology. 
This assumption should be relatively uncontroversial, as it has been a guiding 
assumption for mainstream linguistic theory at least since Chomsky’s Aspects (1965). 
Nevertheless, as there have been some recent challenges to this idea (Devitt, 2008), it is 
worth stating explicitly. Since my case study for the role of innateness in linguistic theory 
is drawn from the literature on language acquisition, it is important to highlight the fact 
that modern linguistic theory (including the study of language acquisition) takes its primary 
task to be the discovery of the representational facts that underlie human linguistic 
competence. Thus, our search for the “psychological notion of innateness” or the “notion 
of innateness used in cognitive science,” is also the search for a notion of innateness for 
linguistic theory.4 
3.2.2 The explananda of innateness claims 
As a further constraint on theories of innateness in cognitive science, I argue that 
innateness claims are aimed at providing individual-level explanations. That is, the primary 
explanatory focus of innateness claims is providing explanations for the emergence of traits 
in individuals. This conception of the explanatory focus of innateness claims conflicts 
with—and if my arguments here are successful, invalidates—the otherwise plausible-
                                                 
4 Interestingly, Chomsky himself has at certain points offered an explication of his views that renders my 
three assumptions inconsistent. That is, he has claimed that the science of linguistics is not committed to 
the existence of mental representations of linguistic entities, which would mean that linguistics is not a 
branch of psychology, if psychology is what I have claimed it to be (the study of representations). 
However, I am employing here what I take to be the “standard” interpretation of Chomskyan linguistics, 
on which the explanations offered for linguistic phenomena are committed to the existence of mental 





sounding idea that what makes something innate is that it is universal among normally-
developing members of a species. My claim about the individual-level explanatory focus 
of innateness claims is grounded in the presumption that whether a trait is innate for a 
creature is a matter of the facts of that creature's development, independent of facts about 
the distribution of traits in the population. I motivate this presumption with the following 
thought experiment. 
Suppose that a human embryo is placed in an incubator that simulates typical 
human gestational conditions and is launched into space. The incubator reaches a 
sufficiently earth-like planet just as the fully-formed infant is ready to emerge. This infant 
therefore exists as a population of one. Could this infant have innate psychological traits? 
It would seem that the standard interpretation of nativist cognitive science is committed to 
an affirmative answer. Several of the more well-known suggestions for innate traits (e.g., 
those involving language and theory of mind) are tricky insofar as they concern phenomena 
that are largely social, so let us consider the proposal that humans have innate beliefs about 
many properties of physical objects (Baillargeon, 2002).5 Could this be true of our infant 
singleton? Suppose it is a fact about the infant that it does not expect solid objects to be 
able to pass through one another. It seems that this infant has innate beliefs about physical 
objects in exactly the same way nativists about intuitive physics usually mean the claim. 
Crucially, we do not need to advert to any facts about the distribution of intuitive physics 
                                                 
5 One might well take a view about belief (e.g., one that takes natural language to be a necessary condition 
for having beliefs) that entails that the representations infants entertain about physical objects do not 





in the infant's population (for there is no such population); if the infant's beliefs are innate, 
they are innate because of intrinsic facts about its development.  
There are construals of the notion of a population that do not require spatial 
contiguity, so one might object to the claim that the infant constitutes a population of one, 
and insist instead that it is a member of some population of humans back on Earth, 
(presumably the one that included its parents). Enter Swampbaby. Swampbaby exists in a 
universe in which humans never evolved, but when lightning strikes the swamp an embryo 
in an incubator spontaneously forms, an embryo that is identical to a typical human one. 
When Swampbaby emerges from the incubator, it has the usual beliefs about physical 
objects. Insofar as one is able to form intuitions about this bizarre scenario, I think it still 
seems right to say that Swampbaby has its beliefs about objects innately.  
Thus it appears that the standard claims about innate characteristics offered in 
nativist cognitive science should be construed as claims about those traits arise in the 
development of individual creatures. 
3.2.3 The explanatory two-step 
Clearly, however, there is a tension between my claim that the proper explananda 
of innateness claims are individual-level phenomena (i.e., instantiations of psychological 
traits in particular individuals) and the idea that innateness claims play a role in a genuine 
scientific research program (nativist psychology and linguistics). For we might suppose 
that whatever “science” is, it fundamentally concerns the identification and explanation of 





that the purpose of their investigations is to explain observed regularities and generalized 
phenomena, such as the fact that the vast majority of human children in a linguistic 
community end up speaking the same language as their parents and each other, and that 
these languages seem to share a common basic structure. If nativist psychology is, as a 
scientific discipline, concerned to provide generalized explanations of pervasive 
regularities, then how can it be true, as I have claimed, that the central claims of nativist 
psychology—that this or that psychological trait is innate—are aimed at such local, 
individualized phenomena as the emergence of particular traits in particular individuals? 
The concern here is that insofar as innateness claims concern extremely localized 
phenomena, they will, even if they are true, be of no more scientific interest than a claim 
about when and why a particular leaf fell from a particular tree. Indeed, we might wonder 
why, if the purpose is to explain individual-level phenomena, nativist psychologists and 
linguists bother to conduct experiments with large samples of individuals! 
We can see how deep this tension goes if we reconsider the motivation for 
advancing the idea that innateness claims are directed at individual-level phenomena in the 
first place, namely the thought experiment provided above. If the lesson drawn from the 
thought experiment—that the very framework in which nativist cognitive scientists work 
is committed to the possibility of innateness claims being true at the individual level—is 
right, then the problem of identifying the proper explananda of innateness claims does not 
arise merely as a quirk of my own pet theory of innateness. Rather, the puzzle arises simply 





Fortunately, however, I think this tension can be resolved. The key is to recognize 
two important points. One is that although claims about individual-level phenomena and 
claims about population-level phenomena are logically independent, there are nevertheless 
evidentiary connections between them in many cases (more on this point in a moment). 
The second point is that we can distinguish between the phenomena that particular 
scientific claims are intended to (and indeed can) explain, and the phenomena that motivate 
scientists to take up their investigations in the first place.  
Consider the case of human language (the lessons will apply equally to other areas 
of nativist cognitive science): surely one reason why linguists have sought to study 
language, and why they utilize the particular tools they do in order to study it, is because it 
is a striking fact that there is so much regularity in human linguistic behavior. Moreover, 
it is evident that if linguistics failed to provide any insight as to why there is so much 
regularity, it would fail to satisfy the intellectual curiosity (or the practical interests, where 
these are involved) of those who study language—indeed, if linguistics provided no insight 
on this question, it is hard to imagine that it would have lasted very long as a research 
program. But, crucially, this is all consistent with the thesis that claims about innateness, 
per se, do not explain these regularities. For it can be true that while the overall explanatory 
itch that linguistics seeks to scratch concerns population-level phenomena, the explanatory 
work done by one of its central concepts (that of innateness) is confined to the individual 
level.  
In other words, the fact that there is such striking regularity in human linguistic 





vicinity, but this does not mean that innateness claims must serve a direct explanatory role 
in explaining those regularities (though as I argue below, they may play an indirect 
explanatory role). We can state, therefore, that innateness claims are made true by the fact 
that individual creatures have the psychological properties that constitute innate traits, but 
they are interesting because, for reasons that make sense in light of our knowledge of 
biology, many members of a given species can be expected to—and manifestly do—share 
precisely these psychological properties. 
This, then, is the explanatory two-step of nativist psychology: we are often 
motivated to investigate questions about the etiology of psychological traits by 
observations of striking regularities among individuals; that is, our explanatory questions 
begin at the population level. We then descend to the individual level to make claims about 
the etiologies of traits that inhere in individuals. Upon devising plausible explanatory 
stories for how traits have arisen in the individuals studied, we combine these stories with 
our knowledge in other areas (e.g., evolutionary biology) to make sense of the population-
level phenomena we began with: our knowledge of biological species and of how evolution 
works suggests that we can expect the individual-level explanations we have devised (those 
that posit innate structures) to be highly conserved within the species and to arise from 
similar processes of biological development. In this way, we can generate satisfying 
explanations for phenomena of interest, even though we remain committed to innateness 
being an individual-level phenomenon. When the explanatory modus operandi of nativist 
cognitive science is seen in this light, we can recognize that nativists’ claims that they are 





correct, insofar as their discoveries of innate traits (in individuals) are generated in the 
overall service of explaining observed regularities.  
3.2.4 A qualification 
Before we proceed, I should note an important qualification to my claim that we 
are searching for the notion of innateness used in cognitive science. As stated, this claim is 
too strong, insofar as it implies that no cognitive scientist would ever have reason to employ 
a notion of innateness other than the one I defend (the Primitivist analysis). For as I argued 
in Chapter 1, scientific explanations are both contrastive and pragmatic: what counts as a 
good explanation in a given circumstance will depend on various features of the context, 
including the explanatory question being asked and the interests of those pursuing the 
explanation (which will combine to determine which alternative outcomes are relevant) 
(Garfinkel, 1981; Van Fraassen, 1980; for specific applications of this idea to innateness 
and related notions, see Birch, 2009; Gannett, 1999; Wendler, 1996). 
Explanations in cognitive science that appeal to innateness will exhibit this same 
context sensitivity; different construals of innateness may well be appropriate in different 
explanatory circumstances even within a single scientific domain. The upshot is that any 
claim about what notion of innateness is appropriate in a given domain will have to be 
qualified to countenance the possibility that particular contextual factors will demand a 
different explanatory focus. Thus I do not wish to claim that I will be identifying the only 
notion of innateness that could ever be of use to cognitive scientists. There may well be 





call for the use of a different notion of innateness. There are too many pragmatic variables 
that go into determining the appropriateness of a particular explanation in a particular 
context for us to rule out, a priori, the possibility that a psychological researcher might have 
occasion to employ a notion of innateness that rests on, say, genetic determination.  
What then of my thesis that purports to identify “the notion of innateness employed 
in cognitive science”? I think that properly qualified, the thesis is still true. I think that most 
mainstream cognitive scientific theorizing takes place in explanatory contexts where 
“innate” can be taken to mean “psychologically primitive.” Moreover, as I demonstrate 
below, the Primitivist account comports extremely well with Poverty of the Stimulus 
arguments. Given that these arguments are one of the most central features of modern 
nativist psychological and linguistic theories, this suggests that Primitivism captures the 
notion of innateness utilized by cognitive science in its “core” or standard explanatory 
contexts.  
3.3 The Primitivist view of innateness 
The Primitivist family of views, again, seeks to capture the notion of innateness 
only as it appears in cognitive science. There are a variety of ways of spelling out the basic 
idea behind Primitivist views, but fundamentally these views hold that psychologically 
innate traits are those that emerge in development without the need to process information 
from the environment. A traditional way of formulating this idea is to suggest that what is 
innate is not learned (learning is, presumably, a way of processing information from the 





or as a result of being taught this by her parents), her belief that water is wet is not innate. 
On the other hand, if it is true that no such learning process is needed for the child to 
understand that solid objects cannot pass through one another (if, for example, the child 
has this belief even prior to any experience with solid objects), then according to this 
approach the belief is innate.  
3.3.1 Samuels and “psychological processes” 
Picking up on this intuitive idea, Samuels (2002) has offered the notion of a 
psychological process to capture the sort of etiology innate traits are supposed to lack. That 
is, according to Samuels innate cognitive traits are psychological structures whose 
emergence cannot be explained by appeal to any psychological process (where again, what 
is distinctive of a psychological process is that it involves representational states). In other 
words, innate psychological traits are those whose acquisition has no psychological 
explanation—they are psychologically primitive (i.e., they exist at the psychological level 
and can play a role in psychological explanations, but in order to explain their presence we 
must appeal to phenomena outside the scope of psychology—presumably biological 
phenomena).  
Returning to the example above, a child’s belief that water is wet is not innate if it 
arises as a result of an inductive generalization (a psychological process) over a series of 
individual experiences with water (i.e., token representations with the content “this water 





with the content “water is wet”).6 The child’s beliefs about the properties of solid objects, 
however, are innate because no such psychological explanation can be given for them—
they arise, let’s suppose, simply as a result of biological maturation in the brain. 
As we’ll see, I think Samuels’ specific formulation of innateness as primitiveness 
has several shortcomings, but it’s worth first defending this notion against an objection 
raised by Mameli and Bateson (2006). The objection is that the idea that innate traits are 
those that have no psychological explanation is unacceptable because it defines innateness 
sociologically. The worry here is that if we define innateness in terms of what “psychology 
explains (or can explain),” then what counts as innate will reflect not only the biological 
and psychological properties of the organism, but also highly contingent facts about the 
sociological organization of science—in particular which researchers, institutions, 
experimental methods, research questions, and so forth are counted as part of 
“psychology.”  
However, the assumptions outlined above in Section 3.2.1—that psychology does 
not reduce to some lower-level area of study (e.g., physiology or physics) and that it studies 
a well-defined (again, non-reducible) kind of phenomenon (mental representation)—
should make it clear why the objection is unfounded. For as I—and, to all appearances, 
Samuels—are using the term, “psychology” does not refer, as Mameli and Bateson assume, 
to the sociological institution typified by university departments with the label 
“psychology,” but to a scientific discipline defined by its interest in a particular kind of 
                                                 
6 Of course it is expected that child would engage in this cognitive process implicitly, rather than explicitly 





phenomenon, that of mental representations. This phenomenon would exist even if there 
had never arisen a specific sociologically-defined scientific field dedicated to studying it, 
and so its status as part of the “furniture of the world,” amenable to scientific study, is 
independent of any particular sociological facts of how we go about studying it. Thus, the 
claim that innate traits are those that are “not explainable by psychology” should be 
understood simply as a claim that a certain kind of natural phenomenon does not feature 
into the causal-etiological explanations of those traits, not as a claim (as Mameli and 
Bateson construe it) that certain kinds of scientists and not others are willing or able to 
explain the traits in question. This objection, therefore, rests on a confusion about the 
central claim of Primitivism. 
While Samuels’ formulation of innateness as primitiveness survives this objection, 
it is subject to other difficulties. Specifically, the notion of a “psychological process” is too 
broad a characterization of the sorts of processes we wish to exclude from the acquisition 
of innate traits. To see this, consider how the psychological/non-psychological distinction 
might be applied to individual perceptual events. A core question in scientific psychology 
is at what point in the perceptual processing stream does something deserving of the term 
“representation” arise? That is, the process of perception is, if nothing else, a process by 
which non-representational sensory activation (e.g., luminance gradients on the retina) is 
used to generate representational states (e.g., a representation of a flower in one’s visual 
field). It is (well) beyond the scope of this chapter to take up the issue of where in the 
processing stream representational content first appears, but the key point is that at some 





there was none. Such a representation (say, of an edge) would be a psychological entity, 
but it would have no psychological explanation; there would be no need to appeal to any 
psychological (i.e., representational) phenomena to explain how the representation was 
acquired—the explanation is couched entirely in physical (or at least physiological) terms.  
Thus, the “no psychological explanation” approach to defining innateness—which 
excludes representations of empirical matters—would therefore seem to count the 
representation of an edge as innate. For even though some of the information used to 
generate the representation is experiential (or empirical, or exogenously provided), the 
edge-y representation still lacks an etiology in psychological processes (i.e., processes 
involving representation). Thus, Samuels’ notion of Primitivism, which again centers on 
the very broad notion of psychological process, yields an unacceptable result: every single 
instance of perception that yields representational content yields an innate psychological 
state! 
3.3.2 An alternative version of Primitivism: the “starting state” hypothesis 
This shortcoming in Samuels’ version of Primitivism—which relies on the notion 
of a psychological process—pushes us in the direction of what I take to be the most 
promising version of the primitivist strategy, namely the idea that innate features of the 
mind constitute a starting state for cognitive systems, i.e., the state of those systems prior 
to their engagement with information from the environment (Gross & Rey, 2012). These 
states need not be temporally initial—the organism may need considerable time to mature 





systems may emerge at different times (so some innate traits might be present at birth, but 
others might not emerge until significantly later). Rather the idea is to identify an initial 
state of a cognitive system that is explanatorily relevant for the project of explaining the 
acquisition of some psychological structure (where “psychological structures” include, for 
example, token concepts, token doxastic representations, and large-scale competences like 
the ability to recognize whether a given linguistic string is consistent with a hypothesized 
grammar). The (innate) starting state of a system is a state of that system that successful 
explanatory projects in the study of cognitive development take as primitive for the purpose 
of explaining how the mature psychological states of the organism emerge from the 
organism’s interactions with its environment. 
To take a simple example, suppose that, as has been suggested, human infants 
innately possess a representations of all the phonemes that might appear in the totality of 
humanly-possible languages, as well as a system for “pruning” this repertoire in response 
to early linguistic experience (e.g., by collapsing phonemic distinctions that do not carry 
meaning in the ambient language). (This theory is meant to account for the fact that all 
infants are sensitive to the difference between, for example, the l and r sounds in English 
or the hard and soft v sounds in Spanish, but (generally speaking) adult Japanese speakers 
cannot perceptually distinguish English l and r, and adult English speakers do not perceive 
the difference between hard and soft Spanish v.) Under the “starting state” idea of 
innateness, what it means to say that the repertoire of phoneme representations and the 
pruning system are innate is that successful explanations of human competence when it 





distinctions at various points in development) operate by assuming the existence of the 
complete representational repertoire and the pruning system, and demonstrating how these 
elements plus early linguistic exposure yields the mature (i.e., “pruned”) repertoire. The 
representations and the pruning system are taken as psychologically primitive in generating 
a satisfactory explanation of an interesting psychological phenomenon, in that they are the 
most fundamental psychological components of that explanation—the remaining 
components of the explanation are either further, non-primitive psychological structures 
(e.g., representations of the phonological and/or semantic properties of incoming linguistic 
strings) or non-psychological elements (such as, perhaps, facts about physical maturation 
of the brain and/or perceptual apparatuses). 
As detailed above, I take the “starting state” approach to the Primitivist account of 
innateness to be the most promising version, given the problems we observed with 
Samuels’ “no psychological process” formulation. Importantly, however, I am more 
interested in establishing the general promise of the Primitivist strategy than with narrowly 
defending any particular version of it. It may well turn out that unforeseen problems will 
doom the “starting state” account I’ve offered, and that the problems noted with Samuels’ 
formulation can be solved, such that the best way of cashing out the promise of Primitivism 
is to move back towards psychological processes as the key theoretical notion. With this 
in mind, I turn now to a discussion of the role of innateness in some of the theories, 
arguments, and debates in contemporary cognitive science. The subsequent analysis will 
generally be couched in terms of the “starting state” version of Primitivism, but will not 





3.4 Case Study: Innateness and the poverty of the stimulus 
What follows is an analysis of nativist theory in action. I scrutinize both an 
argument made by theorists in the nativist tradition in linguistics—in which the notion of 
innateness plays a prominent role—and the debate with anti-nativists that has ensued.7 The 
motivation for proceeding in this fashion is two-fold. First, looking at the ways in which 
innateness figures into how nativist theorists construct an argument—what they take to be 
evidence for what, what they believe follows from the claim that something is innate, and 
their (perhaps implicit) assumptions about how language acquisition occurs—will give us 
insight into what is at the core of the notion of innateness to which practicing researchers 
commit themselves. Second, on the assumption that when theorists in different camps 
argue about whether something is innate, they are arguing about something substantive—
that is, they do in fact have a common notion of innateness in mind and the debates are not 
merely verbal8— looking at what actually underlies a disagreement about innateness 
should give further evidence about what comprises the core of the notion of innateness 
employed—and fought about—in cognitive science.  
 
                                                 
7 The terms nativist and anti-nativist are somewhat infelicitous, in that all sides in these debates must—and 
generally do--countenance a substantial degree of innate cognitive structure in order to explain human 
learning (these debates, as noted by Cowie (1998), are, in many cases at least, probably best understood 
as conflicts regarding the domain-general versus domain-specific nature of learning processes). 
Nevertheless, I’ll stick to the nativist/anti-nativist nomenclature for reasons of familiarity.  
8 It is of course a live possibility that some or all nativist debates will turn out to be merely verbal; 
nevertheless, it seems to me most methodologically expedient to assume that these debates are in fact 






3.4.1 Poverty of the stimulus arguments 
Our case study centers on an exemplar of the well-known family of nativist 
arguments known as poverty of the stimulus arguments (henceforth POSAs), and the loci 
of disagreement surrounding the argument. A few introductory remarks about POSAs are 
in order. As they are typically conceived, POSAs seek to establish some sort of innate 
structure to the mind by emphasizing that the knowledge acquired in some developmental 
process cannot be reached from information available in the environment via general 
learning procedures. While POSAs can be (and are) applied in a broad range of 
psychological-developmental contexts, their most well-known application is in the domain 
of language acquisition, from which our case study is drawn.  
Now, there is some measure of disagreement surrounding just how POSAs are 
supposed to work. Points of disagreement include (inter alia): (i) what conclusions POSAs 
aim to establish; (ii) what conclusions POSAs can establish; and (iii) which premises often 
included in POSAs comprise the “core” of the argument, and which are supplementary or 
are best taken as support for other propositions (which may be theoretically related to, but 
are ultimately distinct from, the conclusions putatively established by the POSA). Thus, 
although reference is often made to “the argument from the poverty of the stimulus,” it is 
not clear whether there is any such unique argument. Nevertheless, following Laurence & 
Margolis (2001, p. 220), I suggest that POSAs can be usefully viewed as series of “related, 
mutually supporting claims” that tend to follow a common inferential structure.  
That there are actually two related but distinct forms of POSA: one (largely) a 





falls into the a posteriori category, but it’s worth first outlining the general contours of the 
a priori version as well. The more a priori arguments tend to emphasize that only negative 
evidence about what structures are not part of the language can be of help to learners in 
particular situations. Specifically, if a learner settles on a grammar that is consistent with 
the sentences she has thus far encountered, but that is ultimately incongruous with the 
correct grammar9, only negative evidence can steer her back towards the correct principles. 
For example, suppose a learner of English forms the hypothesis that expressing a 
grammatical subject is optional, as it is in, say, Spanish (e.g., Ella fue al teatro and Fue al 
teatro are both acceptable ways of saying ‘She went to the theater’). This hypothesis is 
consistent with any sentence of English the learner will have heard. This learner’s 
grammatical competence would count *Went to the theater as a grammatical sentence of 
English, even if she had never heard a construction with a null subject or produced one 
herself. Thus, without negative evidence (i.e., evidence that sentences with a null subject 
are ungrammatical in English), the child will have no way to recover from the mistaken 
hypothesis.  
Negative evidence could take a variety of forms, including spontaneous explicit 
instruction about ungrammatical forms or corrections of children’s ungrammatical 
utterances. But, according to this version of the POSA, such negative evidence is generally 
not available, and so if children arrive at the correct grammar (as they invariably do), then 
innate constraints, again, must have had a hand in preventing the child from settling on a 
mistaken hypothesis about the language. Whether negative evidence is typically available 
                                                 





to language learners is, of course, an empirical matter (this is why this variety of POSA is 
largely a priori). There are those who are more optimistic than Chomsky and his followers 
about the availability of negative evidence (e.g., Cowie, 1998), but proponents of this sort 
of argument emphasize that given the consistency with which children arrive at the correct 
grammar, the appropriate negative evidence must always be available to each learner (and 
for each learning problem that requires it); this seems implausible given the diversity of 
childrearing methods, including differences in adults’ propensity to correct children’s 
ungrammatical utterances (Laurence & Margolis, 2001).  
More generally, a priori POSAs seize on the Goodmanian insight that our 
experiences are consistent with a veritable infinitude of “grue-some” concepts that are 
never even considered. And just as no child learning color words considers the hypothesis 
that the term “green” might mean “green if observed before year 2500 and blue if observed 
thereafter,” there is no evidence that any child considers such hypotheses as that the subject 
of a sentence may be fronted only if the number of words in the sentence is even, or less 
than nine, or any of an infinite number of other bizarre alternatives. The fact that we all 
end up using concepts like “green,” rather than “grue,” and that the variation in human 
languages is but a tiny subset of the infinite number of logically possible languages, 
suggests significant innate constraints on these acquisition processes. 
In contrast, in presenting an a posteriori POSA, linguists studying language 
acquisition will compare what language learners appear to know about some specific 
grammatical feature of the ambient language with what could plausibly (or even possibly) 





are exposed). If learners appear to know more than could be extracted from the available 
data, then it is concluded that some form of innate constraint has guided the learner in 
arriving at the correct grammar. (The next subsection explores in detail a specific example 
of such an argument.)  
It’s important to note that although, again, POSAs concerning language acquisition 
might be considered the arguments’ paradigmatic exemplars, these arguments—
particularly the a posteriori variety—are widely applicable and widely utilized in the study 
of cognitive development. In many cases, the argument is pursued not by claiming that it 
would be impossible for organisms to develop an observed competence with only general-
learning mechanisms, but rather by comparing the sophistication of the competence against 
the timeline of its emergence. It is difficult to deny that certain competences that are present 
literally at birth—such as face recognition in human neonates (Bushneil, Sai, & Mullin, 
1989) or predator recognition among newly-hatched turkeys (Goth, 2001) were not 
acquired by learning. But even when the presence of a competence cannot be established 
quite this early—such as understanding of false beliefs, which appears at least by 15 
months (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005), or understanding of addition and subtraction at 5 
months (Wynn, 1992)—a plausible a posteriori POSA can still be constructed if the 
competence is sufficiently sophisticated that it is unlikely it could have arisen from general-
learning processes (for a series of such arguments, see Spelke, 1994). Thus, a posteriori 
POSAs feature prominently in nativist theorizing throughout cognitive science. What I 






3.4.2 Case study: NP structure and anaphoric use of “one” 
A paradigmatic a posteriori POSA is offered by Lidz, Waxman, and Freedman 
(2003). Lidz et al.’s analysis concerns the structure of noun phrases (NP) and the rules that 
govern the referent of the pronoun one. Consider sentence (1): 
 
(1) I’ll play with this red ball and you can play with that one. 
 
For adults, the referent of one is red ball rather than just ball. But this is only 
possible if red ball is treated as a distinct constituent of the NP the red ball, as can be seen 
in the comparison between two possible structures of NP in Figure 3.1: 
 
Figure 3.1: Hypotheses about the structure of NP 
Let us call the hypothesis that NP has structure (a) (flat structure) H1, and the 
hypothesis that NP has structure (b) (nested structure) H2. Only H2 treats red ball as a 
constituent, and both structures are, as Lidz et al. note, consistent with many sentences of 
English (e.g., The red ball is on the floor). Thus there is a question as to how and when 





in English, and how and when they come to know that one is anaphoric to red ball rather 
than ball (it is assumed that all children do so, as there is no evidence that idiolects differ 
in this respect). 
Lidz et al. investigated whether 18-month-old infants have command of the 
hierarchical structure of NP and the anaphoric properties of one. Infants in the study were 
shown a picture of an object (e.g., a bottle, shoe, or bear) at the same time they were 
presented with a sentence that referred to the object with a determiner phrase that included 
both an adjective and noun (e.g., Look! A yellow bottle.). The infants were then shown a 
picture containing both the original object and another object of the same type but a 
different color (e.g., a yellow bottle along with a blue bottle). Infants in the control group 
heard a neutral phrase (Look! Now what do you see?), while infants in the experimental 
group heard a phrase with an anaphoric use of one (Look! Do you see another one?). Infants 
in the control group looked longer at the novel stimulus, while infants in the experimental 
group looked longer at the familiar stimulus. Previous studies having established (i) that 
infants tend to prefer looking at novel stimuli, all else being equal, and (ii) that infants tend 
to prefer looking at stimuli that match the linguistic input (if such is available), the 
researchers concluded that these 18-month-old infants understood that one is anaphoric to, 
e.g., yellow bottle rather than bottle, which in turn suggests that they have settled on H2 
regarding the structure of NP.  
Lidz et al. also performed a corpus analysis (using databases of child-directed 





structure of NP and the correct referent of one; such data could come, for example, in the 
form of sentence (2) being uttered in a situation in which Max has a blue ball: 
 
(2) Chris has a red ball but Max doesn’t have one. 
 
According to the corpus analysis, sentences like (2) occur at about the same 
frequency as do ungrammatical utterances containing anaphoric uses of one, making such 
sentences, from the learner’s perspective, indistinguishable from mere noise in the 
linguistic data. Given that infants at this young age appear to have ruled out certain 
logically possible hypotheses about the syntactic structure of English, and given that the 
data available to them appears not to contain sufficient evidence for an unbiased learner to 
extract the relevant structure, Lidz et al. conclude that learners must not have considered 
H1 in the first place; that is, there are innate constraints on the hypothesis space of language 
learners.10,11 
                                                 
10 While Lidz et al. conclude that H1 is not even considered, this strong conclusion does not seem warranted 
by their data. It might be the case that H1 is part of the hypothesis space of the learner, but is assigned a 
much lower prior probability than H2, such that structure (b) constitutes a “default” hypothesis, and direct 
evidence would be needed to steer the learner towards H1 (e.g., sentences of the form Chris has a red ball 
and Max has one too, in a situation in which Max has a blue ball). Nevertheless, these prior probabilities 
would constitute innate constraints on the hypothesis space just as much as the total exclusion of structure 
(a), so Lidz et al.’s overall thesis would be unaffected by the weakening of this conclusion. Hence in what 
follows I will refer to their conclusion that “H1 is absent from the hypothesis space,” but this can be read 
as “H1 is absent from the hypothesis space or assigned low probability.”  
11 It’s worth noting that the specific grammatical principle chosen by Lidz et al. as the basis for their POSA 
is perhaps not the ideal case for establishing the innateness of a grammatical principle, since it is not clear 
that the constraints on the referent of anaphoric one are entirely grammatical, rather than pragmatic (i.e., 
it may be possible for adult speakers of English to envision scenarios in which one could be understood to 
refer to “ball” rather than “red ball”). Other examples (such as children’s understanding of the constraints 
on the use of contractions like “wanna”—e.g., Crain & Thornton, 1988) might serve as more compelling 
elements of the nativists’ arsenal. But the present example has the advantage of being the subject of an 





What can we say about the explanatory role of innateness at work in this argument? 
To begin with, let us apply some of the lessons we learned earlier about contrastivity and 
pragmatics in explanation. Our earlier remarks on contrast classes can assist us in 
identifying what, exactly, is the explanandum in this instance. It might be thought that, as 
it’s sometimes put, the phenomenon to be explained in language acquisition is the child’s 
coming to know the correct grammatical principles.12 But given the contrastive nature of 
explanatory questions, we know there must be something more to the story. What, in this 
case, is the range of relevant alternatives to the explanandum (i.e., the child comes to know 
the correct grammatical principles)?  
To answer this question, notice that as Lidz et al. frame the learning problem, 
learners must decide between two different hypotheses about the structure of NP and the 
anaphoric referent of one. The data that would allow learners to make the correct choice 
between these two hypotheses are, ostensibly, not available. If the matter were left at that, 
it would be mysterious why learners consistently end up knowing the correct grammatical 
principles rather than settling on one of the two different hypotheses according to chance. 
Thus, it appears that what Lidz et al. take to be the relevant explanandum—that which the 
innateness claim is supposed to explain—is the fact that learners end up with the grammar 
they do rather than any of the other logically possible alternative grammars consistent 
with the linguistic data available to them. When framed in this way, it is clear how Lidz et 
                                                 
12 In saying that infants—or adults—“know” principles of grammar, I of course do not mean to suggest that 
they consciously represent these principles. I use the term “knowing grammatical principles/rules” as 






al.’s answer—that there is some antecedent structure13 to the learners’ hypothesis space 
that makes the adoption of H1 impossible or unlikely— constitutes an explanation of the 
revised (contrastive) explanandum: if these alternative grammars are not part of the 
hypothesis space (or are assigned very low prior probability), then it is no mystery that 
learners do not adopt these grammars with anything near the frequency that would be 
predicted if, e.g., H1 and H2 were assigned equal prior probabilities in the hypothesis 
space.14  
The addition of this contrast space to the explanandum may seem trivial, or so 
obvious as to not be worth stating, but note that there are, in fact, contexts in which we 
might well consider different contrast classes to be the relevant ones. Consider two other 
contexts in which we might wish to explain a child’s adopting a particular grammar, but 
with a different comparison in mind instead. If, for example, we are comparing the same 
normally-developing child to a child who—like the tragic case of Genie—has been given 
virtually no linguistic input at all, we might well ask the question, “Why did this child 
develop the grammar she did, rather than developing virtually no grammatical competence 
                                                 
13 Note that there is an inference on Lidz et al.’s part from “antecedent structure” to “innate structure” (i.e., 
it is possible that children’s language acquisition device acquires the structure required to adopt the correct 
grammar in the face of ambiguous evidence via some process that is inconsistent with that structure’s 
being innate). Whether this inference is valid turns on what exactly we take psychological innateness to 
be (e.g., the inference is valid if “innate” amounts to “not learned” and there is good reason to believe that 
the “antecedent structure” could not have been learned—for example, if 18 months is insufficient time for 
the required learning to occur). But of course the proper construal of psychological innateness is precisely 
what we are hoping to discover. Since my approach relies on analysis of the ways nativists use the notion 
of innateness, I will, for the time being, take Lidz et al.’s assumption—that the antecedent structure must 
be innate structure—at face value.  
14 It is of course possible that some of the infants in Lidz et al.’s study had in fact settled on H1 for the time 
being (the prediction for such infants would presumably be that at the test phase, when they are given a 
phrase with anaphoric use of one, they would attend to the novel stimulus, given the baseline preference 
for novelty and the fact that both stimuli would match the linguistic input under H1). Lidz et al. do not 
report whether any infants displayed this pattern, but in any case there would be no principled way to 





at all?” Or, if we are considering the one known case of a particular genetic mutation that 
affects linguistic capacities specifically, we might wish to compare our linguistically-
normal child, possessed of a non-mutated copy of the FOXP2 gene, with a child who has 
the specific language impairment (SLI) that is associated with having a mutated copy of 
FOXP2 (see Lai et al., 2001, and Enard et al. 2002 for details about FOXP2 mutation; 
Watkins et al., 2002, for a description of the associated phenotype). Here we might wish to 
ask: why did this child develop the grammar he did rather than one that includes irregular 
use of inflectional morphemes? 
Again, according to our contrastive account of explanation, the contrast class we 
select for an instance of a child adopting a particular grammar will inform and constrain 
the sorts of explanations that are appropriate. In the case of comparing a normally-
developing child to one deprived of linguistic input, citing the mere presence of any 
linguistic data, or (depending on exactly what our interests are) the presence of emotional 
nurturance might serve as a proper explanation. In the FOXP2 case, we would presumably 
cite the presence of a particular genetic factor as the explanation of the child’s grammatical 
competence.15  
Returning to the original explanatory context, however—that of Lidz et al.’s 
hypothesis, in which the contrast space includes children adopting faulty grammars 
consistent with the primary linguistic data—we can say the following: insofar as most 
linguistic theorizing takes place in a shared explanatory context, one in which the relevant 
                                                 
15 Skepticism about “genetic determination” as a general explanatory theory—a skepticism I espouse 
elsewhere—is of course consistent with acknowledging that citing genetic factors can constitute a good 





alternatives to learners arriving at the correct grammatical principles involve learners 
arriving at other grammatical principles consistent with the primary linguistic data, then 
innateness claims will have the same explanatory role as they have in Lidz at al.’s POSA: 
they make the otherwise mysterious fact that learners adopt the correct grammatical 
principles un-mysterious. 
3.4.3 The debate 
Regier and Gahl (2004) and Foraker and her colleagues (Foraker, Regier, 
Khetarpal, Perfors, & Tenenbaum, 2009) have both offered critiques of Lidz et al.’s 
analysis of young children’s competence with anaphoric uses of one. While these critics 
do not dispute that even young children possess such competence, they do argue that it is 
not necessary to posit the particular innate constraints postulated by Lidz et al. in order to 
explain this competence. Rather, the critics argue, this competence could be acquired by a 
Bayesian learner who assigned equal prior probabilities to the flat-structure hypothesis 
(H1) and the nested-structure hypothesis (H2). 
Both Regier and Gahl and Foraker et al. object to Lidz et al.’s acquisition story, 
arguing that Lidz et al. have overlooked the possibility that the absence of certain 
grammatical constructions from the linguistic input available to learners could provide the 
necessary evidence to rule out H1 and settle on H2. Both sets of researchers designed a 
model of a hypothetical language learner whose task was to determine the proper use of 
anaphoric one and the proper structure of NP. Both models gave equal prior weight to the 





sentence “I’ll play with this red ball and you can play with that one,” one may refer to a 
blue ball), were equipped with a Bayesian procedure for evaluating hypotheses, and were 
fed a standard diet of child-directed speech (in Foraker et al.’s case, the input to the model 
was a subset of the corpus analyzed by Lidz et al.). Both models learned the correct 
syntactic principles with relatively limited input, owing, the authors say, to the absence 
from the input of certain grammatical constructions or utterance-environment pairings that 
would be predicted by the flat-structure hypothesis (but not the nested-structure 
hypothesis). These researchers conclude that Lidz et al. were mistaken in their assertion 
that this aspect of children’s syntactic competence could not have been extracted from the 
available linguistic evidence, and, consequently, in their application of the (a posteriori) 
POSA. According to these critics, a hypothesis space that assigns low or zero probability 
to the flat-structure hypothesis is not necessary to explain learners’ convergence on the 
correct grammatical principles. 
Let us take stock of the debate between these two camps in light of our earlier 
discussions of the nature of scientific explanation and of the role of the concept of 
innateness in this realm of psychological research. Importantly, my aim here is not to 
declare a winner, but rather to identify precisely what is under dispute.  
To begin, let us note a number of points that are not under dispute. First is the claim 
that the process of language acquisition—or indeed, the acquisition of the syntactic 
structure of NP—is heavily constrained. Both Regier & Gahl and Foraker et al. openly 
acknowledge that their models employ a variety of built-in assumptions (e.g., Bayesian 





more difficult), as well as various kinds of specifically-linguistic knowledge (e.g., the 
ability to recognize syntactic types, such as nouns, modifiers, and so on). Likewise, there 
is no dispute over whether something is innate; Lidz et al.’s critics do not say this explicitly, 
but it is widely acknowledged that some innate structure is necessary for any learning to 
take place at all (it is plausible, for example, to read the critics as supposing that Bayesian 
reasoning principles are innate). Rather, the debate between Lidz et al. and their critics 
appears to center on two key questions: (1) whether the procedure for acquiring the 
syntactic knowledge in question is language specific (Lidz et al.) or domain general 
(Regier & Gahl, Foraker et al.); and (2) the respective prior probabilities assigned to 
different elements in language learners’ hypothesis space. 
We will focus on the latter point of contention, as this is the one that most directly 
and immediately concerns questions of innateness. Lidz et al.’s critics, again, do not say 
what they do think is innate, but let us suppose, for simplicity’s sake, that they would grant 
the existence of an innate hypothesis space of possible grammars. We may then rephrase 
point (2) to make explicit the role of innateness in the dispute: according to Lidz et al., 
human children innately possess a hypothesis space that either lacks or assigns low 
probability to the hypothesis that NP has a flat structure; according to their critics, the 
innate structure of children’s hypothesis space is such that the flat-structure hypothesis is 
both present and assigned the same prior probability as the nested-structure hypothesis. In 
other words, these theorists disagree about the innate structure of the hypothesis space of 





We can quickly put to rest any worries that these theorists are merely talking past 
one another because they are inhabiting different explanatory contexts (e.g., having in mind 
different contrast classes for the observed outcomes), as was the case between Willie 
Sutton and his priest. Rather, all appearances are that these opposing theorists are operating 
within a shared explanatory context and are seeking to explain the same phenomenon: why 
do learners, from a very early point in development, embrace the correct syntactic 
principles rather than any of the other principles consistent with the data? Again, 
according to Lidz et al. the explanation for this fact is that the “other principles” are innately 
excluded from the hypothesis space. According to their critics, however, the proper 
explanation is that human infants are good Bayesian reasoners, and there is no need to posit 
the innate constraints described by Lidz et al.. Hence we have a straightforward 
disagreement in which one side believes that a particular trait is innate (a hypothesis space 
with structure S), with the opposing side denying that this same trait is innate. The upshot 
is that both Lidz et al. and their critics appear to have in mind a particular notion of 
innateness, and are merely in disagreement about what the empirical evidence suggests 
about which things meet the criteria for innateness. 
Given that we have a straightforward disagreement about what is innate (and not 
about what is innateness), such that the two opposing sides mean the same thing when they 
talk about innateness, we can ask what, precisely, these two sides mean. I think that the 
core disagreement between these two camps can be captured by the “Psychological 
Primitiveness” account of innateness. This view, again, holds that whether a trait is innate 





environment is necessary for the emergence of that trait, or if instead that trait may be 
counted as part of the “starting state” of a system in the creature’s psychology.  
My claim here is that the interlocutors in the debate over acquisition of the structure 
of NP are, as the Primitivist analysis of innateness would have it, arguing about what the 
starting state of the human language faculty (or at least, those aspects of it that underlie 
understanding of anaphoric one) looks like. Again, the explanandum here is the emergence 
of syntactic competence in human infants—a state of affairs in which the language faculty 
operates in accordance with the nested-structure hypothesis about NP. The debate between 
the nativists and anti-nativists concerns whether this phenomenon is best explained by 
positing an initial (or primitive) state in which only the nested-structure hypothesis is 
considered and the flat-structure hypothesis is absent (or assigned much lower 
probability)—as the nativists would have it—or by positing an initial state in which the 
nested- and flat-structure hypotheses are both present and assigned equal probabilities—as 
presumed by the anti-nativists. Nativists think the preference for the nested-structure 
hypothesis is innate because they think an adequate explanation of the children’s observed 
competence requires taking this preference as a primitive, irreducible component of the 
language acquisition process. Anti-nativists consider the preference non-innate because 
they think the best explanation for the children’s competence derives the “mature” state of 
the 18-month-olds’ language faculty from the combination of experiential input and a yet-
more-basic state of the system (a state in which the nested- and flat-structure hypotheses 





So it appears that the Primitivist account of innateness, and in particular the idea 
that innate traits are (part of) an explanatorily-relevant starting state, captures what is at 
issue in the debate between nativists and anti-nativists about grammatical competence. It’s 
worth noting that this result holds even if we consider the debate through the lens of 
Samuels’ original “no psychological process” account. That is, the debate can be seen as a 
disagreement about the process by which the language faculty has arrived at its “mature” 
structure in the 18-month-olds, and in particular whether an appeal to psychological 
processes is necessary. A full analysis of the notion of a “psychological process” in beyond 
the scope of this chapter, but I take it that if anything is a psychological process, checking 
hypotheses against incoming empirical evidence according to Bayesian principles is one. 
Hence, according to the anti-nativists, the explanation for the structure of the language 
faculty in its mature state appeals crucially to a psychological process (i.e., Bayesian 
reasoning). According to the nativists, on the other hand, the explanation for the structure 
of the language faculty (at least with respect to the structure of NP) makes no appeal to any 
such process. We do not, according to the nativist, need to appeal to any cognitive process 
to explain why learners’ hypothesis space comes to assign low or zero probability to H1, 
for this was the state of the hypothesis space before the language acquisition process even 
began.  
Thus, regardless of the particular version of the Primitivist account we appeal to, 
the Primitivist strategy succeeds in capturing the contours of this debate about innateness, 
and shows us why, for example, the participants in the debate would appeal to the sorts of 





I contend that the central notion at issue in the debate between nativist and anti-nativist 
theorists in language acquisition is that of the psychological primitiveness of particular 
features of the structure of the language faculty.  
3.5 Conclusion 
Assuming my analysis is correct, we have now identified a notion of innateness that 
accounts for the explanatory practices of nativist cognitive science, and characterizes what 
is at issue in debates about whether particular psychological traits are innate. Notably, the 
explanations given by nativist cognitive scientists (e.g., Lidz et al.), do not make any overt 
appeal to biological properties of the children, such as their genetic makeup. So, as noted 
in the introduction, the analysis offered here lends no particular support to the idea that 
innateness should be defined in biological terms (e.g., as “genetic determination”), as is 
often suggested. Many explanatory projects in nativist theorizing seem to get by just fine 
without referencing genetic facts at all.  
Of course, this does not preclude the possibility that nativist scientists do in fact 
think of innateness in genetic terms (indeed, as we will see in the next chapter, many say 
explicitly that they do), nor does it preclude the possibility that psychological primitiveness 
is just a particular species of genetic specification, such that the Primitivist analysis can be 
subsumed under a more general biological account of innateness. But in light of the fact 
that successful explanations can be devised in nativist theories without appealing to genetic 
facts, we would need an argument for why we should collapse psychological innateness 











 CHAPTER 4: THE DISUNITY OF INNATENESS 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter argued for a particular analysis of innateness in cognitive 
science. This chapter explores whether this analysis can be subsumed under a more general 
notion of innateness, one according to which the notion of innateness employed in 
cognitive science is the same notion employed in biology. As hinted at in previous chapters, 
I do not believe it is possible to identify a singular analysis of innateness that can do all the 
explanatory work required of it in both of these domains. The remainder of this chapter is 
dedicated to offering arguments for the position that whatever analysis we might give for 
innateness in biology, the primitivist analysis of innateness in cognitive science is an 
independent explanatory notion. 
Let us begin by spelling out—in an intuitive and preliminary fashion—the view I 
aim to argue against, namely, that “innateness” means in cognitive science the same thing 
it means in biology. In order for this idea to work, we would need to identify some property 
of biological systems that distinguishes innate from non-innate traits, and then we would 
need to show that the set of psychologically primitive traits also possess this further 
property. If this were accomplished, we would have shown that the primitivist analysis of 
innateness in cognitive science is in an important sense unnecessary: it picks out innate 
psychological traits, but it needlessly clutters the explanatory landscape, for these traits are 





What might this property be? The most obvious answer is that organismal traits—
biological or psychological—are innate in virtue of the fact that their presence is in some 
way explained by the activities of the organism’s genes. And in fact, some of the leading 
theorists of nativist cognitive science have espoused just such a view. Fodor, for example, 
says that nativist claims in cognitive science and in biology share the basis feature of 
positing that 
there is a characteristic human phenotype…that can be attributed to a 
characteristic human genetic endowment…the idea that some properties are 
significantly genotypically determined is now deeply scientifically 
entrenched; to that extent, biology seems to be in the process of constructing 
a concept of innateness that saves many of the rationalists’ paradigms. 
(Fodor, 2001, p. 102, emphasis added)  
Fodor’s statements here seem to accord with a common-sense view of biological 
development, according to which genes count as a special kind of explanation for particular 
biological outcomes. It seems natural to suggest, therefore, that the notion of innateness 
can be characterized in such terms. Similarly, we hear from Chomsky that innateness (or 
as he puts it, “Platonic ‘remembrance,’ ” 1990, p. 633) is to be thought of “in terms of the 
genetic endowment, which specifies the initial state of the language faculty, much as it 
determines that we will grow arms not wings” (1990, p. 633).  
As we can see in the quotes from Chomsky and Fodor, a variety of locutions might 
be (and are) used to describe the kind of explanatory relation that genes are supposed to 
bear to innate traits: such traits are attributed to a genetic endowment, are significantly 
genotypically determined, and are specified by the genetic endowment. But we might ask 





genotypically determined (as opposed to, say, moderately genotypically determined)? How 
do genes specify things? In the surrounding passages, Fodor acknowledges the considerable 
difficulty of answering such questions, but remains confident that answers are there for the 
discovering, if only because “it would be unlikely if the notion of innateness according to 
which [claims that traits are largely genetically determined] are true will turn out to be 
dispensable for the larger purpose of biology” (2001, 102).  
The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to considering what kind of case can be 
built for the Fodor/Chomsky view, by exploring various ways we might attempt to make 
good on the idea that innate psychological traits can be identified via their special 
explanatory relationship to the genome. The arguments presented herein will build upon 
those offered in Chapter 2, where I provided reasons to doubt that genetic factors can, in 
general, be granted special explanatory status in the emergence of even non-psychological 
traits. My critique of the proposal to subsume psychological innateness under a more 
general biological account begins in Section 4.4 below; first, however, I set up that critique 
with a some general discussion of issues that arise when we begin to consider the question 
of whether our explanatory toolkit contains (or ought to contain) one analysis of innateness 
or many. 
4.2 The scope of innateness 
A question that arises immediately for any account of innateness concerns its scope 
of application. For any proposed definition of innate, we must ask whether the definition 





some of them. We must ask, that is, how unified are the phenomena that surround talk of 
innateness? This question is of particular importance given that innateness claims occur in 
what appears to be a broad range of contexts and in a variety of scientific disciplines and 
sub-disciplines. I have defended a notion of innateness in cognitive science with a limited 
scope of application, but as the issues here are rather complex and potentially confusing, 
it’s worth taking the time to spell out the variety of options for views of varying breadth, 
as well as some of the reasons why one might favor one view over another.  
The question of unity for analyses of innateness has the potential to cause 
considerable confusion, since there are multiple ways in which the role of innateness in 
different scientific contexts and disciplines might diverge. Specifically, there are two 
questions we must ask. One question is whether there is a single, universal notion of 
innateness—a single property or cluster of properties that everyone intends to pick out each 
time they use the term “innate,” and that they go looking for when they look for innate 
things.1 A separate question concerns whether there is a single property (or cluster of 
properties) that scientists investigate in the various contexts in which they study innateness. 
We can express this latter issue as a question about whether innateness is a natural kind in 
the sense that there is some core property (or property cluster2) the presence of which 
                                                 
1 This question might be put in terms of whether the word “innate” picks out multiple concepts, but 
articulating this claim in a precise manner would require discussion of what exactly concepts are. Since I 
won’t be engaging in that discussion here, I rely on the admittedly vaguer but more forgiving term 
“notion.” 
2 Boyd (1991) offers a view of natural kinds that does not require natural kinds to be defined by the possession 
of a single property, but rather may be thought of as what he calls homeostatic property clusters. I do not 






causally explains the reliable co-occurrence of various further properties. (See Mameli, 
2008; and Samuels, 2007 for related discussion of these issues.) 
There are thus four possibilities when it comes to the unity of innateness, depending 
on whether we answer “yes” or “no” to each of the two questions posed above: (1) One 
notion, one property;3 (2) One notion, multiple properties; (3) Multiple notions, one 
property; and (4) Multiple notions, multiple properties. We’ll look at each possibility in 
turn. 
The first possibility (one notion, one property) is simple enough: innateness is 
rather like femaleness. Everyone, presumably, has pretty much the same thing in mind 
when they talk about females, and there is a single naturally-occurring phenomenon that is 
investigated under the label of “femaleness” and that explains a wide range of other 
properties.4 This possibility looks dubious from the start given the long history of still-
unresolved debates about innateness that seem to be replete with cross-talk and confusion 
(to say nothing of the wide range of properties that have been suggested to be constitutive 
of innateness—see Mameli & Bateson, 2006, and below for an overview—and the recent 
charges that innateness talk is “fundamentally confused,” Griffiths, 2002). Moreover, there 
is empirical evidence (Griffiths, Machery, & Linquist, 2009) that intuitions about 
innateness (among “the folk,” at least) are hazy at best and likely inconsistent, and it is not 
implausible that such confusion enters into scientific practice at least some of the time. But 
                                                 
3 For simplicity’s sake, hereinafter I will drop the “or property cluster” qualification, but again, I do not mean 
to close off the possibility that innateness phenomena might be unified under a single property cluster.  
4 That there is a single property of femaleness is, I take it, consistent with the possibility that sex categories 





nevertheless, “one notion, one property” is a live possibility that appears to have its 
supporters (e.g., Fodor, 2001). 
The second possibility (one notion, multiple properties) is that there is a single thing 
we mean by “innateness” (though we may occasionally have inconsistent or confused 
beliefs about it), but there is no one property in the world that satisfies all and only the 
criteria included in our idea of innateness. We might all believe, for example, that innate 
traits are specified in the genome and are invariant in a population. But genetic 
specification and invariant emergence might end up picking out rather different classes of 
traits. The worry then is that we would be inclined to think the presence of one entails the 
presence of the other, even though these are distinct natural phenomena. In this vein 
Mameli (2008) suggests that “innateness” could turn out like Newton's “mass,” which in 
modern thinking conflates rest mass and relativistic mass.  
The third possibility (many notions, one property) is that our present situation with 
regard to innateness is not unlike that of scientists studying electromagnetism in the mid-
18th century. For these scientists thought they were studying two different phenomena 
(electricity and magnetism), whereas the various phenomena they observed actually 
stemmed from the same underlying property.5 If this is the case, then we can hope that as 
we continue to investigate the various phenomena associated with innateness, eventually 
we will come to see that phenomena we have treated as distinct (perhaps genetic encoding 
                                                 
5 The analogy is not perfect, since there was, for a long time at least, little or no debate among scientists as 
to whether two distinct phenomena were being studied (they were mistaken in thinking there were two 
properties, but at least they all agreed), whereas in the present case there is disagreement and uncertainty 





and developmental invariance, for example) arise from the same underlying property 
(perhaps identical to one of the original options). 
Finally, our fourth possibility is that there is little unity about innateness at all: 
perhaps it is the case that, not only are there multiple different notions of innateness at work 
in the sciences, but scientists who all say they are studying innate phenomena are actually 
studying different kinds of things entirely. This has the potential to make matters very 
confusing indeed, since it opens the possibility that scientists (and philosophers) are both 
constantly equivocating on their use of the “innate” (switching from one notion to another 
without realizing), and lumping together distinct phenomena that will turn out to have no 
unifying core of common causal properties. As we will see, my own estimation is that this 
fourth possibility describes the actual state of affairs regarding the study of innateness, 
though I will argue that there is (or at least can be) some order to the madness.  
The array of possibilities described above raises the question of how we ought to 
proceed in studying innateness. That is, given the fact that there is widespread disagreement 
about what we should be looking for when we look for innate things, and about how many 
types of things we are likely to find, what should be our general attitude and orientation 
towards whether and how the notion of innateness should play a role in our scientific 
theorizing? Three such attitudes seem plausible and can be discerned in the literature: 
 
The assumption of unity: One might argue that we should assume, until it is shown 
conclusively otherwise, that there is but one notion of innateness and but one natural-





this assumption, if we think we have found a good candidate for the one innateness 
property, we can chalk up the various instances of crosstalk and bickering to mere 
confusion (as does Fodor, 2001). Proponents of this view typically identify innateness 
with some biological property, and then argue (or assume) that psychologically innate 
traits are also innate in virtue of their possession of this biological property (see 
discussion of Fodor’s view below).  
 
Pessimistic disunity: On the opposite end of the spectrum, we might respond to the 
confusion regarding innateness notions and innateness properties by abandoning the 
concept altogether. Several philosophers of biology (Griffiths & Machery, 2008; 
Griffiths, 2002; Mameli & Bateson, 2006) have recently defended just this suggestion, 
on the grounds that the concept of innateness is “hopelessly confused.” Proponents of 
this view tend to hold that there are both multiple notions of innateness and multiple, 
independent properties associated with it,6 a state of affairs that yields only confusion 
and unwitting equivocation. According to the pessimistic disunity thesis, then, there is 
little or no hope of salvaging anything scientifically useful from the wreckage that 
comprises the notion(s) of innateness in its current state—for even if some of these 
notions actually do pick out natural biological or psychological kinds, the continued 
use of the term is simply an invitation to unwittingly equivocate among conceptually 
distinct notions. 
                                                 
6 Samuels (2007) points out that the mere fact that multiple properties are “associated with” innateness need 
not be problematic, since “associated with” is a rather weak relation. The claim must therefore be a stronger 
one, namely that there are multiple independent, non-co-occurring properties that are taken to be 






Optimistic disunity: Finally, we can respond to the present quandary about the status of 
innateness by supposing that there may indeed be multiple distinct notions of 
innateness that should not be confused with one another, and multiple distinct 
properties that should be studied independently; however, at least in some instances, 
applying one of these notions within a restricted domain yields a scientifically 
legitimate concept, one that picks out an interesting natural property—we only get into 
trouble when we give in to the Procrustean urge to apply these restricted notions of 
innateness outside their proper scope of applicability. Samuels (2002, 2007) and 
Godfrey-Smith (2007) both take an optimistic disunity view, though they do not 
necessarily frame their own views as such. The position I defend in this essay is 
likewise an Optimistic Disunity view, since I argue—much as Samuels (2002) does—
that there is a notion of innateness that serves the explanatory purposes of mainstream 
cognitive science but is inapplicable outside this domain. 
 
It's worth noting that the optimistic and pessimistic versions of the disunity thesis are much 
closer to one another than either is to the unity thesis, since the two disunity positions are 
generally in agreement about what the facts of the world are: there are multiple distinct 
properties that get referred to by “innateness.” The difference here is simply in the attitude 
one takes towards this fact. To endorse an optimistic disunity position is to consider it a 






It should be obvious why a Primitivist analysis of innateness goes hand-in-hand 
with an Optimistic Disunity view about the scope of this analysis: if Primitivism constitutes 
the best analysis of innateness in cognitive science, then there is little hope for unifying 
this notion with a biological concept of innateness, since the idea of psychological 
primitiveness has no obvious analogue in biology.7  
My endorsement of Pessimistic Disunity means that I will be arguing against the 
idea that the notion of innateness in cognitive science defended in Chapter 3 can be 
subsumed under a more general biological notion of innateness. The rest of this chapter 
considers proposals for unitary notions of innateness—proposals that seek to identify a 
single notion of innateness that is useful in both the biological and psychological sciences. 
I demonstrate that each of these proposals fails to capture what is most central to 
psychological uses of the concept of innateness; hence I conclude that psychological 
innateness is distinct from biological innateness. 
4.3 Theories of innateness: an overview  
There are a variety of proposals in the philosophical and scientific literature for how 
innateness should be understood. Here I provide brief descriptions of some of the options, 
which will be followed by more detailed analyses of each, and assessments of the prospects 
for subsuming the primitivist account under them. I will argue that even if these approaches 
                                                 
7 Gross and Rey (2012) do suggest that Jerne’s (1985) work in immunology may offer a way to construct a 
biological notion of innateness based on the idea of primitiveness. Jerne discovered that all the antibody 
types one will ever have are present at birth; these antibody types thus comprise a set of biological 
primitives that are the building-blocks of the body’s defenses against antigens. While the suggestion is 





constitute useful notions of innateness in biology, they cannot be expanded so as to do the 
explanatory work required of a notion of innateness in cognitive science. Thus I will not 
be seeking to show that these are bad notions of innateness in general, only that their scope 
must be limited (as is the case with my preferred notion of Primitivism). 
 
Invariance/canalization views: According to this family of views, innateness can be 
characterized in terms of a trait’s propensity to manifest in a wide range of 
environments. Traits whose emergence in development is insensitive to certain kinds 
of environmental variation are innate according to this view. Sober (1998) and Ariew 
(1999, 2006) have both offered accounts along these lines. 
 
Genetic views: Genetic views tap into the widely-held—if fuzzy—assumption that innate 
traits are somehow genetic in nature. Genetic views come in two varieties. First, 
genetic information theories hold that genes in some way “code for” or “represent” 
certain phenotypic traits, and these traits are the innate ones; genetic 
causation/determination theories posit that some traits—i.e., the innate ones—are 
caused by (perhaps determined by) genes in a way that others are not. 
4.4 Invariance, canalization, and innateness 
Several philosophers of biology have proposed that innateness can be characterized 
in terms of a trait’s propensity to manifest in a wide range of environments (Ariew, 1999, 





Thus, “a phenotypic trait is innate for a given genotype if and only if that phenotype will 
emerge in a range of developmental environments” (p. 795, original emphasis). In similar 
spirit, Ariew contends that innateness is canalization. The canalization account holds that 
innate traits are those that are insensitive to a variety of environmental perturbations. The 
term canalization comes from Waddington (1957; 1975), who likens development to a ball 
rolling through a contoured landscape of possible phenotypes with hills and valleys (or 
“canals”). Each point in the ball’s trajectory therefore represents the phenotype of an 
organism at a point in its lifecycle. Innate traits, according to this account, are the ones that 
arise from developmental pathways represented by the deepest grooves in the landscape—
the areas of the landscape where the ball is likely to end up even if it is buffeted about by 
environmental forces.  
These accounts are not without intuitive appeal—it seems quite natural to suggest 
that those traits that are liable to emerge even in the face of substantial variation in the 
nature of the environment are innate. For example, the fact that humans develop ten fingers 
and ten toes in all but the most inhospitable of developmental (e.g., pre-natal) environments 
is a plausible reason for thinking that number of fingers and toes is an innate trait in 
humans. We might further suppose that a similar story can be told for psychological traits: 
when a psychological trait seems to emerge invariantly despite environmental differences, 
then it counts as innate. Indeed, a proponent of an invariance view of biological innateness 
might extend this view to psychological contexts by arguing that Lidz et al. are right to 
classify syntactic competence as innate, but that what makes this competence innate is the 





linguistic and non-linguistic environmental factors (e.g., diet, climate, parental nurturance, 
particular grammatical constructions prevalent in the linguistic input, and so forth). 
To see why this approach fails, however, let us consider an objection to Lidz et al.’s 
conclusion that competence with NP is innate, one that comes from an invariance 
perspective. The objection comes from Griffiths and Machery, who write:  
[Lidz et al.’s data] is perfectly consistent with the development of children’s 
knowledge of the constituent structure of noun phrases being contingent 
upon the presence of very specific stimuli in the environment of children. . 
. Furthermore, the stimuli required. . .might well be non-obvious. (Griffiths 
& Machery, 2008, p. 407) 
Griffiths and Machery’s contention is that Lidz et al. have not demonstrated the 
innateness of this piece of grammatical competence, because showing that knowledge of 
NP is innate would require demonstrating that the emergence of the knowledge does not 
depend upon (i.e., that it is invariant with respect to) some hitherto unexplored and 
potentially non-obvious environmental stimuli. 
However, pace Griffiths and Machery, even if the emergence of syntactic 
competence were sensitive to some obscure environmental variable, this would constitute 
no objection to Lidz et al.’s argument. Suppose it did turn out that, by dint of some quirky 
neurodevelopmental mechanism, knowledge of NP structure fails to emerge in children 
whose neonatal diet is deficient in some obscure trace nutrient (cesium, let’s say). There is 
no reason to suppose that the discovery of such a fact would shake Lidz et al.’s confidence 
in the innateness of this psychological trait. To all appearances, Lidz et al. take the 
innateness of knowledge of NP to be established by the fact that the kids didn’t learn it. 





some surprising way with an environmental variable, the core of Lidz et al.’s argument is 
still intact. Insofar as the potential existence of the kinds of environmental dependencies 
Griffiths and Machery worry about appear to be irrelevant to Lidz et al.’s argument and to 
the explanatory project in which it is situated, we have every reason to think that the notion 
of psychological innateness assumed by Lidz et al. is independent of the biological 
properties of invariance/canalization. Hence, we have no reason at this point to revise the 
view that the psychological notion of innateness is independent of any biological notion.  
4.5 Genes and innateness 
The idea that innateness—whether biological, psychological, or both—is somehow 
related to genetic properties is both ubiquitous and intuitively appealing. It is therefore a 
natural place for proponents of the Unity thesis concerning innateness to set up camp, as 
both Fodor (2001) and Chomsky (1988, 1990) do. Unfortunately, however, advocates of 
this approach are not always clear about how exactly the account is supposed to work. The 
idea is supposed to be that certain phenotypic traits are innate in virtue of some crucial 
relationship they bear to particular genotypic properties, but often we are given little insight 
into which genotypic properties are relevant or what the relationship between these 
genotypic properties and phenotypic traits is. Instead we are given rather vague gestures, 
such as the idea that innate traits are those that are “attributable to” the genome (Fodor, 
2001, p. 102) or that phenotypic traits are innate in virtue of the fact that “the genetic 





In spite of this dearth of specificity, we can identify two strategies for making good 
on the idea that innate traits are genetic traits, each comprising a cluster of similar 
proposals. The first we can label the informational approach, according to which genes 
“code for” (or “represent” or “carry a program for constructing”) certain phenotypic traits, 
and all and only those traits that are genetically encoded/represented/programmed are 
innate. The second we can call the causal approach, which seeks to identify some special 
causal relation (usually that of “determining”) that holds between genes and certain traits. 
All and only the traits that are “genetically determined” in this way are innate, according 
to this view. I will argue that both of these accounts fail to deliver what the Unity theorist 
needs, however. 
4.5.1 Innateness and genetic information 
Let us begin with the informational approach. The idea that genes carry information 
is perhaps not entirely unproblematic (see Oyama, 2000), but let us assume for the moment 
that something like the following is right: genes utilize a code to store and convey 
information about biological structures (such as proteins), such that they can be said to 
represent those structures. If this is right, then we have the potential for precisely the sort 
of distinctive relationship between genes and traits needed to ground a genetic account of 
innateness: if genes hold coded representations of phenotypic traits like proteins, 
fingernails, blue eyes, and language acquisition devices, then there is a biological property 





 However, as several philosophers have pointed out (Godfrey-Smith, 2007; 
Mameli & Bateson, 2006), the problem is that there does not appear to be any reason to 
suppose that genes code for or represent any of these things, except perhaps for proteins. 
The reason is that while it makes sense to speak of a genetic code that maps nucleotide 
sequences onto amino acid sequences in the process of protein synthesis, it is not at all 
obvious how one could generalize this story into an account of how genes code for or 
represent anything developmentally downstream of protein synthesis (including 
fingernails, eye color, or a recursive computational system). The reason we can speak of 
genes “coding for” proteins is that we can specify a sort of semantic mapping from one to 
the other, much as we might specify a semantic mapping from the dots and dashes of a 
string of Morse Code to sentences of English. But there is simply no way to specify such a 
semantic mapping from genes to fingernails, for example, much less from genes to a 
hypothesis space of grammatical principles. Hence, genes do not “code for” these higher-
level traits.  
The implications for the proposal that genetic encoding can provide a unitary 
concept of innateness should be clear: this proposal cannot countenance any innate 
psychological traits, so if there are innate psychological traits (and of course there are), a 
notion of innateness that appeals to genetic encoding is one with limited, rather than 
universal, scope. 
Now, one might object that my dismissal of the prospects for genetic encoding to 
undergird a unitary notion of innateness has been too hasty. For one could point out that 





proteins that the genes code for will go on to play a crucial causal role in the development 
of everything from fingernails to the assemblages of brain cells that implement the 
psychological structures that are of interest to cognitive scientists. So we can, in principle, 
trace a continuous causal path from genes to the very psychological traits that nativists in 
cognitive science count as innate.  
However, it should be clear that the existence of such causal pathways does not 
vindicate the proposal that genetic encoding is the biological property in virtue of which 
traits of all kinds are innate. This is because the existence of such causal pathways does not 
change the fact that organism-level psychological traits are not genetically encoded. 
Simply put, encoding is one thing, and causation is another. Godfrey-Smith sums this up 
nicely: although we can perhaps unproblematically count some of an organism’s traits (e.g., 
its proteins) as being genetically encoded,  
[o]nce we are asking questions about levels of aggression, about Universal 
Grammar, about sexual orientation or basic numerical cognition, we have 
far outrun the kinds of entities that can be said, on the basis of biological 
theory, to be coded for. When understanding those sorts of traits, we are 
back in the land of ordinary causal explanation.” (Godfrey-Smith, 2007, p. 
61)  
Since following the trail of genetic encoding has led us to the land of ordinary 
causal explanation, let us consider the proposal that there is a unique kind of causal 
relationship between genes and certain phenotypic traits (rather than a 
semantic/informational relationship), and it is in virtue of this relationship that traits—





4.5.2 Innateness and genetic causation 
The idea that underlying the notion of innateness is the fact that some phenotypic 
traits—cognitive and otherwise—are “attributable to” genetic factors in ways that other 
traits are not is perhaps the most widely-held position on innateness. Unfortunately, it is 
also in many ways the least well-defined of the available theoretical treatments of 
innateness, so part of our task will be to spell out what exactly the proposal is. This will be 
the last challenger to the view I have espoused according to which innateness in cognitive 
science cannot be identified with any biological property. If this challenge fails, we will be 
left with Primitivism as our only viable candidate for a notion of innateness in cognitive 
science. 
Let us begin by attempting to specify in a bit more detail just what the genetic 
causation view of innateness amounts to. It is widely acknowledged that the view cannot 
be that innate traits are those that have only genetic causes, for there are no such traits—all 
traits will have both genetic and environmental causes (Kitcher, 2001, calls this the 
“interactionist consensus”). It is similarly widely acknowledged that it will not help to 
suggest that what makes a trait innate is that it owes more to the influence of genes than to 
the influence of the environment. Genetic and environmental factors interact to give rise 
to any particular trait, so their contributions cannot be separated out from one another and 
the quantities compared (Sober, 1988; Keller, 2010). 
So we cannot make sense of innateness-as-genetic-causation by appealing to some 
quantitative measure of the causal contribution to the trait made by genes (e.g., all or most). 





emergence of certain traits, a role not also played by environmental causes. But then we 
are left with the question of what this special causal role could be. One might be tempted 
at this point to reach for the notion of genetic encoding, since coding for biological 
structures is a special kind of causal influence that genes can exert but that environmental 
factors, plausibly, cannot. But clearly this will just take us in a circle: we abandoned the 
genetic encoding account precisely because it only forestalls momentarily the need to sort 
through the many causal factors contributing to the emergence of any particular trait. 
There is one other move open to the proponent of the genetic causation account. I 
said a moment ago that there is no way to “single out” one cause among many (e.g., a 
particular genetic factor) of a phenotypic trait and assign it a (quantitatively or 
qualitatively) special causal role. This will remain true so long as we are considering the 
causal etiology of a particular trait in a particular individual: questions about the relative 
causal contributions of genetic and non-genetic factors to that trait will be senseless, and 
all we will be able to say about the trait’s causal etiology will be to describe the particular 
causal interactions that took place in the trait’s development. However, if we shift our focus 
beyond the individual to the population the individual inhabits, we can potentially begin to 
ask different sorts of questions, some of which seem like they might actually help us 
identify a sense in which a trait could be “more genetic” than it is environmental. So a 
defender of the genetic causation account might advocate calling upon population-level 
considerations in an attempt to salvage the idea that some traits are more attributable to 
genes than to the environment. If all this can be accomplished, then we should, in principle, 





vindication of the idea that innate traits are those that are significantly genetically 
determined. 
Needless to say, I don’t think this will work, but let’s examine how the story would 
go.8 Again, questions about the relative causal contributions of genes and environment to 
a particular trait are meaningless, but we can begin with such a meaningless question—
“How much of Jane’s hair color is due to her genes and how much to her environment?”—
and, taking into consideration facts about Jane’s population, pose instead a similar (but not 
identical) question that can be coherently asked and coherently answered. If we have 
information about the hair color of individuals in Jane’s population and about degrees of 
genetic relatedness among individuals in the population, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
can tell us the relative contributions of genetic differences and environmental differences 
to differences in hair color across the population. 
This procedure is common in the field of population genetics (and the subfield of 
behavioral genetics in particular), where the resulting value for the amount of phenotypic 
variation in a trait that is “attributable to” genetic variation9 is called the heritability of the 
trait. Note that in the domain of behavioral genetics, “heritability” is a technical term that 
differs in meaning from the term's vernacular use. Heritability for a trait is here defined as 
the proportion of total variation in that trait in a population that can be attributed to genetic 
variation. Heritability is therefore represented as a number between zero and one, with 
values near zero counting as “low heritability” and values near 1 counting as “high 
                                                 
8 My discussion here draws heavily on Sober’s (1988)—see also Lewontin (1974) for a similar take. 
9 As we will see, there is considerable disagreement about how this notion of “attributing” phenotypic 
variance to different sources (also expressed as genetic or environmental variance explaining phenotypic 





heritability.” Debates about the notion of heritability will figure prominently in the 
discussion in Part II of this dissertation, and so it is worth taking some time to explain 
familiarize ourselves with the basic methodological and theoretical issues relating to 
heritability.  
A heritability statistic is generated by collecting data about the variation in a trait 
within a population, and about the degree of genetic similarity among different pairings of 
individuals in the sample. The analysis of variance (ANOVA) is then performed to 
determine how much of this variation can be “explained” by variation in genotypes 
between individuals. In practical terms, there are two primary methodologies for 
determining the heritability of a trait in a population. One is to measure trait differences 
among genetically related individuals who have been separated (i.e., reared in different 
environments). Typically this is done by comparing the similarities of monozygotic (MZ, 
or “identical”) twins reared apart with those of dizygotic (DZ, or “fraternal”) twins reared 
apart. Since MZ twins share 100% of their genes and DZ twins (on average) share 50%, 
we can infer how much genotypic differences contribute to phenotypic differences. The 
second, more indirect methodology is to compare trait correlations among people with 
varying levels of relatedness in the population (i.e., asking the question: how much more 
similar to one another are siblings than are first cousins? Second cousins?). 
The basic intuition behind the heritability statistic is this: when individuals who are 
more genetically similar to one another tend to be similar to one another in their 





in their phenotypes, then it would seem that the similarities and differences in traits are 
best “explained” by similarities and differences in genes. 
Now, returning to our question about Jane’s hair, suppose we conduct a heritability 
analysis and we discover that genetic variation makes a much greater contribution to 
variation in hair color than does environmental variation. Can we now conclude that Jane’s 
genes make a bigger contribution to her hair color than her environment (and hence, that 
her hair color is innate)? 
No. The question of whether Jane’s genes or her environment made a bigger 
contribution to her hair color is just as meaningless as it was before. However, with the 
information provided by the ANOVA, we can ask what Jane’s hair color would have been 
like if she’d had the same genes but inhabited a different environment, or if she lived in the 
same environment but had different genes. And we can further ask: in which of these 
counterfactual scenarios would her hair color have been more different from its actual 
color? By drawing on population-level facts we can eventually generate an answer to the 
question of whether Jane’s genes or her environment made a bigger difference to her hair 
color (importantly, this is not the same as the question of which made the bigger 
contribution). It might appear that at long last we have found our biological notion of 
innateness: if Jane’s genes made a bigger difference to her hair color, then it is innate. If 
her environment did, it’s not. Moreover, there is no reason, in principle, why we couldn’t 
apply this same procedure to psychological traits to determine whether they meet this 





There are two reasons why this approach fails, however. First, note that this 
proposal’s rather uncritical use of the question, “would Jean’s hair color have been more 
different if she’d had different genes or a different environment?” is deeply problematic. 
For the answer to this question will be different depending on exactly what properties we 
assign to her genotype and to her environment when we consider the counterfactual 
scenarios in which these factors would have been different (i.e., if we are asking what her 
hair color would have been if she’d had the same genes but lived in a different environment, 
how do we know which of the infinitely many possible alternative environments we should 
consider?). And as Sober (1988) points out, there do not appear to be any principled 
theoretical guidelines for making these decisions. 
Second, and more importantly, this approach seems to characterize innateness in 
terms of considerations that are simply irrelevant to what I have argued (in Chapter 3) that 
innateness is all about. I have argued, again, that whether a particular trait is innate for an 
individual should be a matter of the facts of that individual’s development. But under this 
latest construal of the genetic causation account, we can only determine whether some trait 
of Jane’s is innate by considering facts about the distribution of various genetic and 
environmental variables in Jane’s population. It seems odd, to say the least, that whether 
Jane’s hair color (or her fingernails, or her hypothesis space of possible grammars) is innate 
should depend on such a diffuse set of facts that are completely extrinsic to the 
developmental processes through which Jane’s traits emerge. Indeed, if we take this take 





one could have no innate traits, no matter what sorts of unlearned cognitive capacities (for 
example) it displayed.  
Taking these matters into consideration also helps us to see why a recent view from 
Waters (2007), which seeks to afford genes a unique causal role as causal difference 
makers, is of no help to the Fodorian/Chomskyan view of innateness as genetic causation.10 
For although Waters aims to establish that there is an “ontological feature that distinguishes 
DNA as the actual difference maker” (Waters, 2007, p. 3), his approach features the same 
drawback as do heritability analyses. That is, Waters’ notion of causal difference-making 
is designed to account for the causal role of genetic differences in generating trait 
differences, rather than in the causal role of genes in generating traits. 
Waters provides a formal description of his notion of difference maker, but I think 
the idea is best seen in his example of an experiment by T.H. Morgan, who cross-bred two 
strains of Drosophila—females that were homozygous dominant for a gene controlling eye 
color (“the purple gene”), and males that were homozygous recessive for the same gene. 
Thus, there were three populations (mothers, fathers, and offspring) exhibiting two 
different traits. What is the cause of the difference in eye color? As a matter of fact, a 
Woodward-style intervention on several other genes would also have yielded differences 
in eye color, and so, Waters concedes, these genes all count as “causes” of the flies’ eye 
color in some sense. But, Waters argues, it was at the site of the purple gene that the 
populations actually differed, and so it was the purple gene that “made the difference.” 
                                                 
10 Note that Waters does not defend his view as a genetic account of innateness, though he does seem to think 
that his account constitutes a response to “causal parity” theorists (e.g., Oyama, 2000), whose work 





Waters may be correct that the notion of “making a difference” grounds an 
ontological distinction among causes when those causes are causes of differences within a 
population. But this again, this won’t help to formulate a genetic notion of innateness.  
For if we were to attempt to apply Waters’ analysis to a case of individual development, 
we would be forced to appeal not to an existent difference between two individuals but 
between an individual and a counterfactual version of that individual. And a Woodward-
style counterfactual account of causation, when applied to such circumstances, yields 
causal parity (i.e., does not ontologically privilege one set of counterfactual circumstances 
over another). So if our aim is to develop an account of the role of genes in development, 
then the sort of question to which Morgan’s experiment was directed cannot help us.  
Putting these critiques together, it appears the proponent of a genetic causation 
approach to innateness faces a choice between two unappealing options: either try to 
develop a notion of genetic causation/determination that operates at the individual level, 
and face the difficulties of identifying a unique causal role for genetic factors, or else draw 
on population-level facts that can potentially identify statistical asymmetries between 
genetic and environmental factors, and risk ending up with an account that appeals to 
intuitively irrelevant considerations in determining whether or not a given trait is innate.  
I conclude, therefore, that the prospects for the genetic causation (or genetic 
determination) account of innateness are looking dim. All told, our consideration of three 
different proposals for unitary notions of innateness (invariance/canalization, genetic 





reached earlier that psychological innateness is best construed along the lines of the 
Primitivist account.  
4.6 From populations to individuals (again)? And a preview of things to come 
This concludes my consideration of the meaning of innateness in contemporary 
cognitive science and my defense of a primitivist account, which has been the focus of Part 
I of this dissertation. But before closing this chapter, and setting aside (for a while at least) 
the questions about heritability, populations, and individuals I considered in the previous 
section, I would like to consider one further argument for the view that measures of genetic 
contributions to population-level variability (e.g., heritability analyses) can justify 
privileging genetic over environmental factors in individual development.11 This argument 
comes from philosopher Neven Sesardic, who, as we will see, is a staunch defender of the 
hereditarian tradition in the “nature-nurture” debates (and race-IQ debates in particular) 
that I’ll be examining in Part II. Analyzing Sesardic’s arguments in detail will serve as a 
useful transition to the second part of this dissertation for several reasons. First, Sesardic 
is one of the few authors to attempt a full-throated defense of the value of heritability 
statistics in drawing inferences about individual-level phenomena. If I am correct in 
defending the received view, then we should be able to identify where Sesardic goes wrong 
in rejecting it. Second, examining Sesardic’s mistakes will help us to see why confusion 
and cross-talk are so common and so deeply ingrained in nature-nurture debates.  
                                                 
11 While I hope that the arguments in this section will prove illuminating, they are ultimately outside the main 
thread of the argument for either Part I or Part II; the reader may proceed to Chapter 5 without missing 





As we saw in the previous section, the received view about heritability is that one 
cannot infer anything about individual-level developmental processes from population-
level statistics like heritability (Northcott, 2006; Sober, 1988). Sesardic (2005), however, 
takes exception to the received view. He discusses a series of examples and statements 
offered by both critics of heritability and by behavioral geneticists themselves expressing 
the received view, and argues that they are wrong. 
Sesardic criticizes several expressions of the received view. One is from a 1998 
article by behavioral geneticist David Lykken: “It is meaningless to ask whether Isaac 
Newton’s genius was due more to his genes or his environment, as meaningless as asking 
whether the area of a rectangle is due more to its length or its width” (1998, p. 24). A 
second comes from Cosmides and Tooby (1997), and the passage there that Sesardic 
attacks is worth reproducing in full: 
A heritability coefficient measures sources of variance in a population (for 
example, in a forest of oaks, to what extent are differences in height 
correlated with differences in sunlight, all else equal?). It tells you nothing 
about what caused the development of an individual. Let’s say that for 
height, 80% of the variance in a forest of oaks is caused by variation in their 
genes. This does not mean that the height of the oak tree in your yard is 
“80% genetic.” (What could this possibly mean? Did genes contribute more 
to your oak’s height than sunlight? What percent of its height was caused 
by nitrogen in the soil? By rainfall? By the partial pressure of CO2?) When 
applied to an individual, such percents are meaningless, because all of these 
factors are necessary for a tree to grow. Remove any one, and the height 
will be zero. (qtd. in Sesardic, 2005, pp. 55–56)  
Against these claims, Sesardic argues that there are “perfectly meaningful 





that contribute to a phenotype, and that “population-to-individual [inferences are] not 
‘meaningless’ at all” (2005, p. 56).  
However, it is not entirely clear what proposition Sesardic means to establish. He 
says that Cosmides and Tooby “are wrong that heritability tells us nothing about what 
caused the development of an individual,” (2005, p. 56, emphasis preserved) so clearly we 
are to understand that Sesardic thinks heritability tells us something about what caused the 
development of an individual. But what is this something? In the next sentence, Sesardic 
notes that if a trait is highly heritable, then we can infer that an individual's deviation from 
the mean for that trait is “in all likelihood caused more by its deviation from the genetic 
mean than by its deviation from the environmental mean” (2005, p. 56). This is plausible 
enough, but Sesardic doesn't say whether this is the “something” that heritability ostensibly 
tells us about causal etiologies in individual development, and if so, what exactly we're 
being told.  
Sesardic's next move is to observe that “someone might object” (again, since it's 
not clear what claim Sesardic is advancing, neither is it clear what proposition this is 
supposed to be an objection to) that deviations from the group mean are relational facts 
and therefore not genuine facts about individuals. In response, Sesardic points out that 
“many population-relative facts are usually regarded as giving important information about 
individuals, like being an Olympic champion, having an IQ above 140, being a best-selling 
author, being a surgeon with an unusually high patient mortality, etc.” (2005, p. 56, 
emphasis added). So perhaps the claim Sesardic wishes to establish here is simply that we 





notion of “important information” is perhaps on the vague side. Yet even if we give 
Sesardic wide berth on this, it's unclear why he would take this quite general claim to be 
important in the present context: what bearing does the rather generic notion of “important 
information about individuals” have on questions about “what caused the development of 
an individual”? Again, we are left unsure of the thesis being advanced and why it matters.  
Here is what I take to be the most plausible construal of Sesardic's argument. 
Broadly speaking, we can distinguish questions about individual-level phenomena (such 
as heights of individuals) and questions about population-level phenomena (such as the 
mean height of a group of individuals). It is a well-worn point in debates about heritability 
and development that different “nature-nurture questions” arise at these different levels; 
the explananda at one level are different from the explananda at the other, and different 
investigative and explanatory tools must be applied with respect to each sort of 
phenomenon (i.e., population-level questions are pursued using heritability/ANOVA and 
individual-level questions are pursued with analyses of developmental mechanisms). This 
might be summed up in rough-and-ready fashion with the following dictum: One can't 
infer anything about individual traits from population-level tools like heritability. This 
dictum might be seen as positing an unbridgeable chasm between the individual and 
population levels. It is such a dictum, with such a reading, that I think Sesardic has in mind 
as his target. His aim, then, is to show that the divide between the population and individual 
levels can be bridged: it can be bridged by using population-level analyses like heritability 
to make inferences regarding relational facts about individuals. If the argument goes 





advanced by developmentalists against heritability, by showing that we can, despite 
developmentalists’ insistence to the contrary, unproblematically move from the population 
to the individual level.  
But Sesardic's conception of the relation between the individual and population 
levels is too course-grained, and in consequence his rebuttal is aimed at the wrong target. 
Sesardic is right that when talking about biological traits we can oftentimes move from the 
population to the individual level by considering relational facts (i.e., we can use 
heritability to say what caused an individual's deviation from the mean). But the cautionary 
notes expressed by Lykken and Cosmides and Tooby were never intended to deny that any 
information whatsoever about individuals can be adduced from heritability. The scope of 
these admonitions, rather, is limited to the practice of making inferences about 
developmental processes or the causes of particular developmental outcomes.  
To see the mismatch between what Sesardic seeks to establish and what the 
challenge to heritability is supposed to be, notice the slippage in the language he uses when 
characterizing his opponents' views. In introducing the quotation from Cosmides and 
Tooby, for example, he says, “Cosmides and Tooby also argue that a heritability value tells 
us nothing about an individual” (2005, p. 55, emphasis added). Note, however, that what 
Cosmides & Tooby actually say is that a high heritability score for a trait in a population 
“tells you nothing about what caused the development of an individual”. Cosmides and 
Tooby's claim is clearly about what heritability can tell us about a particular aspect of 
individuals (viz., the causal processes underlying their development), not about what 





(and as quoted above), Sesardic, having just characterized Cosmides and Tooby's claim as 
about the informativeness of heritability regarding individuals (tout court), lapses back to 
talking about the relevance of heritability to causal processes in individual development: 
Cosmides and Tooby, he says, “are wrong that heritability tells us nothing about what 
caused the development of an individual” (2005, p. 56, emphasis added).  
The vacillation in Sesardic's characterization of his target notwithstanding, his core 
suggestion—that relational facts are all the bridge we need between the population level 
and the individual level—fails to address the key issue raised by the developmentalist’s 
insistence that heritability is silent about the causes of individual development. For 
knowing some relational fact about an individual oak tree (say, that it is one standard 
deviation taller than average) is not, pace Sesardic, the same as having information about 
the causal mechanisms by which the tree came to be (say) eighty feet tall. Sesardic is quite 
correct that it is perfectly sensible to say that it is a fact (specifically, a relational fact) about 
the individual tree that it is taller than average. But the fact that an individual tree is taller 
than average is not a fact about the mechanisms at work in the development of the tree 
which are causally responsible for its being eighty feet tall.  
It would seem rather obvious that relational facts about an individual's standing 
within a population and causal facts about its development are two quite different things. 
But should we need confirmation that these are distinct phenomena, we need only observe 
that the intrinsic causal character of the individual's developmental mechanisms would be 
the same no matter what the population mean; that is, identical epigenetic sequences could 





2SD or +2SD—it simply depends what population the tree is part of. So while the 
heritability of height in the population may be informative about the causes of an 
individual's deviation from the mean (and one might be interested in this information for a 
variety of reasons), the causal-mechanistic processes underlying development are a distinct 
class of phenomena, and so must be explored and explained in different ways.  
 To sum up: the objection to heritability that Sesardic should be concerned with is 
the following: the causal-mechanistic etiology of a trait value is one thing, the deviation of 
that value from the population mean is another; just because heritability provides 
information about the latter does not mean it provides any substantive knowledge about 
the former. Sesardic's (again, perfectly reasonable) observation that relational facts about 
individuals are nonetheless still facts about individuals, and that heritability can provide 
information about relational facts, does nothing to disarm this objection.  
The foregoing discussion undercuts Sesardic's attempt to collapse questions about 
the causal mechanisms at work in individual development into questions about individual 
and/or group differences. In spite of Sesardic's attempt to demonstrate that heritability 
analyses are informative about the causes of individual development, the received view 
(that heritability analyses are, for all practical purposes, silent about mechanisms of 
individual development) still stands. To put it bluntly: where developmentalists talk about 
analyzing the causes of individual development (and the irrelevance of heritability of such 
analyses), introducing the idea of individual deviations from the population mean, as 





However, although Sesardic's attempt to close the chasm between the population 
level and the individual level is not successful, the above discussion—in particular the 
distinction between causes of individual development and population-relative facts about 
individuals—can help us make sense of cases like Isaac Newton’s genius, as well as 
disagreements about them. To review the disagreement: Lykken takes the standard line on 
heritability and individuals: even if intelligence is highly heritable, it is “meaningless to 
ask whether Newton's genius was due more to his genes or his environment” (1998, p. 24); 
Sesardic disagrees, saying once again, “it makes perfect sense to inquire whether Newton's 
extraordinary contributions were due more to his above-average inherited intellectual 
ability or to his being exposed to an above-average stimulating intellectual environment” 
(2005, p. 55). Evelyn Fox Keller (2010, p. 42) also weighs in on this particular case, 
defending Lykken against Sesardic and citing the latter's treatment of the Newton case as 
a clear example of conflating questions about individual traits with questions about trait 
differences.12 
As should be clear from the above discussion, my own position ultimately aligns 
with Lykken’s and Keller’s, but Sesardic’s mistake is understandable. This is because a 
case like “Newton's genius” is particularly amendable to engendering confusion about the 
relevance of heritability to individuals, because the example exhibits an ambiguity between 
the causal and the relational. That is, either side (Sesardic or Lykken/Keller) can draw 
support from the example depending on whether “Newton's genius” is conceived as an 
                                                 
12 The difficulty of keeping separate questions about individual traits and questions about trait differences—
even for careful thinkers—is the main theme of Keller’s (2010) book, and the analysis I provide here is in 





intrinsic or a relational fact about him. On the one hand, Newton's particular assortment 
of cognitive capacities (for abstract reasoning and so forth) were intrinsic properties of him 
as an individual: somehow or other Newton came to be possessed of a mind/brain with 
certain properties, among these being the ability to generate an ingenious physical theory 
that unifies a wide array of phenomena. On the other hand, a very commonsensical way of 
defining a “genius” is simply as “someone who’s a lot smarter than the rest of us.” 
The first of these construals (Newton's genius as a set of cognitive capacities) takes 
a causal process as the relevant explanandum: by what mechanisms did Newton come to 
have a brain that could do the things that Newton's brain did? This is the question Lykken 
and Keller have in mind, and they are correct that the causal contributions of Newton's 
genes and his environment to this outcome cannot be partitioned and quantified. The 
second construal (Newton's genius as relational intellectual superiority) takes the relevant 
explanandum to be a relational fact: why was Newton so much smarter than other people 
with whom he shared varying degrees of genetic and environmental similarity? This is how 
Sesardic interprets the question about Newton's genius, and he is right that we can use 
information about the heritability of intelligence in Newton's population to make an 
informed judgment about whether atypical genes or an atypical environment made the 
greater contribution to Newton's large deviation from the population mean. 
Again, Sesardic is not wrong that there are some individual-level facts (i.e., 
relational ones) about Newton to which heritability is relevant, and moreover, there might 
certainly be contexts in which these are the individual-level questions about Newton that 





Newton's cognitive capacities (and how they got to be that way), and relational facts about 
his capacities as compared with the rest of his population, are simply different phenomena, 
to be explained in different ways. In other words, Sesardic’s mistake is not in taking 
heritability to provide information about Isaac Newton (for it does do that), but in 
apparently assuming that relational facts about Newton are the only ones we ought to care 
about.  
The general lesson to be drawn from our discussion of the Isaac Newton case is that 
specificity in characterizing the phenomenon of interest is especially crucial in the context 
of nature-nurture debates. Relatedly, the foregoing discussion also helps to highlight one 
of the central themes to come in Chapter 7, namely the divergence between the 
explanatory/pragmatic interests of hereditarians and their opponents in the nature-nurture 
debates (one manifestation of which is the kinds of phenomena towards which the different 
camps direct their explanatory energies).  
To see this divergence of explanatory interests, note that despite the confusion in 
his argument, Sesardic ultimately does seem to acknowledge the gap between individual-
level and population-level questions; however, he argues that his focus on the latter is 
justified because considering individual developmental processes “amounts to abandoning 
a population perspective. With this move the connection with the nature-nurture 
controversy becomes tenuous because that debate makes most sense as looking for answers 
at the level of population differences” (2005, p. 54).  
Now, Sesardic is correct that if we are merely concerned with describing population 





“answers at the level of population differences.” But, as I will demonstrate later on, if we 
are instead concerned with exerting control over developmental processes in order to 
change the distribution of phenotypes in the population (and in various sub-populations), 
then it is entirely appropriate to focus on individual-level processes, and to point out that 
heritability analyses will not tell us what we want to know. In other words, Sesardic’s 
stipulation that nature-nurture debates must be confined to population-level questions (i.e., 
heritability of the relevant traits) merely reflects the fact that his interests are limited to 
description rather than manipulation. Since others do not (and, I have argued, should not) 
share these same interests, there is no need for us to maintain focus exclusively on 







 CHAPTER 5: INTRODUCTION TO PART II: SCIENCE, MORALITY, AND 
RACE 
5.1 Introduction 
Racial and ethnic groups continue to enjoy vastly different levels of political, social, 
economic, and cultural power, both in the United States and around the world. It is typically 
thought that such inequality is a morally unacceptable state of affairs, and that efforts 
should be made to remedy it. However, a number of thinkers in what is known as the 
hereditarian tradition in the behavioral sciences have argued that racial inequality is a 
natural and inevitable outcome of “innate” or “genetic” differences between racial groups 
(e.g., in intelligence and other socially-relevant psychological characteristics) and need not 
raise any particular moral concerns. In contrast to the prevailing post-Civil-Rights-Era 
view, these hereditarians argue that we should assume psychological differences among 
racial groups to be fixed and irremediable, that we should take such differences as empirical 
premises in our collective policy deliberations, and that we should accept permanent racial 
inequality as simply a fact of life. 
This chapter and the three that follow are dedicated to arguing against these claims. 
My arguments draw on empirical, conceptual, and moral considerations. Many scientists 
and philosophers have also mounted critiques of hereditarianism’s scientific and social 
agenda on these three (empirical, conceptual, moral) grounds, but my arguments combine 





are best served by adopting a particular theoretical orientation towards the investigation 
and explanation of biological and psychological development. The approach I favor 
privileges mechanistic understandings of organismal development—of the causal 
interactions between genes and environments in developmental processes—over 
generalizations about the statistical relevance of genotypic variation to phenotypic 
variation. As will be explored in the next chapter, mechanistic understandings of 
development afford greater opportunities for intervention and control of developing 
biological systems than do behavior-genetic alternatives. Insofar as we wish to intervene 
to eliminate racial differences, then, mechanistic strategies are to be preferred.  
The project pursued in this second part of the dissertation is largely distinct from 
that completed in Part I, but there are some important connections between the arguments 
of Part I and the goals of Part II as well. For example, I argued in previous chapters that 
the acceptability of different explanatory strategies in science depends upon our pragmatic 
interests (including moral interests)1 and goals. Therefore, assessing the scientific worth of 
different strategies in these nature-nurture debates2 will require that we attend to the 
broader interests and goals we bring to bear on the scientific investigations at hand. 
Whether terms like “innate” and “genetic” earn their explanatory keep in the domain of 
debates about racial differences will depend, in large part, on the broader explanatory 
context in which nature-nurture battles are engaged.  
                                                 
1 Recall our discussion of omissions in Ch. 2: my failure to water your plants is relevant in explaining the 
plants’ death if I have made a promise to water them 
2 Throughout Part II, I use the term “nature-nurture debates” interchangeably with “racial-difference 





Understanding the full social and moral context of these debates will require 
exploring the dynamics of nature-nurture debates—claims and counterclaims, polemical 
strategies, and so forth—in some detail. But my overarching aims in these chapters will be 
to show that we have substantive moral reasons to disfavor hereditarian explanatory 
strategies, and to show that mechanistic, interactionist strategies constitute a viable 
alternative that comports with our collective values.3 A key step in establishing these 
claims will be my enumeration of the moral costs (i.e., the morally bad outcomes) of 
adopting hereditarian strategies (Section 6.2). The rest of the present chapter, however, is 
dedicated to setting the stage for these arguments. I begin in Section 5.2 with some general 
comments about how I will approach the rather difficult and sensitive topic of scientific 
claims about racial inferiority. Section 5.3 specifies the core claims of hereditarianism (i.e., 
the claims I will be arguing against), while Section 5.4 provides an overview of my overall 
strategy—pursued throughout Part II—for resisting these core claims. Finally, Sections 5.5 
and 5.6 establish some fundamentals of the current empirical status of questions about 
racial differences, by discussing the biological nature of “race” and providing an overview 
of some of the main empirical matters under dispute in the race-IQ debate. 
                                                 
3 In other words, I am offering a version of what has been called the “underdetermination argument”: the 
choice between different research agendas and explanatory strategies is underdetermined by the totality of 
empirical evidence that could be gathered; thus some set of non-scientific criteria or other must therefore 





5.2 Some general comments about racial difference debates 
Given the long and fraught history of scientific debates concerning potential racial 
differences, it is worth beginning with some general comments on the nature of the debate. 
These are highly sensitive issues, and as will emerge in Chapter 8, I believe there is a duty 
to talk about them in the right way. Therefore, my aim in this section is to offer some 
context to the discussion that follows, including situating the specific debates I’ll be 
looking at within the broader context of historical and current conversations about the 
possibility of racial differences. 
Claims have been put forth that races differ in their “innate” or “genetic”4 
propensities with regard a wide variety of socially-important psychological traits, and such 
claims are typically followed by heated dispute. The most famous of these debates concerns 
intelligence, but similar controversies surround traits such as personality (extrovertedness, 
openness to experience, conscientiousness, and so forth), aggressiveness, and (lack of) 
sexual restraint.5 For reasons of space and of tractability, my discussion will, for the most 
part, be limited to what is by far the most well-known of these debates, that centering on 
differences in intelligence or IQ6 between White and Black racial groups.7  
                                                 
4 In Part II of the dissertation, I’ll mostly be using the terms “innate” and “genetic” when referring to 
hereditarians’ positions. Hence, the words will mostly appear in scare quotes to indicate that I am 
endorsing neither the hereditarian’s definitions of these terms, nor their application to the traits in question.  
5 It is common in these debates for there to be disagreement not only about the extent to which differences 
are “innate” or “genetic,” but also how differences should be defined and measured. For a helpful 
discussion of such issues in the case of aggression, see Longino (2001).  
6 Strictly speaking, there is a threefold distinction between intelligence (a mental ability), IQ (a score on a 
test) and g (symbolizing general intelligence; a latent factor computed from batteries of psychometric 
tests). Since the technical distinction between intelligence and IQ is immaterial for my purposes, I use 
these two terms interchangeably.   
7 “Blacks” here refers to both native Africans and members of the African Diaspora throughout the world, 
including African-Americans. I capitalize names of racial/ethnic groups for the same reasons given by 





However, it is with some hesitation that I adopt this restricted scope. The reason for 
this hesitation is that I believe the full depth and breadth of the moral issues raised by 
claims about racial differences cannot be truly understood when these claims are 
approached as atomistic empirical statements—he full moral weight of these statements 
emerges when they are considered collectively. For example, examining a range of claims 
about racial differences allows us to see that it is not only IQ in which Blacks are allegedly 
deficient, but a host of other traits as well—they are consistently portrayed as all-around 
inferior human specimens (Levin, 1997b; Rushton, 1997). Thus, pretty much without 
exception, the hereditarian position happens to be that wherever racial/ethnic differences 
in socially-relevant traits are found (and “genetic” explanations offered), the prevalence of 
desirable traits will be lowest, and the prevalence of undesirable traits highest, among 
Blacks.8  
Similarly, although hereditarians do typically attribute higher IQs to Northeast 
Asians as compared to Whites, very little is made of this difference as compared to the 
amount of attention hereditarians dedicate to the gap between Whites and Blacks. The gap 
between Whites and Northeast Asians is thought to be only a fraction of the size of the gap 
                                                 
to using color terms and those referred to using names of continents, to highlight the difference between 
ordinary color words and the homonymous use of such words as names for some race, and highlight the 
artificiality of race in contrast to the apparent naturalness of color. . .making this distinction between 
“color” and race explicit is, I believe, theoretically important” (2004, n. 1). 
8 The supposed superiority of Blacks in athletic endeavors (e.g., Entine, 2008) is frequently cited as a 
counterexample, but it’s actually not clear how favorable the stereotype really is for Blacks: as a number 
of commenters have pointed out (Miller, 1998; Sheldon, Jayaratne, & Petty, 2007), a sort of implicit 
assumption prevails in our society that there are people who are smart and people who are good at sports—
people with good brains and people with good bodies—and that these categories are to some degree 
exclusive and compensatory (i.e., an enhanced prowess in one entails a lack of prowess in the other). The 
idea that Blacks are superior athletes may just be the flip side of the belief that they aren’t smart. The 
suggestion is speculative and fully assessing it would take some work, but the point, again, is that how 





between either of these groups and Blacks (i.e., the White-Asian IQ gap is standardly 
reported at about 3-5 points, whereas the gap between Whites and Blacks is claimed to be 
at least 15 points).9 Thus, Blacks are portrayed as inferior to Whites and Northeast Asians 
by a wide margin and across all traits that are thought to contribute to a person’s being a 
successful, responsible, and morally upright member of society. While Black-White IQ 
gaps and White-Asian IQ gaps are both part of hereditarian theory, only one of these is 
presented as a creating a genuinely qualitative difference among human beings; hence 
Rushton makes a point of emphasizing that “While Orientals developed complex societies 
in Asia, and Whites produced complex civilizations in Europe, Black Africans did not” 
(2000, p. 22).10  
To the extent that many observers are suspicious of hereditarian claims about racial 
differences, much of this suspicion likely stems from the fact that it seems an odd 
coincidence that a single group within a species, a species that exhibits an extremely small 
amount of overall genetic variation (relative to other animals—and indeed, other primates), 
would happen to differ so substantially—with genetic differences as the primary cause—
on such a wide range of traits that happen to be important for professional and financial 
                                                 
9 Note that hereditarians take different positions about the genetic characteristics of various peoples subsumed 
under the commonsense racial term “Asian.” People from the Indian Subcontinent are thought to be the 
same as Europeans in their genetic psychological dispositions. Peoples of Southeast Asia are considered a 
distinct racial group, with levels of intelligence and other socially-desirable traits below those of either 
Northeast Asians or Whites (Lynn & Vanhanen, 2002).  
10 Comments like these also highlight the disingenuousness of a common hereditarian defense against charges 
of racism, namely that they (hereditarians) hold that Asians, not Whites, have the highest average IQs of 
any racial group (i.e., “If we were racist, wouldn’t we say Whites are smartest? But we don’t, so we’re not 
racist.”). But as Rushton makes clear, the differences between Whites and Asians are to be regarded as 
negligible, and not the sort of thing that makes a difference to the capacity to develop and participate in 





success and harmonious coexistence in modern human societies.11 Again, I cannot fully 
explore the plethora of issues raised by the observation of this “odd coincidence,” I merely 
wish to highlight that, while the empirical and epistemological (and moral) facets of the IQ 
debate can be assessed individually, we should bear in mind that hereditarians’ claims 
about IQ are but one component in an interconnected series of claims that paint a 
comprehensive picture of stark racial differences in socially desirable characteristics. 
Finally, I should also note my reservations about confining the discussion to debates 
about alleged differences between just two racial groups, White and Black. One reason for 
this narrow focus should be clear from the above: differences between Blacks and the 
remaining groups are thought to be the largest and most socially significant. Another reason 
is that the issues raised by debates about Black-White differences will, I surmise, be most 
familiar and salient to the majority of readers. Nevertheless, hereditarian claims about the 
characteristics of Asians (and various subgroups thereof), American Indians, Latinas/os, 
Jews, and Aboriginal Australians,12 and the ways in which these claims are intertwined 
with the history of relations between these groups and White Europeans, and with popular 
stereotypes about each group, raise a number of issues that are, again, ultimately vital to a 
                                                 
11 Some researchers, most notably Rushton (1997), claim to have developed an overarching theory of human 
evolution according to which patterns of racial differences are not coincidental, but rather reflect different 
evolutionary strategies taken by different ancestral human populations. However, Rushton’s grasp of the 
complexity of human evolutionary history and biological diversity is suspect (when challenged on his 
division of the human species into three monolithic groups—Black, White, and Asian—he defended his 
racial classification scheme with the claim that it was obvious that aliens visiting Earth would immediately 
observe these groups and make the same tripartite division; see Rushton, 1991), and evolutionary 
biologists have argued that his use of concepts in evolutionary theory to support his model is entirely out 
of step with mainstream understandings of these notions (Graves, 2002).    
12 The distinction between “races” and “ethnic groups” is of course fuzzy, and while those of us in the United 
States are perhaps accustomed to thinking of “Jewish” and “Latino/a” as ethnicities rather than races, these 






complete understanding of the moral dimensions of racial science. To take one example, it 
is notable that even while hereditarians acknowledge higher Northeast Asian IQ, there is a 
pronounced tendency in the writings of certain hereditarians to characterize Northeast 
Asians as meek, submissive, and sexually inadequate (Lynn, 2013; Rushton, 1997). Again, 
I think when we consider claims about racial differences in intelligence in the context of 
these larger claims, we gain valuable perspective about the broader context of the debates. 
But there is insufficient space to consider all of these issues here.  
The takeaway point for this section is that considering only the Black-White IQ 
dimension of debates about racial differences necessarily leaves out much that is relevant 
to the empirical and—especially—the moral assessment of hereditarian claims. Going 
forward I will occasionally make reference to these other alleged areas of difference, where 
doing so is particularly relevant. Again, however, my main concern will be with debates 
about the Black-White IQ gap. The next section sets up my critique of the hereditarian 
position by providing a precise specification of what the core claims of hereditarianism 
amount to. 
5.3 The claims of hereditarianism 
Let me begin this section by stating what I consider to be my main target—that is, 
the hereditarian claim that I am most concerned to reject. The claim, as I express it, will 
require some explanation, much of which I will put off for later chapters. For now, I’ll 





HED: The genetic differences between racial groups are such that currently-
observed psychological and behavioral differences will manifest across the 
full range of relevant environmental conditions.  
While I’ll be forestalling full discussion of this “core” claim for the time being, 
there are a number of elements to the hereditarian position that are worth spelling out. 
Below I list a series of claims about intelligence and heritability that are key components 
of the hereditarian position on racial differences. Spelling out these claims in this way will 
serve the dual purpose of summarizing the hereditarian argument and allowing me to make 
clear which of the hereditarian’s claims I will and will not be arguing against. Here are the 
claims, listed roughly in order of the degree to which they are accepted in mainstream 
scholarship on intelligence:  
1. General or fluid intelligence (known as g) is a stable property of individuals, 
consisting, roughly, of the ability to process and manipulate complex 
information efficiently across a wide variety of contexts. 
2.  Phenotypic intelligence differs among individuals. 
3. IQ tests accurately measure the phenotypic intelligence of individuals; that is, 
an individual’s score on an IQ test accurately reflects a stable property of that 
individual, namely her ability to process complex information. IQ tests are 
equally accurate measures of g in individuals across genders, races, cultures, 
and socioeconomic classes. 
4.  IQ becomes fixed in adolescence. While it may be possible to change IQ early 
in development, adults’ IQ is essentially fixed and cannot be significantly 
modified. 
5.  Intelligence is a prime determinant of success in modern society. On average, 
more intelligent people will accumulate more wealth, prestige, and political 
influence than less intelligent people. Moreover, IQ is a better predictor of 





6.  The mean IQ score among African Americans is about 1 SD (15 points) lower 
than the mean among Whites. 
7.  Intelligence shows high heritability, meaning that individual differences in 
intelligence are largely attributable to genetic (as opposed to environmental) 
differences. 
8.  Just as individual IQ differences can be attributed to genetic differences between 
individuals, group IQ differences (i.e., the Black-White gap) are attributable to 
genetic differences between groups. 
9.  The high heritability of IQ places severe limits on the potential for 
environmental manipulations to increase an individual’s (or group’s) IQ. 
Most of these claims are have been the subject of significant controversy. Critics of 
hereditarianism have argued that there is no such thing as general intelligence (Gould, 
1983), that IQ tests are inadequate measures of general cognitive ability (Sternberg, 1985), 
that IQ tests are biased against certain cultural groups (Sandoval, 1979), that IQ is less 
important than other factors for job performance and success (Ceci & Liker, 1986; 
Chomsky, 1972), that the Black-White IQ gap has closed to less than 1 SD (Dickens & 
Flynn, 2006; Nisbett, 2009), that heritability is a misleading measure of genetic influence 
(Lewontin, 1974; Wahlsten, 1990), and that it is illegitimate to infer from the fact that 
individual differences are genetic that group differences are also genetic (N. Block & 
Dworkin, 1976). 
For the sake of the argument, however, I propose to grant all of the above 
propositions save for the final two. That is, I will not be challenging the claims that IQ tests 
measure general cognitive ability, that IQ is an important determinant of academic and 





IQ owe largely to genetic differences among individuals. All of these claims appear to 
enjoy mainstream support among experts in the field, even those who disagree with claims 
about “innate” racial differences. As we will see, however, I think there are good reasons 
to doubt that group (i.e., racial) differences in IQ are best explained by appeal to genetic 
differences among racial groups, and I will argue that high heritability for a trait like IQ 
need not place any significant limits on the effectiveness of well-designed interventions.  
There are as number of consequences that follow from the above concessions, and 
these are worth spelling out explicitly, as they will help to frame the aims and scope of my 
argument (of which I will present an overview in the next section). First, if we are to 
achieve racial equality, we must eliminate or at least minimize the IQ gap. While there are 
a number of characteristics beyond IQ that contribute to success, and while effort and luck 
will be sufficient in many individual cases to overcome low IQ, it seems unavoidable that 
in the aggregate a racial IQ gap of any significant size will yield differential socioeconomic 
outcomes in a society that increasingly values intellectual labor and cognitive efficiency.  
Second, improving IQ among disadvantaged groups will require intervening early 
in development. There is some evidence that certain kinds of training (specifically, working 
memory training) can induce moderate IQ gains in adults, but these gains are slight 
compared to the size of the Black-White IQ gap. IQ appears to be much more malleable in 
childhood (early childhood especially) than in adulthood; hence, the best prospects for 





Combining these two points, I will be assuming that given our present state of 
knowledge, early-childhood interventions to improve intellectual development ultimately 
constitute the best (and perhaps the only) route to promoting racial equality. 
5.4 A sketch of the argument against hereditarianism 
I argue that we ought to reject the hereditarians’ core claim, but I present a novel 
argument for this conclusion. The argument will be developed over the course of this 
chapter and the two that follow, but the overall outline is as follows. Previous chapters 
established that our practices of scientific explanation cannot be divorced from our 
interests; explanation therefore involves the interplay of empirical and pragmatic 
considerations, where “pragmatic considerations” includes our moral concerns. Thus there 
is a role for values in assessing the worth of a proposed explanation or explanatory strategy. 
(This is especially true when it comes to decisions about whether a particular phenomenon 
has been given a “satisfactory explanation.”) This much, again, has been established in 
previous chapters.  
In keeping with the methodological and explanatory pluralism advocated in 
previous chapters, I suggest that the hereditarian and mechanistic/developmentalist 
strategies each constitute legitimate explanatory approaches in the sense of offering 
explanations that will be sufficient in at least some explanatory contexts. But I argue that 
we have practical and moral reasons to disfavor hereditarian strategies. This is not to say 
that the methodological and explanatory strategies employed by hereditarians are wrong, 





compromise important moral values by closing off possibilities for closing racial gaps in 
achievement and in social and economic capital. Mechanistic strategies, on the other hand, 
comport with our values because they offer the possibility of discovering interventions that 
will serve to promote racial equality, and so we are justified in preferring them to the 
hereditarian alternatives.  
Hereditarians will be inclined to call foul on this move, seeing it as evincing an 
Orwellian mindset that grants license for egalitarian ideals—rather than objective scientific 
inquiry—to dictate truth on what are clearly matters of empirical fact. That is, proponents 
of hereditarian scientific positions on the nature of racial differences in social outcomes 
strenuously resist the encroachment of social or moral concerns into “purely scientific” 
aspects of nature-nurture debates. It should be clear from the arguments presented 
throughout this dissertation that I do not think such interest-immunity for scientific practice 
is possible.  
Nevertheless, I acknowledge that there are legitimate and illegitimate ways for our 
practical and moral concerns to inform our explanatory practices (as expressed in earlier 
chapters, it’s not the case that “anything goes”). In particular, practical and moral 
considerations cannot give us legitimate grounds for rejecting propositions with 
overwhelming, unqualified empirical support, nor for accepting propositions that are 
clearly empirically inadequate. Human communities have, at various points, seen 
considerable value in a role for humankind as the center of divine creation, but the 





out any value-based considerations: these theories have rightly been rejected, and we have 
had to learn to live with the implications.  
Thus it remains to be shown that HED is not like heliocentrism or evolution, so far 
beyond any serious doubt that any reasonable person or society must accept it as true and 
take it as a premise in all relevant practical deliberations. If it were the case, as some 
hereditarians have suggested, that HED cannot be reasonably doubted, then the value-based 
considerations I offer against it would be entirely moot. Thus the first step in my argument 
(Section 5.6) will be to establish that the empirical case for HED—for genetically-
determined, permanent racial differences—is considerably weaker than its proponents have 
supposed; while I do not take a stand on whether HED is, given the available empirical 
evidence, more or less plausible than its negation, I do argue that the evidence does not 
rationally require that we accept HED.  
Having shown that the empirical status of HED is far from determinate, I go on, in 
Chapter 6, to demonstrate the moral costs that would ensue from taking HED as true, by 
looking at what a society that adopted hereditarian conclusions and implemented them 
wholeheartedly into its policies might look like (where the policy proposals I consider have 
mostly been offered by hereditarian scientists and philosophers themselves). Again, my 
argument in favor of deemphasizing, if not discarding, hereditarian explanatory strategies 
would go nowhere if it were not the case that there are genuine moral costs to adopting 
hereditarian thinking on a broad scale (that there are no such costs is the position of most 
hereditarians who have commented on the matter). Thus, having described some of the 





morally unfortunate (contra hereditarians who argue that a racially stratified society is 
either evaluatively neutral or indeed a paragon of justice).  
I should clarify here what I am not saying about the relationship between morality 
and scientific inquiry. I do not mean to claim that when we are faced with alternative 
theories that purport to explain the same phenomena, the alignment of each competing 
theory with our moral commitments (for lack of a better term, the theory’s “moral 
goodness”) should be counted among the “theoretical virtues” (e.g., simplicity, explanatory 
power, coherence, and so forth) that we use to adjudicate theory choice. In other words, I 
am not claiming that the moral goodness of a theory counts in favor of the theory being 
true, in the sense that it accurately describes the causal relations among phenomena in its 
domain—alas, the causal structure of the world pays no heed to human moral strictures. 
Rather, my claim is that in the case of debates about racial differences, we are not 
necessarily considering two competing accounts of the causal relations underlying 
disparate behavioral and social outcomes among racial groups. Rather, we are deciding 
between two explanatory frameworks that impose different criteria for assessing the 
adequacy of explanatory statements; that is, hereditarianism treats certain explanations for 
racial differences as adequate, while the opposing (mechanistic) framework rejects the 
adequacy of these explanations. No disagreement about the underlying causal structure is 





5.5 The biological status of “race”  
5.5.1 Is discussion of “racial differences” based on a confusion? 
Before turning to the substantive empirical matters that divide hereditarians and 
environmentalists, it is worth considering an objection to the entire enterprise of looking 
for racial differences. It is sometimes argued that there can be no such thing as “racial 
differences in intelligence” (or racial differences in anything, for that matter) because there 
are no such things as races. That is, it is argued that race is at best a social category rather 
than a biological one, and so insofar as claims about psychological differences between 
“races” appear to rest upon the reality of biological distinctions between groups, such 
claims must be false.13 Hence Bob Richardson, in a review of Michael Levin’s (1997b) 
book defending racial differences in intelligence and criminal proclivities, remarks,  
Biologically, human races do not exist, however important race is as a social 
category and however much it features in our lives. Consequently, there is 
no biological basis for racial differences and no point in writing a book on 
the biological basis of racial differences (Richardson, 2000, p. 847).  
Indeed, in the last half-century or so, it has become a point of scientific and 
philosophical orthodoxy that human “races” do not constitute valid biological categories. 
The claim has various formulations: races are not natural kinds, there are no biologically 
interesting subdivisions (i.e., subspecies) within the human species, and so forth. The key 
                                                 
13 The claim that race is “not real” is sometimes identified with the claim that race is “socially constructed.” 
However, we need not dwell on the tricky matter of what social construction is, and whether and how it 
relates to the “reality” of categories like race (see Hacking, 1999; Mills, 1998)—we can here restrict our 





move for our purposes is the inference from the non-reality of race to the implausibility or 
impossibility of psychological differences among races.  
Richardson’s seems to be a common view (see also Antony, 1993, pp. 143–144; 
Loury, 2002, p. 111). But I believe this position misrepresents the upshot of the claim 
(which, broadly speaking, I endorse—see Section 5.5.2) that race is “not real.” The 
argument that race does not exist usually proceeds by way of giving an “error theory” about 
race (Appiah, 1996): our common-sense talk about race commits us to the existence of a 
small number of discrete human subspecies, but since there is greater genetic diversity 
within human populations than between them (Lewontin, 1972), and because human 
biological variation is clinal rather than discontinuous, it follows that our discourse about 
race fails to pick out any real categories in the world; hence race (as the word is commonly 
used and understood) is an illusion. 
Thus, the “error theory” account of race depends crucially on a premise about what 
our common-sense talk about race commits us to. But racial anti-realism need not (indeed, 
should not) deny that we can use biological criteria (i.e., morphological and genetic 
differences) to draw distinctions among human population groups; it merely denies that 
these population groups meet the standards set by our use of the word “race.” For our 
purposes here, we do not need to settle the issue of what exactly our racial discourse 
commits us to, or whether the error theory of race is correct. For a defender of group 
differences like Levin could concede that human populations do not live up to our use of 
the word “race” (and hence agree that there are no racial differences in intelligence, 





population groups are causally responsible for observed differences in psychological 
characteristics among these groups. Indeed, Levin makes precisely this move early in his 
book, when he acknowledges the uncertainty of the meaning of “race,” and suggests that 
readers may take the book “not as a discussion of race differences at all, but of differences 
between descendants of Africans and Eurasians. Nothing is lost but a word” (1997, p. 22, 
emphasis in original).  
Thus, hereditarian claims have much more to do with the genetic structure of human 
populations than with “race,” per se. And it turns out, unsurprisingly, that with enough 
genomic data and sophisticated statistical software, it is quite easy for researchers to 
distinguish genetically among human populations across continents (Bamshad et al., 2003; 
N. Rosenberg et al., 2002; Tang et al., 2005) and even across countries within a single 
continent (Novembre et al., 2008).  
The upshot of this discussion is simply that insofar as the possibility of “genetically-
determined racial differences” with regard to socially-relevant psychological traits has 
captured the attention of scientific researchers and the general public, the debate does not, 
contra philosophers like Richardson, really turn on whether it is legitimate to apply the 
term “races” to the populations studied; the debate could proceed in essentially the same 
way, and with the same momentous social import, even if less semantically loaded terms 
like “population” are substituted for “race.” The non-reality of race does not obviate 
discussions of group differences in socially-relevant traits.14 Claims about group 
                                                 
14 At least, not in the way that many commenters seem to think. One might attempt to undermine 
investigations of group differences by inquiring as to why, given that race is not a genuine biological 
category, the scientific establishment nevertheless considers it so damned important to investigate whether 





differences must stand and fall based on what interpretation is given to the idea of “group 
differences in genetic endowments for a trait,” and the empirical evidence that can be 
adduced for such differences. 
5.5.2 “Race” and contemporary genetics 
In spite of the non-relevance of the biological reality (or non-reality) of race as a 
biological concept to debates about innate racial differences, for the sake of completeness 
it is worth evaluating some modern attempts to vindicate common-sense notions of race 
using recent advances in population genetics. As noted above, the received view among 
contemporary biologists and philosophers is that race is not a legitimate biological 
category. However, a number of scientists, and at least one philosopher, have recently 
challenged this view. According to this latter camp, new developments in genetics have 
more or less vindicated the common-sense notion of race. As explored below, the details 
of human genetic variation are turning out to be quite complex, and little is known for 
certain. But I take it that a large part of what philosophers can contribute to the debate is to 
find a good answer (or at least some plausible answers) to the question, what would 
genomics researchers have to find in order for them to have found “races”? While I cannot 
provide an exhaustive discussion of this question here, this section aims to provide some 
context to discussions of race and biology by touching on some of the relevant empirical 
findings and some of the extant debate about what “races” would have to be in order for 
them to exist. The discussion here is, however, auxiliary to the main thrust of this chapter, 





5.5.2.1 The received view and “Lewontin’s Fallacy” 
Let us call the emerging consensus—the view that human races are not valid 
biological categories—“racial anti-realism.” Classic statements of the anti-realist view can 
be found in Montague (1964) and Lewontin (1972). Lewontin’s argument is perhaps the 
most widely cited and, being grounded purely in analysis of human genetic variation, the 
most relevant here. 
Lewontin’s claim that there are no human races is grounded in his finding that there 
is more variation within human groups than between them. Using a sample of over 100 
global populations and 17 genetic loci, Lewontin found that about 85% of genetic variation 
is found within populations, while 15% is found between populations. Moreover, the 
between-population percentage shrinks to 6% when the populations considered are 
common-sense racial groupings. Another way of expressing Lewontin’s finding is as a 
fixation index (FST) value, which expresses the ratio of within-population to between-
population genetic variation as a number between 0 and 1 (i.e., if the FST is close to 0, then 
between-population variation is small compared to within-population variation—that is, 
populations are not very genetically distinct from one another). Lewontin’s analysis 
corresponds to an FST value of .15 across all populations or .06 across common-sense racial 
classifications, whereas a value of > .25 is generally considered necessary to justify 
division into subspecies (Templeton, 2002). The low degree of between-population 
variation is sometimes summarized by the claim “two people selected from different 
‘races’ will be no more genetically different than two individuals chosen at random from 





However, papers by Mitton (1977) and, more recently, Edwards (2003) have 
challenged Lewontin’s analysis, to the point that the latter is now often referred to as 
“Lewontin’s Fallacy.” The alleged fallacy is Lewontin’s use of a measure of variation (FST) 
that reflects the average degree of genetic difference between populations at multiple loci. 
Such an averaging procedure, critics argue, is capable of masking clear, systematic patterns 
of variation that distinguish populations from one another. In other words, Lewontin’s 
procedure would be sensitive to large differences in the frequency of one or a few alleles 
in different populations (which critics agree are not found), but it is not sensitive to small 
but systematic differences in allele frequencies at multiple loci. Critics also point to 
Lewontin’s use of only a few loci, whereas modern genome-sequencing techniques and 
statistical software allow scientists to look for population differences using many thousands 
of loci. 
And indeed, when such advanced techniques are applied to human populations, 
small but systematic differences in allele frequencies can be detected that allow for 
individuals to be assigned to populations with a high degree of accuracy (whether this 
amounts to “racial” classification is controversial and is discussed below). Studies in this 
vein often rely on a statistical package called STRUCTURE, which, given a series of 
individual genomes, identifies “clusters” of individuals with similar allelic patterns.15 
Using this technique, Rosenberg et al. (2002) were able to identify 5 such clusters that 
roughly correspond to major geographic regions (Africa, Europe/Middle East, East Asia, 
                                                 
15 It has been argued, based on simulation data, that STRUCTURE does not reliably identify population 
structure (Kalinowski, 2011). However, most researchers seem to accept the viability of STRUCTURE’s 





Oceania, and America), while Bamshad et al. (2003) identified three such clusters (Europe, 
Africa, East Asia). Responding to the claim that genetic population clusters might not 
correlate with folk or self-applied racial categorizations, Tang et al., (2005) identified four 
major genetic clusters using samples in the U.S. and Taiwan, which matched self-identified 
race/ethnicity (Asian, African-American, Hispanic, or White/Caucasian) almost perfectly. 
Using a different measure of genetic distance, Witherspoon, et al. (2007) found that 
if sufficiently many loci are examined from individuals of geographically distant origins, 
it is—contrary to aphoristic summaries of Lewontin’s argument—never the case that two 
individuals from different populations are more similar to one another than two individuals 
from the same population. Some of these scientists (e.g., Risch, Burchard, Ziv, & Tang, 
2002; Tang et al., 2005) have argued explicitly that these findings establish the biological 
legitimacy of traditional racial categories, while others (N. Rosenberg et al., 2002; 
Witherspoon et al., 2007) caution against leaping to this conclusion. Sesardic (2010) has 
brought philosophers’ attention to these findings by stepping in on the side of the “racial 
realists,” and arguing that “in view of these new studies it becomes harder to accept the 
widespread but often unsubstantiated claim about the biological meaninglessness of race” 
(2010, p. 154).  
5.5.2.2 But what are races anyway? 
What are we to make of these claims that, contrary to what seems to be the 
prevailing opinion of biologists, anthropologists, and philosophers, race is in fact a 





whether or not there are races clearly depends in large part on what we mean by “race.” 
For starters, given that “race” appears to be a putative natural-kind term, we can expect 
some degree of “semantic deference” on the matter, with ordinary users of the term 
deferring to “experts” on the precise meaning of the term (just as I might defer to experts 
on the precise meaning of “acid” or “magnetic field”). So a scientific notion of race need 
not correspond perfectly with ordinary usage (i.e., scientific racial taxonomy may differ 
from common-sense taxonomy, or the role of morphology in making racial distinctions 
may be lesser in scientific usage of the term than in folk usage, and so forth). Importantly, 
however, defenders of the “new racial biology” claim that modern science vindicates the 
common-sense idea of race. And as Glasgow (2003) points out, races cannot be just any 
biologically interesting subdivisions within the human species—it would be absurd to 
claim that one had vindicated the common-sense idea of race by discovering a “clear 
genetic difference” between two human populations: those with chromosomes XX and 
those with chromosomes XY. So the possibilities for a scientific notion of “race” must be 
somewhat constrained by ordinary usage. So what does “common-sense” usage of the term 
“race” entail? 
It is by no means obvious exactly what all “ordinary usage” amounts to, but I take 
it that contemporary folk ideas of race hold, minimally, that races are major biological 
subdivisions of the human species (i.e., relatively few in number, usually three to seven), 
including at least the categories of “African/Black,” “European/White,” and “Asian.” 
Appiah (1996) has argued for the much stronger claim that the term “race” commits us to 





aesthetic characteristics that are inherited together and are biologically fixed—the 
possession of which is necessary and sufficient for an individual to be a member of a 
particular race16 (see also Zack, 2002). Sesardic (2010), however, points out—correctly, I 
think—that this kind of essentialism as a straw-figure version of the racial realist’s claims: 
such rigid taxonomical conditions (requiring that, in order for a taxonomic category to be 
legitimate, “all and only” members of that group must possess some characteristic) would 
rule out even species-level classifications.  
So if racial essentialism is too strong a characterization of the race-realist’s claim 
that modern biology vindicates the idea of race, what might the alternative be? According 
to Sesardic, all that is needed to establish the existence of human races is that there should 
be human subspecies, and subspecies are simply “populations of organisms that, despite 
belonging to the same species, differ among themselves with respect to frequencies of 
alternative alleles at a number of loci” (2010, p. 148). The existence of such populations 
seems quite clearly established by the new genetic studies. 
However, Sesardic’s criterion for subspecies seems too minimal to count as a 
definition of race that captures ordinary usage. For populations exhibiting this minimal 
condition (some difference in allele frequencies) are quite easy to find and come in all 
shapes and sizes. Notably, the number of genetic clusters generated by the STRUCTURE 
program (K) is not “mandated by the data” but rather specified by the researchers in 
advance. Thus, one can just as easily use STRUCTURE to identify two human populations 
                                                 
16 Appiah constructs this argument using a causal-historical conception of linguistic meaning, according to 
which the meaning of terms like “race” for contemporary speakers is fixed by the intensional states of the 





(“races” in Sesardic’s terms) or 20, suggesting that the number of “races” identifiable in 
this fashion is arbitrary. Moreover, the number and nature of the clusters seems quite 
sensitive to the particular population samples used. For example, both Bamshad et al. 
(2003) at K = 3 and Rosenberg et al. (2002) at K = 5 obtained clusters roughly 
corresponding to major geographic regions. But at K = 4 and K = 6, respectively, 
STRUCTURE generated additional clusters corresponding to small ethnic groups (the 
Mbuti of Central Africa for Bamshad et al. and the Kalash of South Asia for Rosenberg et 
al.). Thus it is by no means obvious that common-sense racial categories represent the most 
salient “objective” subdivisions of the human species as identified by genetic clustering 
techniques.  
Even more embarrassing for Sesardic’s “race” criterion, Novembre et al. (2008) 
were able to separate the population of Europe into a number of distinct genetic clusters 
(e.g., Iberians, Italians/Slovakians) and could reliably assign the individuals in the study to 
a fairly precise region of origin (e.g., Poland, Belgium, and even French- or German-
speaking areas of Switzerland). While these results were obtained using principal 
components analysis (PCA) rather than the STRUCTURE program, the point is the same: 
these groups clearly meet Sesardic’s criterion of being “populations that differ among 
themselves with respect to alternative alleles at multiple loci,” and thus according to his 
definition Poles, Germans, and Swedes are all members of distinct subspecies and hence 
distinct races. Such a construal of “race” seems completely divorced from ordinary 





There are, however, two moves available to the racial realist that might salvage the 
idea that the genetic structure of human populations vindicates “race” as a valid biological 
category. First, Risch et al. (2002, p. 3) offer a more stringent criterion than Sesardic’s for 
“race,” namely that race is “based on continental ancestry.” They argue that this is the 
“classical definition of races” and makes the following classifications: “African, Caucasian 
(Europe/Middle East), Asian, Pacific Islander (for example, Australian, New Guinean, and 
Melanesian), and Native American” (Risch et al., 2002, p. 3). That is, Risch et al. suggest 
that races are not just any identifiable genetic clusters, but only those corresponding to 
major continental regions.17 If Risch et al. have accurately characterized the definition of 
“race,” then it could be argued that this notion is vindicated insofar as these populations 
are in fact genetically distinguishable from one another. This move, however, would seem 
to require giving up the idea (also arguably part of the “classical definition” of race) that 
races are non-arbitrary categories; for there is apparently nothing “in the data” that 
demands we stop at five clusters (corresponding to the “major continental regions”) rather 
than six (and counting the Kalash as a distinct race).  
Alternatively, a defender of biological races might suggest the following: although 
STRUCTURE will generate as many clusters as the experimenter asks for, there is a 
plausible non-arbitrary way to determine what is the “right” number of clusters warranted 
by the data. If the genetic data fed to STRUCTURE do not actually reflect K genetically 
distinguishable populations, then it will produce drastically different outputs for multiple 
                                                 
17 One might challenge whether Risch et al. are entitled to their particular notion of what the “major 
continental regions” are, inasmuch as Europe and Asia are not distinct continents, nor is Oceania/Pacific 
Islands really a continent at all. But Risch et al. can probably be charitably interpreted as articulating what 





independent runs of the algorithm. And indeed, this is precisely what happened when 
Rosenberg’s research team ran the algorithm at K ≥ 7 (Bolnik, 2008). A proponent of using 
genetic clustering to rehabilitate the race concept might therefore suggest that there are 
precisely as many races (major human subspecies) as can be reliably identified by genetic 
clustering algorithms applied to a global sample of populations, no more and no less. This 
makes the question of how many human races there are, and who belongs in which one, a 
straightforward empirical one, albeit one which we are not in a position to answer with any 
appreciable degree of confidence (again, the outputs of the algorithm are quite sensitive to 
the populations utilized—in contrast to Rosenberg et al.’s six clusters, Xing et al. (2010) 
obtained reliable results up to K = 12).  
In sum, Sesardic (2010) is probably right that Lewontin’s classic (1972) analysis is 
insufficient on its own to establish that “race” is not a valid taxonomic category. But 
whether there are, in fact, any races depends on both the subtle conceptual questions of 
what exactly races are supposed to be, and on complex empirical facts we are only just 
beginning to uncover. The prospects for developing a genetic theory of race seem to me 
quite dubious, but a definitive answer must await further developments in the field of 
genomics and, perhaps, greater conceptual clarity on what, exactly, “race” means. 
5.5.2.3 A final possibility: cladistics and race 
I will briefly address one final recent attempt from a philosopher to ground racial 
divisions in modern biological practice. In contrast to the genetic approaches described 





monophyletic group is a taxonomic group comprising an ancestral population along with 
all (and only) its descendents. According to analysis from Cavalli-Sforza and colleagues 
(1994), a phylogenetic tree can be constructed for human populations that identifies 
monophyletic groups such as Africans, Northeast Asians, Europeans, and Amerindians 
(see Figure 5.1). Andreasen argues that races can be identified with these monophyletic 
groups. However, Andreasen’s theory has garnered little attention (almost all of it 
critical—see Glasgow, 2003; Marks, 2010; Kaplan & Winther, 2012), as it faces three 
major difficulties. 
 
Figure 5.1: Proposed cladistic division of races (from Andreasen, 2004) 
 
First, whether a tree structure with true monophyletic populations can be extracted 
from the molecular genetic data is contentious, with some (e.g., Templeton, 1999) arguing 
that the data do not fit a tree structure, and that there are in fact no human monophyletic 
groups of appreciable size. Second, the particulars of Cavalli-Sforza’s tree do a poor job of 





from China and people from Thailand as members of separate races. And finally, the 
cladistic theory entails that people with ancestry from more than one monophyletic group 
do not belong to any race (for they themselves do not belong to any monophyletic human 
population); this yields, inter alia, the result—also entirely contrary to ordinary usage—
that most African-Americans (who have some European or Native American ancestry) do 
not have a race.  
5.6 Empirical challenges to hereditarianism 
The debate over the causes of the Black-White gap in IQ and other outcomes is 
long-standing and shows little sign of being resolved any time soon. But it is crucial to my 
argument that the truth of HED is not (as hereditarians generally maintain) so firmly 
established that we ought to begin acting as though it is true. Thus in the remainder of this 
chapter I discuss three challenges to the hereditarian account of the race-IQ gap, which will 
establish that there are good reasons to doubt hereditarian explanations appealing to genetic 
causes. This is not meant to be an exhaustive review (for recent, extended discussions of 
the case for and against hereditarianism, see Rushton & Jensen, 2005; Nisbett et al., 2012); 
Rather my purpose is simply to establish that thoroughgoing agnosticism on this question 
is warranted. It is simply too early to tell.  
5.6.1 Stereotype threat 
A substantial challenge for the hereditarian perspective is the phenomenon of 





possibility of failure at a high-stakes task (such as an IQ test) generates more anxiety for 
groups who are subject to negative stereotypes about their abilities in the relevant domain 
(“Blacks are unintelligent,” “women can’t do math”). The additional anxiety stems from 
the perception among stigmatized groups that if they perform poorly on the task, it will be 
attributed to their identity (as Black or as a woman) and thus taken to confirm the 
stereotype, whereas no such threat is present for members of non-stigmatized groups (e.g., 
White males who perform poorly on a math test need not worry that their poor performance 
will be taken as evidence that “White men can’t do math”). This stress reaction to high-
stakes performance situations impedes cognitive processing and depresses performance. 
(For a comprehensive and accessible review of findings in this literature, see Steele, 2010.) 
Given the prevalence of negative stereotypes about Black intelligence, and the fact 
that laboratory studies have established that interventions designed to reduce threat-related 
anxiety can result in substantial improvements in the performance of stigmatized groups, 
environmentalists suggest that some (perhaps significant) portion of Black-White IQ 
differences can be attributed to the additional anxiety Blacks experience in IQ testing 
circumstances relative to Whites, rather than to any genuine psychological difference 
(including genetically-caused differences) between Blacks and Whites.  
Hereditarians who have addressed the putative role of stereotype threat in 
generating the Black-White IQ gap note that some psychologists (Sackett, Hardison, & 
Cullen, 2004) have expressed doubts about the ability of stereotype threat to account for 
all or most of the Black-White IQ gap. At issue is the way stereotype threat researchers 





implied hereditarian position appears to be, then, that stereotype threat is a laboratory-only 
phenomenon, one that plays no role in actual performance situations and therefore poses 
no threat to the validity of IQ tests as measures of real psychological properties of either 
White or Black test-takers.  
However, this skepticism about the ecological validity of stereotype threat is 
difficult to maintain in the face of the robust theoretical success of stereotype threat 
research. That is, the phenomenon of stereotype threat can be reliably induced and 
observed, is consistent with broader, explanatorily successful theories about the effects of 
anxiety on cognitive performance, and can be reliably manipulated in laboratory settings. 
In short, Sackett et al.’s misgivings notwithstanding, the potential effects of stereotype 
threat on Black IQ-test performance cannot be discounted. 
5.6.2 Intelligence, working memory, and stress 
Recent work on the neurocognitive underpinnings of intelligence have found robust 
correlations between measures of working memory (WM) capacity and traditional 
measures of psychometric intelligence (Alloway & Alloway, 2010; Colom, Rebollo, 
Palacios, Juan-Espinosa, & Kyllonen, 2004; Conway, Kane, & Engle, 2003). While some 
studies suggest that WM and fluid intelligence are essentially identical (Colom et al., 
2004), we do not here need to establish the precise nature of the relationship between WM 
and intelligence. The relevant point for our purposes is simply that, unsurprisingly, 





resource, one that is responsible for maintaining and manipulating active representations 
and suppressing irrelevant information. 
These findings become relevant to the race-IQ debate when combined with other 
recent investigations of both the situational and long-term determinants of WM capacity. 
One such strain of research establishes that physiological responses associated with 
elevated stress significantly impair WM capacity. According to models developed by these 
researchers, elevated stress levels have both short- and long-term effects on WM capacity. 
In the short term, stressful life events have high cognitive salience and function as 
distractors that must be inhibited while directing attention to a task—in effect, stress 
increases cognitive load (Klein & Boals, 2001; Schoofs, Preuß, & Wolf, 2008). Meanwhile, 
the presence of physiological stress markers has been shown to have long-term adverse 
effects on the development of brain systems—e.g., the hippocampus and prefrontal 
cortex—that are known to be crucial in the operation of WM (Evans & Schamberg, 2009; 
Hackman, Farah, & Meaney, 2010). 
Crucially, these physiological stress markers have been shown to be chronically 
elevated in both parents and children in positions of low socioeconomic status, and elevated 
to even greater levels among African-Americans—even after controlling for the effects of 
SES (Mays, Cochran, & Barnes, 2007; Troxel, Matthews, Bromberger, & Sutton-Tyrrell, 
2003; Turner & Avison, 2003). It is hypothesized, specifically, that the persistent burden 





(Sue, Capodilupo, & Holder, 2008)—is responsible for these chronically elevated stress 
responses among Blacks.18  
From these findings it is reasonable to infer that the Black-White IQ gap may be 
mediated at least in part by a subtle but systematic difference in the environmental 
conditions of Blacks and Whites: the continual presence of stressors generated by racial 
stigma in Blacks’ environments impedes the development and functioning of WM, thus 
depressing IQ scores.19 And, consistent with the models proposed in the studies reviewed 
above, environmental interventions—specifically, early-childhood educational programs 
that provide additional support to low-SES children and their parents—can reduce stress 
(both parents’ and children’s) and improve children’s attentional capacities and—
crucially—intelligence test scores as well, at least in the short term (Fisher, Stoolmiller, 
Gunnar, & Burraston, 2007; Neville et al., 2013). While these interventions were directed 
at low-SES children across racial groups and have not yet explored the prospects of such 
manipulations for reducing the Black-White IQ gap, this line of research lays the 
foundation for a very promising and, importantly, theoretically well-grounded strategy for 
addressing the IQ gap.  
                                                 
18 Another, related line of research suggests that training on WM tasks may well improve general intelligence 
in children, at least for some individuals (Hsu, Novick, & Jaeggi, 2014; Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Jonides, & 
Shah, 2011; Karbach & Unger, 2014). This research is in its preliminary stages, and it is not clear precisely 
what factors influence the effectiveness of WM training in raising intelligence test scores for an individual, 
or how durable the effects are over the long term, but these results clearly suggest that certain kinds of 
environmental variations—e.g., the presence or absence of experiences that promote the enhancement of 
WM capacity—can generate individual differences in intelligence during development, and that 
intelligence may not be as impervious to interventions as hereditarians suggest. 
19 Note, however, that the precise hypothesis offered to explain differing levels of chronic stress doesn’t 
matter for the main point here: the hereditarian hypothesis is impugned so long as the stress differences 
are environmental in origin—and it would, I submit, be bizarre to suppose that Blacks are genetically 





To my knowledge, hereditarians have not responded directly to the evidence for the 
role of stress-inducing environmental conditions in generating the Black-White IQ gap. 
Two responses seem likely, however. First, hereditarians have long maintained that 
environmental differences—including those arising from racial prejudice—cannot explain 
the IQ gap because the gap remains even when environmental variables are taken into 
account, and because social changes since the Civil Rights Era have minimized the role of 
racial prejudice in American society (Herrnstein & Murray, 1996; Jensen, 1969; Rushton 
& Jensen, 2005). But the environmental factors for which previous analyses have 
controlled are only very course-grained measures of broad socioeconomic indicators 
(Glymour, 1998), and would be insensitive to the effects of differential levels of chronic 
stress revealed in recent studies. Moreover, the heightened levels of stress observed among 
African-Americans give the lie to the already dubious premise that racial stigma has ceased 
to affect minority groups in any way that might matter for the development of cognitive 
ability. 
As for the second likely hereditarian response, it is true that previous interventions 
have also resulted in significant improvements in IQ scores among disadvantaged youth 
(as defined by race or by SES alone) in early childhood, but these effects have faded as the 
targeted cohorts have progressed through the school system, such that recipients of early 
childhood interventions show little or no advantage in IQ by mid to late adolescence 
(Herrnstein & Murray, 1996; Nisbett et al., 2012; Scarr & Weinberg, 1983).20 Thus, it 
                                                 
20 Hereditarians typically attribute the diminishing longitudinal effects of early interventions to the fact that 
children gain progressively greater control over their own environments as they age, which results in those 





would be premature to assume that the IQ gains engendered by recent interventions will be 
permanent. It is worth noting, however, that recent interventions that target known 
environmental influences on WM and attentional control (e.g., physiological stress 
responses) are, plausibly, more likely to yield sustained results than were their 
predecessors. This is because these recent interventions are embedded in a comparatively 
sophisticated and well-supported theory of both the operations and the development of the 
neurocognitive underpinnings of intelligence (Buschkuehl & Jaeggi, 2010, p. 266), while 
earlier interventions took a less targeted approach and sought to raise IQ merely by 
providing a more all-around enriching environment. (I will return to this point in Chapter 
7.)  
5.6.3 The Flynn Effect 
Finally, let us briefly consider what has come to be called the “Flynn Effect,” which 
is the phenomenon of persistent rising mean IQ scores worldwide, stretching as far back as 
IQ tests have been used (named for psychologist James Flynn, who brought the 
phenomenon to the attention of the scientific community in the 1980s; Flynn, 1984, 1987). 
Because IQ tests are consistently re-normed (to maintain a mean of 100 and a standard 
deviation of 15), a particular score on an IQ test administered at one point in time does not 
necessarily indicate an identical level of cognitive performance as the same score on a test 
administered at another time. The surprising fact is that a score of 100 on an IQ test 
                                                 
intensive early childhood interventions, thus diminishing IQ. This would be an example of gene-





administered in 1900 would correspond to a score between 50 and 70 measured against 
current norms (Flynn, 2007, pp. 9–10). And, not only have these IQ gains been observed 
around the world (Flynn, 1987), but the gains have been most significant in less developed 
parts of the world (which tend to exhibit lower mean IQ), and, within the United States, 
the gains have been most significant among African-Americans, thus closing the IQ gap 
somewhat (Dickens & Flynn, 2006). 
The Flynn Effect is deeply puzzling on the assumption that IQ tests are reliable, 
culture-and-context-invariant measures of real-world cognitive skills. Given that scores of 
around 70 are considered a bare minimum for normal cognitive functioning, taken at face 
value the Flynn Effect implies that generally speaking, our grandparents and great-
grandparents lived in a society where the average person was so cognitively impaired as to 
be scarcely able to walk to the store for a gallon of milk. As this suggestion is clearly 
absurd, something else must be going on with IQ tests. 
Just what this “something else” might be is beyond the scope of our discussion here 
(see Flynn, 2007 for extended discussion), but the most reasonable explanation is some 
combination of (a) inherent shortcomings in IQ tests (i.e., they are not as reliable indicators 
of functional intelligence as their most vigorous proponents suggest, and may be to some 
extent artifactual) and (b) actual changes in cognitive performance brought about by 
environmental changes over the last several generations (e.g., modern test takers’ improved 
facility with abstract thinking and improved brain development as a result of better 
nutrition). The technical issues that arise in attempting to characterize the precise nature 





Wicherts et al., 2004), and there are those who question the effect’s validity (e.g., Rodgers, 
1998), but nevertheless we can extract some important lessons from the Flynn Effect even 
without resolving these questions. 
In my estimation, the relevance of the Flynn Effect to the race-IQ debate is that it 
may be seen as an “existence proof” for something that the hereditarian theory has a 
difficult time explaining: not only have environmental conditions exerted a very large 
effect on levels of phenotypic intelligence, but some groups have benefited more than 
others—that is, certain environmental changes have closed the gap between racial groups. 
This last point is significant because hereditarians have sometimes argued that even if we 
could raise mean IQ among the Black population by providing, say, more enriching school 
environments, this would have little or no effect on the practical outcomes of group 
inequality, for the enriching scholastic environments would simply exert a similar upward 
effect on the IQ of White students, thus holding the gap steady and leaving Whites with the 
same relative advantage in educational and professional environments as they had before 







 CHAPTER 6: THE MORAL STATUS OF RACIAL-DIFFERENCE DEBATES 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I detail what I take to be the moral costs that are likely to result from 
adopting HED. I begin, in this introduction, by distinguishing my own argument for 
disfavoring hereditarianism from another that is common in the literature and bears some 
similarities to my own, followed by some comments about how hereditarian researchers 
have presented (or failed to present) the policy proposals that they take to be supported by 
hereditarian science. Then, in Section 6.2, I describe what the “hereditarian society”—a 
society that adopted the idea of permanent racial differences as a premise in its policy 
deliberations—might look like. Section 6.3 provides extended arguments that the 
hereditarian society exhibits a number of morally problematic features. 
6.1.1 On the “argument from risk” 
The reader might note a similarity between my argument and a popular move 
utilized by moral critics of hereditarianism, which is to urge that the potential harms of 
affirming racial differences, when there are in fact no such differences, are much greater 
than the potential harms of failing to affirm such differences if they do exist (i.e., the costs 
of a “false alarm” are much greater than those of a “miss”) (Boxill, 1978, p. 253; Kitcher, 
2001, pp. 97–99). In other words, proponents of the risk argument have taken the view that 





disastrous, whereas if we believe there are no racial differences when in fact there are, very 
little will be lost. My own argument, while similar in spirit to the classic argument from 
risk, is more nuanced and, I believe, more effective in that it (a) acknowledges extant 
normative disagreement about the (un)desirability of various social arrangements, and 
argues for, rather than assumes key normative premises; and (b) shows how our normative 
commitments positively recommend a substantive theoretical orientation and correlative 
research methodology, rather than merely recommending a suspension of judgment.  
Again, although overall I am sympathetic to something like the argument from risk, 
I think that its proponents have at times assumed that the case for moral asymmetry 
between mistaken hereditarianism and mistaken environmentalism is stronger than it 
actually is. This has occurred, I think, because proponents of the risk argument have 
generally not taken seriously hereditarian arguments for the good social consequences of 
acknowledging racial differences (if such differences actually existed), and the bad 
consequences of failing to acknowledge them (again, assuming they did exist) (i.e., the 
benefits of a “hit” and the high costs of a miss).  
Hereditarians typically cite three types of negative outcomes that would result from 
failing to accept racial differences and taking account of them in our policymaking 
(Gottfredson, 2000, 2005a; Miele & Sarich, 2005). First, they argue that since racial 
differences are immutable, any public resources (money, time, and effort) directed towards 
eliminating them are entirely wasteful. This waste of public resources, they emphasize, 






Second, failing to acknowledge racial differences encourages us to unfairly assign 
blame for disparate racial outcomes. If racial groups differ in the ways hereditarians 
suggest, we can expect that organizations utilizing strictly merit-based selection criteria 
will enroll or hire significantly disproportionate members of different groups. And if we 
continue to take disproportional selection as evidence of discrimination, those decision-
makers will be unfairly accused of moral failings they do not exhibit.  
Third, failing to take account of racial differences has more direct negative effects 
on allegedly less-able groups: by assuming that all racial groups have equal intellectual and 
moral potential, we harm the less-able groups by (a) holding them to unrealistic standards, 
which will lead only to frustration on all sides and lower self-esteem for the cognitively 
disadvantaged; and (b) missed opportunities to provide members of certain groups with 
education and moral guidance that is more appropriate for their genetic endowments. In 
other words, educating Black children the same way we do White children (on the 
assumption that their intellectual and moral potentials are equal), leads to Blacks ending 
up less functional in society than they would be if we acknowledged the differences 
between groups and educated Blacks in a way that allowed them to reach their full potential 
(again, though, recognizing that this potential will be less than that of Whites; Gottfredson, 
2005a; Jensen, 1969, 1998; Rushton & Jensen, 2005). 
Fully assessing the plausibility of these suggestions is beyond the scope of this 
chapter, but they strike me as sufficiently reasonable concerns that they would have to be 





case for the claim that negative consequences of “getting it wrong” about the causes of 
racial differences is a problem only for hereditarians.  
The key difference between the traditional argument from risk and my own is that 
the traditional argument assumes that since adopting hereditarian presumptions is “morally 
riskier” than adopting egalitarianism presumptions, we should demand a higher standard 
of evidence for accepting hereditarianism than would otherwise be required (much as we 
might demand a higher standard of evidence regarding the salt content of a meal if that 
meal is to be served to someone with severe hypertension). That is, the traditional argument 
from risk asserts merely that we should suspend judgment while we continue to collect 
evidence, and that we should demand more of the same kinds of evidence before accepting 
hereditarianism (e.g., performing more behavior-genetic studies with larger sample sizes 
or that control for more variables). In contrast, my argument proposes that we should 
entirely rethink our methodological and theoretical orientation to questions of racial 
differences. 
6.1.2 Identifying hereditarian policy recommendations 
As we will see, much of my argument in the latter part of this chapter will turn on 
my identification of a particular evaluative attitude as implicit in mainstream hereditarian 
arguments—specifically, an attitude towards the sort of society that is likely to result if we 
were to adopt HED. In other words, given that it is an oft-repeated hereditarian mantra that 
denying HED can only lead to bad policy and bad outcomes, we would like to know just 





from adopting HED. Critics of hereditarianism, of course, are not shy about expounding 
upon the potential harms of disseminating hereditarian claims. But the hereditarian, 
evidently, would have us believe that the likely consequences of adopting HED are all-
things-considered preferable to those of denying HED. Unfortunately, however, most 
hereditarian writers have neglected to acknowledge potential harms of accepting HED or 
engage in explicit comparison of potential harms and potential benefits.1 Because direct 
textual evidence of hereditarians’ attitudes towards these outcomes is lacking, I will begin 
by calling attention to some passages in which hereditarians draw near this issue but seem 
to skirt round it at the last minute, forcing us to try to fill in the gaps.  
Let me be clear that this is not merely an exercise in armchair psychology, an 
attempt to discover what individual hereditarians hold in their heart of hearts. Nor is this 
an attempt to score a series of cheap points by catching hereditarian writers in moments of 
unclarity. Rather, my aim here is to motivate the endeavor taken up in Section 6.3, where 
I attempt to make explicit what mainstream hereditarian writers have left implicit, namely 
the sorts of social conditions we can expect to ensue from widespread adoption of HED.  
Again, hereditarians are fond of pointing to the alleged harms caused by—as well 
as the sheer epistemic indecency of—our society’s current state of collective denial about 
racial IQ differences. But to the extent that foreseeable negative consequences of adopting 
a hereditarian outlook and incorporating it into our social policy are acknowledged in 
hereditarian writings, they are referenced only obliquely. For instance, Herrnstein and 
                                                 
1 As we will see in the next section, there are some notable exceptions to this trend—perhaps unsurprisingly, 
hereditarian philosophers tend to be more explicit about the normative implications of their views than 





Murray make only occasional, vague references to the potential harms of a book like The 
Bell Curve, such as the following: 
We are not indifferent to the ways in which this book, wrongly construed, 
might do harm. We have worried about them from the day we set to work. 
But there can be no real progress in solving America’s social problems 
when they are as misperceived as they are today. What good can come of 
understanding the relationship of intelligence to social structure and public 
policy? Little good can come without it. (Herrnstein & Murray, 1996, p. 
xxiii) 
Similarly, hereditarian psychologist Linda Gottfredson’s (2005b) commentary on 
Rushton and Jensen’s (2005) hereditarian manifesto neatly captures many of the dynamics 
of discussion surrounding the social implications of hereditarianism. In her forceful 
rejoinder to critics who are wary of the social implications of hereditarian research, she 
critiques existing practices aimed at equalizing racial outcomes: 
Currently, racial parity in outcomes is often treated as the ultimate standard 
for fairness and lack of parity as a measure of White racism. For instance, 
disparate impact in hiring is prima facie evidence of illegal discrimination 
in the United States, with employers, if sued, then needing to prove 
themselves innocent. By undermining culture-only explanations of racial 
inequality, the “provisional truth” of Rushton and Jensen’s (2005) 
hereditarian hypothesis thereby undermines the moral legitimacy of all 
rationales for racial equalization that posit White misbehavior as its cause. 
That it might persuade the public to temper or abandon its efforts to close 
all racial gaps in success and well-being is surely what inflames critics most. 
(Gottfredson, 2005b, p. 317) 
Again, there appears to be a (perhaps understandable) hesitancy on Gottfredson’s 
part to state in plain English what she clearly takes to be a straightforward implication of 





and economic equality with Whites. Rather than simply acknowledging that this permanent 
inequality is a consequence of the hereditarian position, Gottfredson quickly diverts the 
reader’s attention to critics’ “inflamed” responses and their accusations of “White racism” 
and “White misbehavior.”2 Nathan Glazer makes a similar observation regarding an article 
in which Herrnstein (1990) likewise argues for the inevitability of racial inequality but 
shies away from stating this claim directly: “I believe…[Herrnstein] was trying to avoid 
stating (though all the necessary evidence was in his article) an explanation of black-white 
differences that simply leaves men of good will helpless” (Glazer, 1994, p. 16)  
Given hereditarians’ reticence to name or discuss the potentially problematic social 
implications of their scientific positions, this job has been left to their critics, which they 
have undertaken vigorously—often, it must be admitted, with excessive zeal. Hereditarians 
have understandably taken umbrage at some of the more defamatory accusations, as 
Gottfredson illustrates: 
Rushton and Jensen (2005) themselves acknowledge that open discussion 
of genotypic ability differences between the races might harm race 
relations. Their most vocal critics predict far worse. Widespread acceptance 
of the hereditarian hypothesis would, they say, put us on the slippery slope 
to racial oppression or genocide…The critics’ predictions of mass moral 
madness, like their frequent demonization of scientists who report 
                                                 
2 I should note that Gottfredson here makes a very unfortunate error—exasperatingly common among 
hereditarians—in relying on an incredibly simplistic and outmoded conception of “racism” and racial bias. 
She assumes that the only two possible explanations for racial disparities in outcomes are Blacks’ 
inferiority and “White misbehavior.” There is an enormous psychological literature establishing that 
people who sincerely avow egalitarian racial attitudes can nevertheless exhibit strong implicit biases 
(typically against Blacks), and that this implicit bias can manifest in discriminatory behavior, without the 
subject being aware of or able to control the bias. Therefore, pace Gottfredson’s implication, it is entirely 
possible that hereditarian explanations for racial disparities in outcomes are false, but that “White racism” 
and “White misbehavior” (in the sense of willful racial antipathy or prejudice) play only minimal roles in 





unwelcomes racial differences, seem mostly an attempt to stifle reasoned 
discussion. (Gottfredson, 2005b, p. 317) 
It is true that critics of hereditarianism have frequently referenced Nazi scientists 
and genocidal policies, but I will not be doing so here. My aim, rather, is to answer 
Gottfredson’s call for “reasoned discussion” by exploring the more reasonable policy 
implications of hereditarianism. No modern hereditarian scientist has or would endorse 
genocide against less intelligent racial groups. But hereditarians have, or reasonably might, 
endorse the policies discussed below. Since hereditarians often—justifiably, I think—
complain that their motivations are unfairly impugned and that their views on the social 
implications of their scientific positions are caricatured, I will endeavor to steer clear of 
any inflammatory accusations or absurd extrapolations of hereditarian views. But at the 
same time, given that hereditarians themselves often seem reluctant to be fully transparent 
about certain implications of their views, part of my task will be to draw out these 
implications and set them under good, clear light, so that we may see how we like them.  
6.2 The hereditarian society 
I will discuss four areas of policy to which scientific claims about racial differences 
are relevant (roughly, from less to more controversial): (1) educational programs aimed at 
closing the Black-White IQ gap, (2) what to do about differential representation of various 
groups in positions of prestige, power, and wealth, (3) discrimination in employment, 
housing, and criminal justice, and (4) allocation of foreign aid. I describe, in effect, what a 





emphasize, however, that I am not claiming the consequences described below are 
inevitable if hereditarian conclusions are accepted. The policies outlined below would all 
require justification not merely from the empirical claims of hereditarians, but also 
substantive normative premises—about the value of economic efficiency, the enormity of 
wasting taxpayer dollars, and so forth—that many would be inclined to reject in the first 
place. In other words, a society that accepted hereditarianism as a scientific matter might, 
after a process of deliberation, still find at least some of these policies in conflict with its 
values. And indeed, those who endorse hereditarian scientific conclusions are not univocal 
in supporting these policies (and it is quite possible that some hereditarians would object 
strenuously to some of the more radical proposals discussed). But the fact remains that 
once permanent, ineradicable racial differences are taken as empirical premises in policy 
deliberations, the proposals discussed below are no longer outside the bounds of reasonable 
social arrangements, given the political values currently represented in society. Thus, 
because I consider (for reasons given in Section 6.3) these policies to be deeply morally 
problematic, my overarching aim throughout this and the next chapter is to entirely 
preclude these deliberations by staking out a scientific stance that forestalls the acceptance 
of hereditarianism in the first place.  
6.2.1 Compensatory education 
If hereditarians are correct that Blacks will exhibit lower intelligence in the full 
range of environmental conditions likely to manifest in current or foreseeable human 





IQ gap are entirely without justification. The Head Start program, which provides free pre-
kindergarten education to low-income children, is the focus of much discussion on this 
point, with certain hereditarians—especially those of a libertarian political bent (e.g., 
Herrnstein & Murray, 1996)—arguing for the cessation of the program on the grounds that 
it is a gigantic waste of money. Such an argument depends not just on hereditarian positions 
regarding the science of IQ, but also an assumption that no other benefits (e.g., improved 
social skills or improved access to adequate nutrition) can be expected to accrue to children 
participating in the program. The specific goals and outcomes of the Head Start program 
(or other similar programs) are beyond the scope of this discussion, but the relevant point 
is this. If hereditarians are right that environmental manipulations cannot eliminate racial 
differences in IQ, there is nothing to be gained, and much to lose, by directing resources to 
programs (or particular aspects of larger programs) that have as their explicit, sole purpose 
the elimination of racial IQ differences. If hereditarian claims are true, cutting such 
programs is a no-brainer, whatever one’s values.3 
                                                 
3 Note that I am setting aside the question of affirmative action, which is a rather more complicated case. 
Some arguments for affirmative action frame such programs as a form of compensation for past 
discrimination. These arguments, if otherwise successful, would not be impugned by hereditarianism, 
since no one disputes that unjustifiable racial discrimination has occurred in the past. Other arguments for 
affirmative action, however, view such programs as aimed at countering the effects of current 
discrimination, on the hypothesis that discrimination is what accounts for disparate social outcomes among 
racial groups. Hereditarian claims (e.g., that Blacks are genetically less intelligent) do undermine these 
latter arguments, since they suggest that disparate outcomes result from innate differences rather than from 
discrimination. Thus, from the hereditarian’s perspective, if affirmative action programs succeed in their 
goal of equalizing outcomes between Blacks and Whites, this will have come only as a result of offering 
positions (admissions to universities, jobs, promotions, etc.) to less-qualified Blacks. Therefore, to the 
extent that the case for affirmative action rests on the proposition that unequal outcomes are due to 
discrimination, scientific claims of innate racial differences appear to offer a strong prima facie case for 





Importantly, and in fairness to hereditarians, the above arguments do not entirely 
preclude all programs aimed at reducing the Black-White IQ gap. For while it is a core 
hereditarian position that, owing to genetic differences between Blacks and Whites, this 
gap cannot be closed entirely, hereditarians may acknowledge (and many do) that 
manipulable environmental factors play some role in generating the current 15-point IQ 
gap, and therefore that certain manipulations (i.e., social programs) might shrink the gap 
somewhat (though hereditarians are typically duly agnostic on how much the gap might be 
closed and how it might be done). The upshot of hereditarian arguments on this score is 
that although we might well continue to implement manipulations that seem (on intuitive 
or evidential grounds) promising in closing the IQ gap, we should be prepared for the fact 
that we will, sooner or later, arrive at a point when virtually all of the remaining variance 
in Black-White IQ differences is genetic in origin, and subsequent attempts to close the 
gap further will be mere wastes of resources (and, in the interests of protecting public 
resources from misuse, we should always be on the lookout for evidence that we have 
reached such a point). 
6.2.2 Under/overrepresentation 
It is a well-known fact that in American society, different racial groups are 
differentially represented in various social positions of high and low value. For instance, 
African-Americans are underrepresented among students at prestigious universities and in 






A note about the terms “underrepresentation” and “overrepresentation” is in order. 
These terms may be used in multiple senses, and authors are often unclear as to which 
sense they intend. In one sense, to say that a group is “underrepresented” simply means 
that there are fewer members of a particular group in a certain demographic category (e.g., 
in a particular profession or a particular tier of colleges) than would be expected if people 
were assigned to such categories at random (i.e., if women make up 50% of the population, 
and fewer than 50% of legislators are women, then women are underrepresented among 
legislators). In another sense, a group is underrepresented if fewer members of that group 
attain some outcome than deserve to or ought to attain it. In this sense, if Blacks make up 
15% of the overall population, but only 5% of college professors, then Blacks are 
underrepresented among professors only if the factors accounting for their lower 
representation are in some way illegitimate (e.g., prejudice and bias), rather than being 
traceable to qualities that make Blacks, on average, less interested in or less suitable for 
academic careers. Since I do not wish to beg any questions about the legitimacy of various 
reasons for differential representation, I will use these terms exclusively in the first, 
normatively-neutral sense.  
It is commonly assumed that underrepresentation of Blacks in highly-valued social 
positions, and their overrepresentation in disvalued positions, are social problems to be 
remediated, with much discussion and disagreement about what are the most effective 





be nothing inherently problematic about differential racial representation in social roles.4 
For if hereditarian conclusions about the causes of racial differences in intelligence are 
combined with the (independent, though commonly endorsed by hereditarians) thesis that 
intelligence is an important—perhaps the most important—determinant of success in 
current and foreseeable human societies, we can expect that unless aggressive policies of 
affirmative action and/or wealth redistribution are implemented, African-Americans will 
remain underrepresented at prestigious academic institutions, in prominent and 
intellectually demanding professions, and in the wealthiest income brackets in the United 
States. (Looking internationally, we can also expect that prospects for economic 
development in African nations will be substantially lower than those for European or 
Asian countries.)5 
Hereditarians are fond of insisting that hereditarian conclusions are themselves 
morally neutral, because while their scientific research can “give us the facts,” it cannot 
“determine our goals” (Gottfredson, 2005b; Rushton, 1997). Thus it is possible, in theory, 
for a society both to endorse hereditarian conclusions on the science of IQ and race and 
adopt policies that would serve to equalize the representation of different racial and ethnic 
groups in positions of power and prestige, as well as in various socioeconomic brackets. 
                                                 
4 E.g., Sesardic: “Racial inequality in itself does not constitute a fact that is morally condemnable. Whether 
it is condemnable depends on the origin or source of this inequality” (2005, p. 214).  
5 The hereditarian position on IQ may also entail that—absent radical changes to the criminal justice 
system—Blacks will continue to be overrepresented among the incarcerated, since some (e.g., Herrnstein 
& Murray, 1996) have argued that lower intelligence leads—via direct or indirect means—to increased 
tendencies toward criminal activity. Other hereditarians, like Levin (1997b) and Rushton (1997) also 
suggest that we can expect that Blacks will always be overrepresented among criminals, but offer a more 
direct explanation, namely genetic tendencies for Blacks to be more aggressive and less pro-social and 
future-oriented (a hypothesis that also has implications for the prospects for stable democratic governance 





For instance, there could be a policy mandating that the distribution of ethnic 
groups among employees at all companies of a certain size, and among the student bodies 
at all tertiary academic institutions, must reflect the distribution of those groups in the 
population at large, lest the firm or school be subject to a large fine. Since this policy alone 
would not guarantee equal representation of groups among the higher tiers of the corporate 
structure, if a particular group were found to be underrepresented among CEOs, then a 
lottery would be held to determine which firms would have to replace their CEOs with the 
most qualified available candidate from the underrepresented group. 
While such solutions are, strictly speaking, not ruled out by hereditarian science, 
we can reasonably assume that they would be rejected by any society remotely resembling 
our own. Such measures seem prohibitively intrusive and unwieldy, conflict with most 
people’s notions of fairness and meritocracy, and, if hereditarians are right about the 
relationship between IQ and professional competence, would impose enormous costs to 
overall economic productivity (Gottfredson, 2000). In this connection, it is notable that 
while Gottfredson (2005b), in insisting on the value-neutrality of hereditarian science, 
mentions various “compensatory” measures we might take to assist low-IQ individuals 
(disproportionately Black), none of her suggestions would serve to eliminate current 
inequalities in outcomes. 
Hence, while it is true that hereditarian conclusions do not necessarily entail the 
continuation of social, political, and economic inequalities separating American Whites 
and Blacks, we can expect that if hereditarians are correct about the sources of current gaps, 





fairness, desert, and distributive justice, then we can expect that Blacks will, overall, 
continue to claim only a minimal share of political and economic power, and will continue 
to be underrepresented in prestigious professions and overrepresented among the 
incarcerated and chronically impoverished. 
6.2.3 Discrimination 
As with “under/overrepresentation,” the term “discrimination” has multiple senses, 
one neutral and one overtly normative. In the normative sense (the sense in which the term 
is typically used in everyday discourse), “discrimination” refers to the practice of singling 
out members of particular races/ethnicities, genders, religions, and other “superficial” 
categories for systematically inferior treatment (i.e., denying them benefits afforded to 
members of other categories of similar talents, efforts, and so forth). In the neutral sense, 
“discrimination” simply means treating members of different categories differently. As 
with “under/overrepresentation,” I use “discrimination” in the neutral sense.  
It should be clear that once a hereditarian perspective on group differences is 
assumed, it is only a few short steps to the conclusion that there is nothing in particular 
wrong with racial discrimination in itself. For while skin pigmentation may not itself be 
relevant to job performance, criminal inclinations, and so forth, intelligence is (we are 
assuming here) relevant to these outcomes, and skin pigmentation is, if hereditarians are 
correct, a probabilistic indicator of intelligence. Skin pigmentation could, therefore, be 
used as a source of important information about the talents and character of individuals. In 





evidentiary factor in such decisions as those concerning housing (e.g., whether to rent or 
sell a residence to an individual, and how much to charge), employment (hiring, 
promotions, and compensation), and criminal justice (whom to detain and investigate as 
suspects, whom to convict on what evidence, and how to mete out punishment for crimes).  
Some hereditarians (Levin, 1997b; Sesardic, 2005) have indeed argued that because 
race is probabilistically associated with various socially-relevant characteristics, it is 
reasonable and appropriate for members of society to use race as a source of evidence in 
determining one’s interactions with other members—for instance, by operating with a 
presumption that White job applicants will be more competent than Black applicants, or by 
more readily detaining and/or convicting Black individuals suspected or accused of 
crimes.6  
It is worth noting that a hereditarian position on the causes of racial differences in 
such outcomes is not, strictly speaking, necessary for the argument in favor of 
discrimination; one could argue that if, for example, different racial groups display 
different dispositions to commit crimes, then whether or not this difference can be traced 
to any “innate” or “genetic” factors, it is a good idea to use race as an evidential factor in 
                                                 
6 The oft-cited fact that Blacks are overrepresented among those convicted and incarcerated for crimes does 
not, of course, necessarily mean that Blacks commit more crimes—this pattern could be observed, for 
example, if law enforcement officers, juries, and judges are much more likely to arrest, convict, and deal 
harsh sentences to Black criminals than White criminals, or if innocent Blacks are much more likely to be 
arrested and incarcerated than innocent Whites. While there is plenty of evidence to suggest that these 
latter forces are likely at work, assessing just how much of the disparity in crime and incarceration rates 
can be attributed to them is difficult. For the purposes of this discussion, then, I will grant to the supporter 
of racial discrimination (“racial profiling,” as it’s called in criminal contexts) that Blacks do commit a 
disproportionate number of crimes. It would be remiss not to point out, however, that “crime” is hardly a 
natural-kind term: what activities are taken to be “criminal” is up to a society to determine, and a society 
can quite readily make “criminals” out of a certain segment of its populace by criminalizing particular 





deciding whom to arrest and whom to convict (W. Block, 2010; Epstein, 1994). However, 
I include racial discrimination in this discussion of the policy implications of hereditarian 
positions for two reasons. First, because these policy proposals have frequently been put 
forward by hereditarian thinkers themselves (though they sometimes seem not to notice 
that hereditarian arguments and pro-discrimination arguments are, strictly speaking, 
independent7). And second, because the case for racial discrimination is much more direct 
if the differences are expected to remain, as hereditarians insist, in all environmental 
conditions we are likely to encounter. For while it is open to someone to say “I don’t care 
about why X’s are, on average, more intelligent than Y’s; the mere fact that they are is 
sufficient to justify preferring (all else being equal) to hire X’s,” this response seems 
decidedly perverse if there are very simple environmental manipulations we could perform 
that would raise the IQs of Y’s to the same level as X’s, thus eliminating the relevance of 
race to hiring decisions.8 The case for racial discrimination is, it seems, much stronger if 
racial differences are “rooted in the genes” than if they are rooted in the environmental 
conditions that we, as a society, create.  
We’ll take a look at some particular kinds of discrimination that might be defended 
on hereditarian grounds momentarily, but first we should sketch the general logic of pro-
discrimination arguments. The sorts of judgments being considered here (about applicants 
                                                 
7 An example is Sesardic (2005), who defends discrimination on Bayesian grounds in a book ostensibly about 
the epistemic value of heritability measures for assessing group differences. 
8 Similarly, notice that if this indifference-to-causes argument is taken far enough, all that would be required 
for Group X to be justified in systematically discriminating against Group Y would be for X to subject Y 
to IQ-stifling environments for a generation or two. X’s of subsequent generations could them claim 
innocence in discriminating against Y’s, on the grounds that Y’s are on average less competent, and that 





for housing and employment, and about crime suspects) are almost always made under 
conditions of limited time and information. Those who must make these decisions, it is 
argued, are therefore entitled (perhaps rationally required) to use all relevant information 
at their disposal, including (but not exclusively) the race of the person(s) being judged or 
evaluated. The race of the target can be incorporated as a source of evidence by, for 
example, using Bayesian principles. If Blacks are on average less competent and 
productive employees than Whites, then the probability that a particular applicant will be 
a competent and productive employee given that the applicant is White is higher than the 
probability that a Black applicant will be a comparably suitable employee.9 Along these 
lines, supporters of discrimination suggest that race can be a useful item in the evidentiary 
toolbox of those with a compelling interest in making an accurate judgment about the 
likelihood that an individual has a given characteristic, given limited time and 
information.10 
Note that the consequences of adopting hereditarian-friendly policies on 
discrimination are similar to, but distinct from, those of adopting hereditarian thinking on 
differential representation considered above. The hereditarian arguments for a hands-off 
                                                 
9 An obvious complexity here is that assigning conditional probabilities (e.g., probability of high IQ given 
that someone belongs to racial group R) brings us face-to-face with the reference class problem (Hájek, 
2007): each person we encounter will belong to a dizzying number of classes (e.g., the class of American 
citizens, the class of people under 5’5”, the class of left-handed trombone players, and so on), each of 
which has its own probability distribution for the trait one wants to predict. One will arrive at very different 
judgments about the probability that the target exhibits some quality depending on which reference class 
is used. So one might reasonably challenge the pro-discrimination theorist to provide a rationale for why 
race is the appropriate grounding for a Bayesian inference. This is an important issue, but for the sake of 
argument I will assume that those arguing in favor of discrimination will be able to meet this challenge.  
10 This line of thought further assumes that race has some predictive power over and above whatever other 
information is available to the decision-maker. This will, of course, vary by the circumstances, specifically 
by what information is available—the more information available to the decision-maker, the less likely 





approach to differential representation discussed above do not assume that employers, 
admissions officers, or law-enforcement officers practice any sort of discrimination; rather, 
differential racial representation should emerge naturally because, even if employers (for 
example) completely disregard the races of their applicants, fewer Black than White 
applicants will present the attributes employers consider valuable (e.g., they will have 
lower levels of academic achievement, less impressive references, and so forth). The 
present arguments for discrimination, on the other hand, argue that in addition to looking 
at academic achievement, references, and so forth (which already will segregate racial 
groups), employers are rationally (and morally) justified in using race to inform their 
judgments about candidates for employment and promotion (with similar licenses for 
landlords, police officers, judges, juries, and so on). 
First, let’s consider employment. Again, supporters of discrimination do not argue 
that it is legitimate for decision-makers to consider race exclusively, so these arguments 
would not support a policy of refusing to consider hiring Blacks.11 Nevertheless, the 
Bayesian principles outlined above could be used to justify a policy of hiring Black 
applicants only when they are significantly more qualified than White applicants (in effect, 
                                                 
11 Probably, anyway. Levin (who refers to groups with different average levels of socially-desirable traits as 
“dominant” and “subordinate”) argues: “Unquestionably, there are forces that make the rise of exceptional  
individuals [from subordinate groups] difficult, such as widespread beliefs about the natural subordination 
of B's that discourage able B's. Perhaps the defining ambition of modern liberal egalitarianism is to ease 
informal social pressures of this sort. On the other hand, the cost of identifying exceptions might exceed 
the payoff when the overlap between dominant and subordinate groups is minute” (1997a, n. 256, emphasis 
added). According to Levin, then, an organization might be justified in excluding Black applicants entirely 
if the overlap between Whites and Blacks on the relevant characteristics is judged to be “minute.” 
Although Levin does not specify what counts as “minute” overlap, it seems highly doubtful that the Black-
White divide on any relevant characteristic would turn out to be large enough to justify this level of 
disparate treatment (let us not forget—as Levin occasionally seems to—that Black and White people are 





requiring a higher standard of evidence that a Black applicant will be a competent and 
productive employee than that required for White applicants).12 Against the charge that 
preferring White applicants to similarly-qualified Black applicants is unfair to Blacks, 
firms could argue that these practices are based not on unjust or irrational racial prejudice, 
but rather on cold actuarial calculations of expected future productivity, which firms have 
a legitimate interest in maximizing. 
More generally, notice that since we are speaking of the obligations of individuals 
and corporate bodies in the public sphere, there would need to be pretty significant reasons 
counting against this sort of discrimination in order to prevent firms from practicing it. It 
is unlikely, for example, that a ban on discrimination could be derived from general duties 
of benevolence on the part of companies, since we generally don’t expect—much less 
require—businesses to act benevolently against their own interests.13 Rather, a prohibition 
on discrimination would likely have to derive from some general right on the part of 
members of groups with lower average abilities. Yet it seems doubtful that a general right 
of the relevant sort exists, viz., a right not to have certain kinds of probabilistically-
informative, readily-available information about oneself used by people with compelling 
reasons to make accurate inferences about you given all available information. That is, it 
is not clear that using skin color as a proxy for other valued traits violates any right among 
dark-skinned people to have others make informationally-impoverished decisions.  
                                                 
12 In fact, there is evidence that employers already do rely on just this sort of heuristic (Bertrand & 
Mullainathan, 2003; Pager, Western, & Bonikowski, 2009).  
13 Again, I am not endorsing the view that businesses have no duties of benevolence; rather I am observing 





Now, should this general line of thinking be accepted, a great deal of further 
political deliberation would be required to establish precisely under what circumstances 
and to what extent employers should be allowed to adopt racial preferences in hiring. These 
collective deliberations would take place against a backdrop of competing value judgments 
regarding merit, luck, and so forth, and would presumably take the same general shape as 
other ongoing conversations about what limits are appropriate regarding how businesses 
may prioritize profitability over equal treatment (e.g., can a clothing store or an airline hire 
only physically attractive people, if doing so increases their appeal to customers and 
thereby maximizes their profits?14). Additionally, there is room for a variety of positions 
regarding the extent to which employers are obligated to invest time, money, and effort in 
seeking other, non-racial information about candidates’ likely attributes. However, the 
relevant point for our purposes is that in a world where hereditarian thinking is 
comprehensively incorporated into policy-making (as hereditarians insist it should be), 
these sorts of racial preferences would no longer be off the table.  
On the matter of law enforcement and criminal justice, there are three areas in 
which discrimination might be justified on hereditarian grounds. First, law-enforcement 
officers could be justified in detaining or arresting more Blacks than Whites (i.e., requiring 
a lower threshold of evidence of criminal wrongdoing for detaining/arresting Blacks than 
for detaining/arresting Whites). Second, juries could be justified in more readily convicting 
Blacks than Whites. Third, judges could be justified in dealing harsher sentences to 
                                                 
14 For a summary of historical cases and current debate on the use of attractiveness as a criterion in hiring, 





convicted Blacks than to Whites convicted of identical crimes. I will assume the reader is 
familiar with the standard arguments for increased police scrutiny of certain racial groups 
(i.e., “racial profiling”); arguments that juries ought to be quicker to convict Blacks follow 
the same logic: just as law enforcement officers ought to assign a higher prior probability 
to a Black person’s being involved in some wrongdoing—and so ought to require a lower 
threshold of evidence to detain or arrest such individuals—so jurors ought to assume that 
the probability of a defendant’s guilt is higher when the defendant is Black, and thus 
demand a lower standard of evidence to render a vote to convict. 
On the matter of punishment, Levin (1997b) argues that biological differences 
between Blacks and Whites entail that these groups differ in the sort of punishment (i.e., 
retributive vs. rehabilitative) that is most appropriate for them and for society. Since Blacks 
are, on average, less intelligent and less “future-oriented,” Levin argues, they are more 
likely to be deterred from criminal behavior only by swift, harsh punishment. And 
moreover, given higher degrees of aggressiveness and selfishness among Blacks, many 
simply will not be capable of being reformed into contributing members of society. Again, 
the distributions of whatever traits make harsher sentences more appropriate among Blacks 
and Whites will overlap. But it is a consequence of Levin’s strain of hereditarianism that 
on average, administering harsher, less rehabilitation-oriented sentences to Blacks will 
serve to allocate such sentences more efficiently (i.e., dispense more of them to people for 
whom they are appropriate and less of them to people for whom they are not appropriate). 
In other words, a judge charged with administering a sentence could, in keeping with 





particular defendant, given that the defendant is Black, is higher than it would be if the 
defendant were White. Thus, the hereditarian-cum-Bayesian might argue, given constraints 
on judges’ time and energy, and on the information available in most cases, we are justified 
in adopting a defeasible presumption that convicted Blacks should be given harsher 
sentences than Whites convicted of identical crimes. (This presumption might be 
implemented or formalized in various ways, for example by a default increase of 15% to 
Black sentences unless the judge documents compelling reasons why the harsher sentence 
would not serve the usual purpose.) 
6.2.4 Allocation of foreign aid  
The idea that people of African ancestry are, on average, innately less disposed to 
high intelligence and other socially-desirable traits could also be used to argue for the 
lessening of foreign aid to African nations. One such argument is implied in the discussion 
above about directing resources to improve conditions among African-Americans in the 
United States: since the inhabitants of African nations are (and always will be) significantly 
less intelligent than those of European or Northeast Asian descent, resources spent trying 
to foster developed, post-industrial economies in these countries are likely to be wasted. 
Philosopher Stephen Kershnar (2000), however, has provided a separate argument that 
likewise suggests that we ought to deprioritize the rendering of aid to African nations. 
Kershnar offers a particularly radical take on the implications of hereditarian science for 
our moral deliberations; specifically, he argues that, since intelligence is an important 





about how to achieve one’s ends, and to reflect on what ends one ought to have), individuals 
with lower intelligence are less fully autonomous agents than those with higher 
intelligence. And since Blacks exhibit, on average, less intelligence than other racial 
groups, Blacks have lesser “per capita intrinsic moral value” than other groups (2000, p. 
205).15  
In discussing the implications of this thesis, Kershnar argues that, all else being 
equal, performing acts that benefit beings with greater moral value is morally better than 
performing acts that provide equal benefit to beings with lesser moral value; hence, all else 
being equal, it is morally preferable for a powerful nation to intervene to rescue European 
victims of genocide than to rescue a comparable number of African victims. If we cannot 
intervene in both circumstances, then according to Kershnar, the morally correct choice is 
to rescue the Europeans; but even if we were to rescue both groups, he says, our rescuing 
the Europeans would be more morally praiseworthy than our rescuing the Africans.  
Needless to say, many (including myself) will find Kershar’s argument both absurd 
and repugnant.16 But it’s worth taking note of his view, as it gives a uniquely full-throated 
                                                 
15 Levin’s defense of the Aristotelian notion that some groups are “naturally subordinate” to others (1997a) 
offers a view in the same spirit as Kershnar’s. While Levin does not, in this article, specifically reference 
racial groups, given the overall context of the discussion, and the proximity of the paper’s publication to 
that of his book on racial differences (Levin, 1997b), it is natural to read him as intending his arguments 
to apply to racial groups (see Mosley, 2005; Wilson, 1998). See, in particular, Levin’s claim that, “whites 
are on average better people than blacks” (1997b, p. 10). 
16 On the absurdity point: Kershnar’s argument that more intelligent beings possess greater autonomous 
agency is based almost entirely upon thought experiments involving comparisons between humans and 
non-human animals, or between humans with normal cognitive abilities and those with serious disorders 
that inhibit mental functioning. Thus, the notion of “intelligence” he utilizes bears little resemblance to the 
use of the term in psychometrics (from which he draws his claim that racial groups differ in “intelligence”). 
Kershnar provides no reason for thinking that autonomy, understood in the way moral philosophy uses the 
term, is proportional to intelligence in the psychometric sense. On the repugnancy point, it’s also worth 
noting that Kershnar’s extrapolation of comparisons between “human beings and pigs” (2000, p. 222) to 





defense of applying hereditarian scientific conclusions broadly and wholeheartedly in our 
moral and social thinking. 
6.2.5 Summary of “the hereditarian society” 
To summarize the features of a society that assumes hereditarianism in devising 
social policy: the hereditarian society is one pervaded by racial inequality, with some racial 
groups accumulating the majority of political and economic power, and other groups 
largely absent from the ranks of high-wage, high-prestige, and politically influential 
professions. This, of course, is not too unlike our current social conditions, but in the 
hereditarian society, this inequality is widely accepted as an unavoidable fact of life, and 
attempts to achieve greater proportionality are considered futile and are rarely pursued. 
Additionally, the psychological behavioral differences among racial groups are widely 
acknowledged as elements of “common knowledge” and openly discussed. Among the 
points considered in such discussions is the extent to which it is legitimate (rationally and 
morally) to incorporate race-based Bayesian inferences into decisions about employment, 
housing, criminal justice, and so forth, with some employers (for example) openly 
advocating for a right to discriminate against Blacks.  
Importantly, not all hereditarian thinkers defend the practice of Bayesian 
discrimination, and even among those that do, clearly they must hold that discrimination is 
permissible only if the weight assigned to race in the decision-making process is in strict 
proportion to the actual informativeness of race given other available information (i.e., the 





inference). So in the hereditarian society, although employers, police units, judges, and so 
forth might all adopt (openly) policies that apply different treatment to Blacks and Whites, 
some discriminatory practices will still be unjustifiable; so, for example, an employer that 
automatically adjusted the GPAs of Black applicants downward by a full point (e.g., 
treating a 3.8 GPA on a Black applicant’s résumé as equivalent to a 2.8 on a White 
applicant’s résumé) would be guilty of pernicious discrimination. In short: in the 
hereditarian society, decision makers might discriminate, but they would employ just the 
right amount of discrimination against Blacks. 
6.3 Moral grounds for disfavoring hereditarianism 
In what follows I will advance a series of moral criticisms against a society founded 
on hereditarian principles. I begin by offering reasons for skepticism regarding two 
empirical assumptions about human behavior that are implicit in the hereditarian model of 
social policy. Casting doubt on these two premises will establish that there are good reasons 
to be skeptical that the hereditarian society, as hereditarians describe it, can be realized. 
These two assumptions are: 
1. Members of society can be trusted not to engage in systematic mistreatment of 
certain groups once the society has adopted these groups’ permanent inferiority 
as a point of “common knowledge” (and has perhaps, in addition, been granted 
permission to discriminate on racial grounds). 
2.  Minority groups will exhibit the same levels of achievement whether or not 






If these premises are false, as I argue, then we can predict that attempts to actualize the 
hereditarian society would likely result in a society rife with racial injustice.  
However, I think that even if we were to grant these empirical premises—i.e., if we 
allow that we could in fact structure society precisely as the hereditarian proposes—the 
resulting society would still exhibit significant moral defects. I argue, specifically, that 
racial inequality is, in and of itself, a morally bad-making feature of a society. While this 
claim might seem obvious, as we will see in Section 6.3.2) below, it is a premise that 
hereditarians reject (if often only implicitly). I therefore show that a society characterized 
by racial stratification is harmful to all members of disparaged, inferiorized groups, even 
those who enjoy relative success in such a society.  
A preview of the key steps in the argument is shown in Figure 6.1 below. I aim to 
show that one could maintain that the hereditarian society is not morally faulty only by 
stringing together a long series of questionable claims (i.e., the hereditarian answers must 
follow the course plotted by the small blue “no” boxes). Should the hereditarian be wrong 
about any of these questions, we will have established that accepting hereditarianism comes 
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6.3.1 The feasibility of the hereditarian society 
6.3.1.1 On discriminating “just the right amount” 
As noted earlier on, hereditarians are not necessarily univocal in supporting the 
sorts of discriminatory practices described in Section 6.2.3, and there is room for a wide 
range of opinions regarding whether and to what extent such discrimination might be 
justified. But we can divide these positions, broadly, into two types: one might maintain 
that no such discrimination is ever justified—i.e., that any beliefs about average group 
differences must be entirely discounted when making decisions about individuals—or one 
might advocate some degree of Bayesian racial discrimination, so long as the privilege is 
not abused. Let us begin by considering the suggestion that while hereditarian theories 
about the existence and causes of racial differences should be widely disseminated, 
decision-makers should ignore average group differences when making judgments about 
the character and capacities of individuals. Is it reasonable to suppose that people will 
refrain from such practices? 
Both Herrnstein and Murray (1996) and Jensen (Miele, 2002; Rushton & Jensen, 
2005) insist that no member of any racial or ethnic group need fear the widespread 
publicization of claims about racial differences, because these claims need not (and should 
not) have any bearing whatsoever on how any individual is treated publicly or privately. 
(That is, alleged racial differences in intelligence are relevant only to matters of broad 





trait of an individual based on that person’s race.) So, in this version of the hereditarian 
society, collective awareness among policymakers of innate racial IQ differences will lead 
to the withdrawal of social funding for compensatory education and the abolition of 
affirmative action, but employers, landlords, teachers, law enforcement officials, and the 
person on the street will all recognize that racial differences are statistical averages only, 
and will completely disregard racial information in forming and acting on judgments about 
individuals’ likely characteristics. 
This hereditarian suggestion—that there is no need to fear that widespread 
dissemination of hereditarian claims will affect individual interactions—has elicited such 
responses as “what world do they live in?” (Genovese, 1995, p. 46) and “where have these 
guys been?” (Judis, 1994, p. 18). I share these authors’ incredulity. Still, some unpacking 
of this hereditarian position is worth pursuing. It is somewhat unclear whether Herrnstein, 
Murray, and Jensen really believe there is no epistemic justification for applying 
population-level information about racial differences to individual judgments—their 
emphasis on the fact that racial difference claims reflect only averages and that individuals 
of all IQ levels and personality types will be found among all groups seems to suggest as 
much. However, given these thinkers’ demonstrated statistical sophistication, it is difficult 
to imagine that they could have overlooked the applicability of Bayesian inference 
principles to at least some such situations (something their fellow hereditarians have 
emphasized, as we saw in Section 6.2.3 above). It seems, therefore, that the prohibition 
against using Bayesian principles to make racially-informed judgments about individuals’ 





epistemic justification for letting population averages influence our judgments about 
individuals, we ought not to do so.  
If this is right, we can ask two questions about this normative stricture: is it justified 
by more general normative principles, and is it psychologically plausible to suppose that 
people can or will adhere to it? Some consideration of the first question was provided 
above, where I suggested that, while many would see such a principle as a matter of basic 
fairness, the opposing view cannot be dismissed out of hand (again, we generally recognize 
that people and institutions have a legitimate claim to using all information at their disposal 
to make important decisions). But what about the second question: is it realistic to expect 
that individual agents and institutions will recognize the unfairness of using race to inform 
assessments of individual characteristics and refrain from doing so, even when it is against 
their own interests? 
I think the answer is a resounding “no.” One source of doubt regarding the 
feasibility of this proposal concerns the way humans apply beliefs about group 
characteristics to judgments about individuals. A number of studies have demonstrated that 
when people try to apply information about group base rates to individual judgments, they 
tend to overweight group-based information, especially when it comes to stereotypes about 
women and non-Whites (Nelson, Biernat, & Manis, 1990; Pager & Karafin, 2009; Quillian 
& Pager, 2001; Uhlmann, Brescoll, & Machery, 2010). There is considerable psychological 
evidence that most people already endorse—at least at an unconscious level—negative 
racial stereotypes (Nosek et al., 2007; Phelps et al., 2000). And moreover, thinking of group 





behavior even more (Kvaale, Gottdiener, & Haslam, 2013; Levy & Dweck, 1999), 
suggesting that widespread dissemination of hereditarian claims would likely exacerbate 
tendencies to over-rely on stereotype information. Thus, there is good reason to think that 
in the hereditarian society, Blacks would be subject to a good deal of unjustified 
discrimination at the hands of employers, landlords, and police officers, who, despite 
having no intentions to discriminate, over-rely on stereotype information in everyday 
decision making.  
Rushton and Jensen downplay this worry, suggesting that the solution to the 
problem of pernicious stereotyping is as simple as giving people instruction in basic 
statistics:  
thus, any part of a general program of education must include distributional 
statistics so that people also learn not to stereotype or overgeneralize. This 
may not be as difficult a task as might be supposed. Even kindergarten 
children are capable of learning that although boys are typically taller than 
girls, many girls are taller than the average boy. (Rushton & Jensen, 2005, 
pp. 283–284)  
However, pace Rushton and Jensen, the fact that people—even young children—
are able to recognize the difference between distributional and universal generalizations, 
and can report, when asked and upon reflection, the normatively correct answer to a 
question like “are all girls shorter than all boys?” hardly establishes that they will be able 
to avoid the sort of reflexive overreliance on stereotypes recorded in the literature.  
A second reason for skepticism is that we can hardly expect that everyone will sign 
on to a prohibition against using statistical generalizations to inform judgments about 





who agree with Levin and Sesardic that “reasonable” racial discrimination is entirely 
kosher, and there is little we could do to stop such people from enacting such discrimination 
in their judgments and decisions. And even among those who did assent to the moral 
impropriety of (“rational”) racial discrimination, we can expect that some “weakness of 
will” would arise: when the choice comes between upholding this moral principle of 
fairness and a perceived opportunity to boost profit margins, surely the profit margins will 
win out some of the time. Even people convinced by (certain) hereditarians’ moral 
arguments against discrimination would on some occasions apply their beliefs about group 
characteristics to their assessments of individuals (and this is all assuming, of course, that 
human beings can—contra my arguments above—be counted on to employ normatively 
correct statistical inferences when dealing with socially salient categories such as race). 
Thus, in order for the widespread adoption of hereditarian beliefs not to result in 
(arguably legitimate) racial discrimination, we would have to rely on people to be either, 
to use historian Eugene Genovese’s phrase, “saints or idiots.” Genovese’s response to 
Herrnstein and Murray’s soothing pronouncements of individualism (referenced above) is 
worth quoting in full: 
Each person, [Herrnstein and Murray] solemnly aver, should be taken as an 
individual and treated accordingly. What world do they live in? Do they 
seriously believe that any such sermon would, could, or should dictate the 
policy of employers with bills to pay, payrolls to meet, and profits to make? 
May I suggest that employers would have to be either saints or idiots not to 
be influenced by the collective statistics in choosing between competing 





I conclude, then, that once widespread acceptance of the sorts of irremediable racial 
differences endorsed by hereditarians takes hold in the public mindset, systematic 
discrimination is almost sure to follow. 
Again, however, not everyone thinks this would be a bad thing. As we saw above, 
many hereditarians (e.g., Levin, 1997b; Sesardic, 2005) argue that information about 
average racial differences should inform individual decisions (or at least, that people are 
free to use such information if they so choose). But this position faces the same problems 
as the less radical proposal of Herrnstein and Murray and Jensen. For again, even the 
advocate of “rational” racial discrimination must uphold that such discrimination is only 
legitimate if it is practiced in proper proportion to extant racial differences and the 
availability of other information. But the same psychological effects described above 
would still be operative—that is, even if people are licensed to discriminate to some degree, 
there is good reason to doubt that their decisions will assign only the proper weight to 
information about the target’s race. So it would seem that the vision the hereditarian gives 
us—of a society in which everyone believes it has been scientifically established that 
Blacks are, on average, intellectually inferior, but in which statistical clear-headedness 
prevents these beliefs from spilling over into unjust discrimination—is a pipe dream.  
6.3.1.2 Direct effects on minority achievement  
In contrast to the matter of discrimination, hereditarians have typically not 
addressed another likely outcome of promoting widespread discussion and acceptance of 





among the putatively inferior groups. One source of concern was discussed in Chapter 5: 
stereotype threat. Again, findings in this literature establish that not only do negative 
stereotypes inhibit performance in high-stakes situations, but the effects are greater the 
more salient the stereotype. As hereditarians frequently observe, there are currently 
powerful social mores against openly airing claims about racial differences in 
psychological characteristics; however, they would have us do away with such restraints 
and give the possibility of innate racial differences a much more central role in public 
discourse. Adopting this recommendation can only increase the salience of negative 
stereotypes to members of stigmatized groups and exacerbate the effects of stereotype 
threat.1 
Similarly, there is the worry that pervasive discussion of the alleged inferiority of 
certain groups will result in lower achievement by way of “self-fulfilling prophesies,” 
whereby members of stigmatized groups respond to subtle behavioral cues signaling low 
expectations by performing to meet those expectations. For example, teachers might harbor 
lower expectations for minority students, and these expectations cause the teacher to offer 
less enthusiastic praise for minority students, or to express greater surprise when they 
perform well. Students will then read these cues and moderate their behavior to meet the 
lower expectations, e.g., by exerting lower effort (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968; Weinstein, 
Gregory, & Strambler, 2004). Decades of research on this so-called “Pygmalion Effect” 
                                                 
1 To be clear, I am not here endorsing censorship—formal or informal—of scientific discussions of group 
differences; even setting aside the common hereditarian refrain that the pursuit of truth is an absolute 
good—which I find questionable—there are many good reasons to be skeptical of such censorship (Loury, 
1994). Rather, I am highlighting a social and moral cost of adopting hereditarian recommendations, one 





have yielded conflicting results (Jussim & Harber, 2005), so I do not wish to lean too 
heavily on this concern. But, as with stereotype threat, a greater emphasis on racial 
differences in public discourse could only worsen any such effects as may exist. 
This poses a serious challenge for the hereditarian. For a key premise in the case 
for the hereditarian society is that racial inequality need not trouble us, because this 
inequality simply reflects a process of social goods being distributed according to 
meritocratic principles—through no one’s fault, Blacks have ended up with lower IQs than 
Whites, and so there is nothing wrong with Whites having more than Blacks. But if merely 
by promulgating claims about racial differences, we cause Blacks’ achievement to be lower 
than it otherwise would be, then this justification crumbles. Now a particular set of social 
conditions—of our own making—is causing real and demonstrable harm to those whose 
achievement is artificially depressed by prevailing attitudes. 
Again, hereditarians show a rather surprising indifference towards this point, a 
point that would seem to establish a significant shortcoming of their theory. The reason, I 
suspect, is that hereditarians tend to put very little stock in these sorts of effects on either 
IQ tests or academic achievement more broadly—that is, hereditarians hold to the view 
that IQ tests are equally valid measures of intelligence across all groups and that IQ test 
performance is equally predictive of academic and professional achievement across all 
groups. So the hereditarian might here accuse me of begging an important empirical 
question about the determinants of achievement. In response I would note that even if 
stereotype threat and self-fulfilling prophesies play little role in generating the current 





significant influence on Black achievement if, as the hereditarian recommends, we were to 
make claims about racial inferiority a much more prominent feature of public dialogue. 
But nevertheless, I want to steer clear of any potential question-begging, so for the 
remainder of this chapter I will assume for the sake of argument that the hereditarian is 
correct that disseminating hereditarian scientific claims would exert no inhibiting influence 
on minority groups’ IQ or achievement. Similar considerations apply in the case of 
discrimination. As argued above, I think the evidence suggests it is psychologically 
implausible to suppose that hereditarian science can be widely promulgated without a good 
deal of unjust discrimination following as a result. But hereditarians can object that they 
have explicitly disavowed the (morally or epistemically) improper use of statistical 
information about groups in judgments and decisions involving individuals, and that 
misuse of a theory by misguided people should not count as a strike against the theory. 
And moreover, for all I have said, it is by no means certain that there is nothing we could 
do (e.g., better statistical training, as Rushton and Jensen recommend) to prevent people 
from committing these errors. So I will allow, for the time being, that we can follow the 
hereditarians’ suggestion for more open discussion and use of hereditarian science without 
paying the moral costs of unjust discrimination. 
6.3.2 What is wrong with racial inequality, per se? 
Taking these assumptions regarding discrimination and achievement for granted, 
we are now envisioning a society in which “innate” racial differences are routinely and 





while perhaps our society sanctions some degree of discrimination in places of 
employment, apartment complexes, and courtrooms, no one is subjected to unjust 
discrimination in these contexts.2 And so, while this society still exhibits substantial racial 
stratification (reflecting the IQ distribution—with Whites and Asians at the top and Blacks 
at the bottom), one might nevertheless look at this society and reach the hereditarian-
friendly conclusion that no one has any particular cause for complaint in the way social 
goods are distributed. This section sets out the challenge presented by this line of thinking, 
while the two that follow respond to it, showing that indeed, this society’s racial 
stratification is a significant moral cost. 
How might the hereditarian defend the view that racial inequality per se is not 
morally objectionable? The argument—generally more implicit than explicit in 
hereditarian writings—goes like this. Recall that I have conceded (in Chapter 5) that 
individual differences in socially-relevant behavioral traits (including intelligence) are 
indeed attributable to individual genetic differences. Another way of saying this is simply 
that under any environmental conditions some individual differences in these traits will 
remain. And recall that I also conceded that in the aggregate, differences in intelligence 
will yield differential socioeconomic outcomes. It follows from these two concessions that 
some sort of genetic stratification is almost certainly unavoidable—greater wealth and 
status will, on average, accrue to people with genotypes that (in a wide range of 
                                                 
2 I.e., the hereditarian might liken the discrimination that Blacks would receive to selecting a basketball team 
in gym class: there is of course no guarantee that taller students will prove greater assets on the court than 
shorter ones, but it would be absurd for shorter students to claim they had been wronged by a team captain 





environmental conditions) are conducive to developing high intelligence and other valued 
traits. But now the hereditarian can raise the question: if we accept that a stratified society 
is inevitable, why suppose there is anything particularly wrong with a society in which the 
stratification happens to track race? 
A particularly forthright assertion of this very point comes from historian and 
conservative commentator John Rosenberg. In objecting to an argument for affirmative 
action from legal theorist Owen Fiss, Rosenberg observes,  
asserting that what’s wrong with racial inequality is that it results in “the 
racial ordering of American society” doesn’t really answer the question, for 
it doesn’t explain what exactly is bad about a racial ordering of society...Let 
me put it this way: since any society that has not been leveled by centralized 
totalitarian authority must be “ordered” in some way or other—inherited 
status, wealth, talent, intelligence, where your parents when to school, 
etc.—liberals need to explain why exactly racial ordering is worse than 
other possible ways. (J. Rosenberg, 2011) 
Rosenberg’s challenge makes explicit a premise that I believe to be implicit in much 
hereditarian writing about racial inequality: racial inequality per se is not morally 
problematic. To feel the pull of this position, we can imagine two societies, one of which 
(R) exhibits racial stratification, while the other (S) shows exactly the same degree of social 
stratification, but all races are represented proportionally at all levels of the socioeconomic 
hierarchy. We can even assume that each society has an identical set of “slots” 
corresponding to particular socioeconomic roles—an occupation, a net worth, and so on—
such that across the two societies, wealth and political power are distributed among the 
society’s individuals in exactly the same way; the only difference lies in whether people of 





some groups are disproportionally concentrated in high- or low-status roles. Now, if one 
wants to say that R is morally worse than S, one would have to affirm that we could 
accomplish a moral improvement by moving from R to S. But Rosenberg’s challenge is to 
say why this should be so: in S there is no less poverty or wealth disparity than there is in 
R. If we were to move from R to S, then certainly, some Blacks would be better off, but 
given the rules of the thought experiment, some Whites would be worse off (and by a 
symmetrical amount). How can this be a moral upgrade? 
In the face this challenge, unless the racial egalitarian can identify some inherent 
moral defect of a racially stratified society—as compared to a society that is similarly 
stratified, but not along color lines—then the pursuit of IQ-equalizing interventions would 
seem to be entirely without justification. For on the assumption that pursuing such 
interventions will require some sort of investment of public resources—research funds, 
more money for teacher salaries, and so forth—the hereditarian can question why we 
should make such investments. If we can identify no moral benefit to moving from a 
racially-stratified society to a non-racially-stratified (but still stratified) society, then it 
seems there is nothing to justify the cost of doing so. As I argue below, however, there are 





6.3.3 The moral costs of racial inequality (per se)3 
The first way in which I think the hereditarian society is morally deficient is in—
for lack of a better term—the sheer psychic harm that Blacks would suffer (indeed, already 
do suffer) as a result of being bombarded with constant reminders of the alleged—but 
universally accepted—inferiority of one’s people. Simply stated, it hurts to be told that one 
is a member of an inferior group.4 So even granting the (dubious) hereditarian premise that 
no decrements in achievement for minority groups will result from incessant public 
repetitions of the hereditarian’s inferiorizing mantra, this does not mean that there are no 
moral costs involved. And these costs are especially troublesome when it comes to those 
who are already struggling economically: surely it would be next to impossible for a Black 
person experiencing a run of bad luck not to begin to wonder if perhaps it isn’t a run of bad 
luck—if instead he really isn’t as intelligent as his White neighbors, and is therefore 
ultimately the source of his own misfortune. The fact that following the hereditarian’s 
recommendations would lead to a society rife with this sort of occurrence—where the insult 
of publically-expressed doubt about one’s intellectual adequacy is added to the injury of 
economic hardship—must be a serious moral blight on the hereditarian society. 
                                                 
3 The discussion in this section, more so that any other, is framed in a way that is quite particular to the 
circumstances of African-Americans and the notion of “Black identity.” As such I cannot be certain that 
the framework presented here will be applicable to cases involving hereditarian claims about other 
racial/ethnic groups. To take one illustrative example, scholars have noted that it is unclear whether the 
notion of “Hispanic identity”—a group hereditarians maintain has higher “innate IQ” than Blacks, but 
lower than Whites—can be given a coherent theoretical interpretation, at least under current political 
circumstances (Idler-Acosta, 2005; Tienda & Mitchell, 2006) 
4 The idea I have in mind is similar to Boxill’s (1992, p. 82) “dignitary harm,” or “the sense of wounded 
dignity, inferiority, and stigma experienced by the victims” of public challenges to racial equality (Boxill’s 





The second major moral cost to the hereditarian society is the frustration and 
distress that Blacks experience as a result of the group’s continued status near the bottom 
of the socioeconomic hierarchy. Whatever any individual Black person’s social or 
economic status, it is, I contend, a source of injury to look out upon the world and its extant 
social conditions and to be continually confronted with reminders of the subordinate status 
that one’s group continues to endure. 
Given these quick sketches of the moral costs I see with even the “well-executed” 
hereditarian society, we can anticipate a number of hereditarian responses. Considering 
these objections will help elucidate further why I think these moral costs ought to be given 
serious consideration. First, regarding the psychic harm that results from persistent public 
repetition of claims about average genetic inferiority, one might claim that while this news 
might be unpleasant to hear, it is nevertheless the truth, and we must speak the truth even 
when it hurts. That some religious fundamentalists might find it unpleasant to hear that 
humans share a common evolutionary ancestor with apes is no reason to refrain from 
saying it. Relatedly, the hereditarian might suggest that the harm inflicted—on Blacks in 
particular—by ignoring average group differences would be greater than the harms 
inflicted by speaking candidly about them (cf. Gottfredson, 1988, p. 312).5  
The hereditarian might further allege that for individual Blacks to be in any way 
hurt or offended by hereditarian claims is an irrational response. That is, one might argue 
that an individual Black person who feels any kind of insult in response to hereditarian 
                                                 
5 Some examples of harms that might result from failing to acknowledge group differences—if they existed—





claims about average group differences commits a category mistake: hereditarian claims 
are not about any individual’s intellectual capacities; rather, they are about group averages 
and nothing more. Whatever importance people are inclined to attach to IQ in determining 
a self-conception or a sense of self-worth,6 only an individual’s measured IQ (and not the 
mean IQ of any group to which she might belong) ought to be relevant. If someone believes 
that an IQ of 105 is something to be proud about and an IQ of 85 is something to be 
ashamed of, then it will of course be of interest to her what her IQ is. But once she has her 
own measured IQ score (or some other reliable indicator of her intelligence) in hand, 
incoming information about the average IQ of various racial/ethnic groups should have no 
more bearing on her self-image than information about the average height of the trees on 
her block. Therefore, the hereditarian might conclude, any psychic harm Blacks may 
experience as a result of statements about differing group means should not be counted as 
a genuine moral cost, because it is simply not a reasonable response to the hereditarians’ 
scientific claims. 
Finally, in response to the claim that in a racially stratified society, Blacks are 
harmed by constant reminders that their fellow group members are vastly overrepresented 
among the poorest and least valued members of society, the hereditarian might put forth a 
version of Rosenberg’s challenge: why, the hereditarian asks, should anyone—even 
members of less successful groups—feel distress over the mere fact of stratification when 
everyone is (by hypothesis) being treated fairly? Is there any justifiable reason why Blacks 
                                                 
6 Note that the hereditarian need not be committed to any particular stance on the attitude people ought to 





should feel better about a society with identical material economic conditions but in which 
people of all racial groups are randomly distributed across socioeconomic strata? 
This will take some explaining, but the problem is easiest to see, I think, if we 
consider the case of someone—call her Elise—who is what I will call, for lack of a better 
term, a high-status Black member of the hereditarian society I’ve described. Let us imagine 
that she is aware that her measured IQ is about 120, and that she has experienced precisely 
the academic and professional success that psychometricians would predict for someone 
of her cognitive abilities—she has a stimulating career and comfortable wages, lives in a 
nice neighborhood, and so on. Why, the hereditarian might ask, should it be of any 
particular concern to Elise (much less to anyone else) that some miles away in the inner 
city, the population of “low-status” individuals (those struggling with poverty and related 
social ills) contains a disproportionate number of Blacks? This is not to attribute utter 
callousness to the hereditarian, who can of course maintain that it would be commendable 
or even morally required for Elise to feel compassion for the economically less fortunate, 
to feel sadness or anger about the conditions they endure, and to act so as to improve those 
conditions. But why should she be particularly bothered by the lower average social status 
of Blacks, if in fact that group happens to include a greater percentage of low-IQ 
individuals? 
Pressing further, the hereditarian might concede that some 60 years ago, perhaps, 
Elise would have had every reason to be deeply wary of the racial inequality of the time. 
For the conditions of de jure segregation and open hostility to Blacks that existed at the 





who were otherwise well-equipped to attain conventional success. Even if one did—against 
the odds—manage to accrue some measure of wealth and/or status, the prevailing racial 
stigma would have guaranteed the extreme fragility of this arrangement; no amount of 
intelligence or any other trait could protect one’s status against the hostility or even the 
indifference of Whites. So under these circumstances, someone like Elise—even if she 
found herself, for a time, enjoying the benefits of her intellectual abilities—would have 
every reason to be deeply apprehensive of stark racial inequality, insofar as that inequality 
is indicative of a shared vulnerability among all dark-skinned people. Going from that sort 
of racially stratified society to one which was not so stratified would undoubtedly leave 
Elise better off. 
But in the hereditarian society we are considering, things are much different. For 
here we have stipulated that people in this society acquire wealth and status in accordance 
with the value they bring to the marketplace (largely a function of IQ), and that—in contrast 
to traditional practices in American society—employers and other decision makers would 
not spurn intelligent and otherwise desirable candidates merely because of skin color. In 
other words, in the society the hereditarian would have us adopt, Elise has no reason to 
doubt that her intellectual capacities will be appropriately recognized and valued, and that 
she will enjoy all the benefits of being a high-IQ individual in a society that values high-
IQ individuals. What then, the hereditarian asks, does the low average IQ of Blacks—and 
the social inequality it generates—have to do with Elise’s well-being? 
By way of responding to the hereditarian’s objections, it is worth pointing out a 





which helps to illuminate where the hereditarians’ moral perspective falls short. In 
dismissing the potentially harmful social implications of their claims, many hereditarians 
evince a pronounced individualism regarding ethical questions. For example, when pressed 
by an interviewer about the social implications of his theories—specifically, about the very 
same (discrimination-free) racial inequality I have called attention to— Jensen responds, 
If there are racial, ethnic, social class, or any other kind of group differences 
in the proportions of the groups that meet these selection criteria, so be it, 
as long as every applicant, regardless of group membership or background, 
has been evaluated objectively on his or her own individual achievements. 
(Miele, 2002, p. 179, emphasis added) 
Jensen’s individualism runs deep: in the same passage he affirms his unwavering ethical 
commitment to “the primacy of the individual over the group.” Similarly, Gottfredson 
laments the decline of “American individualism” that has accompanied growing concern 
over racial inequality, and decries the fact that “many people now distinguish between 
individual and group rights and accord the latter higher standing” (1988, pp. 313–314). 
At its core, then, the question of whether the hereditarian society is ethically 
tolerable is a question about whether groups—in particular racial groups—are appropriate 
elements in our moral deliberations, or whether, instead, we should accept “the primacy of 
the individual.” We have encountered this issue as a sticking point at each stage of the 
dialectic: for each of my objections, which stress the harm that hereditarian claims cause 
to Blacks insofar as they think of themselves as members of a group—i.e., as Black—the 
hereditarian responds: why should that matter? The question of the ethical status of social 





metaphysical questions regarding the ontic status of these groups—and I cannot hope to 
give the matter a comprehensive treatment here. But I will outline the core of my case for 
the moral relevance of groups, and in particular the moral relevance of the group classified 
as “Black” in America (and I will provide some further thoughts on this in Chapter 8 as 
well).  
The fundamental problem with the individualism evinced by hereditarians is that it 
is profoundly ahistorical. There is a long tradition of African-American scholarship 
describing and defending the formation of a “shared racial identity” among American 
Blacks in particular (Shelby, 2005). This shared identity—whereby the experience of being 
racialized as Black gives rise to a perceived commonality of interests and shared destiny 
with others so racialized—is grounded in the peculiar and savage history of Blacks’ 
encounters with Europeans and their descendents. The knowledge that one possesses a 
feature—“Blackness”—that has been the common element in a long history of shared 
suffering and shared struggle, engenders a special commitment to the well-being of others 
who share this stigmatizing feature and are thus connected to the same history. This “shared 
experience of racial oppression and a joint commitment to resist it” forms the basis of what 
is often called Black solidarity (Shelby, 2005, pp. 12–13). At the core of the critique against 
individualism is a conviction that group solidarity is an appropriate way for Blacks to 
respond to the history of racial oppression. Thus, to the extent that individualism brushes 
aside the historical considerations that give rise to group identity, individualism is an 





These themes of shared identity are also prominent in the work of economist Glenn 
Loury, who has written extensively on the causes and moral significance of racial 
inequality (Loury, 1999, 2000, 2002). Crucially for our purposes, Loury emphasizes not 
only the legitimacy of Blacks’ adopting a shared racial identity—of seeing one’s own well-
being as being linked to that of others who share similar experiences of racialization—but 
also the moral duty incumbent upon all members of society to acknowledge the centrality 
of race to the lives of African-Americans. Hence, caring about racial inequality is not a 
special obligation incurred by Blacks, but a moral commitment to which we are all 
beholden. 
As Loury argues, our collective obligation to both attend to and combat racial 
disparities is rooted in the fact that—much as the individualist (hereditarian) might 
presume otherwise—we do not experience the events of the social world—events such as 
a walk through a struggling neighborhood, a news report documenting growing income 
disparity between racial groups, or a blog post touting the latest scientific proof that Blacks 
really are genetically inferior—merely as individuals. Rather, the moral resonance of such 
events is necessarily informed and shaped by one’s experiences and, crucially, the sense of 
identity—including racial identity—to which those experiences have given rise. As Loury 
puts it: 
a liberal individualist of any sophistication ought to reject that brittle, two-
step liberalism that enshrines some mythical “unencumbered self”—a “self” 
located outside the flow of history and the web of culture—as a touchstone 
of moral judgment in regard to questions of racial pride, kinship, and fealty. 





Now, the chief argument against conferring moral significance on the status of 
social groups—beyond the claim that doing so is inherently unfair—is that such a practice 
is fundamentally divisive. To consider race as a factor in questions of social justice, one 
might argue, can only further solidify the social barriers that exist between races, and can 
only encourage greater mistrust and antagonism by exerting constant pressure for people 
to frame social issues in terms of group interests. We should, in other words, actively 
discourage people from thinking of themselves in racial terms, encouraging instead a 
“colorblind” mentality whereby citizens have no inclination to see themselves as part of a 
particular racial group.7 If, the hereditarian-individualist might suggest, people were to 
abandon their notions of racial identity, then the moral issues I have raised for the 
hereditarian society (i.e., Blacks feeling slighted by claims about group mean IQs or feeling 
distressed by social disparities that happen to fall along racial lines) simply drop out of the 
equation. These problems, the hereditarian might argue, arise only because of a tendency 
(i.e., to include race as part of one’s self-conception) that the hereditarian actively 
discourages in the first place. 
Again, I believe this perspective fails to take account of the historical realities that 
are at the root of the present significance of race and racial identity to the lives of many. 
The tendency among historically oppressed groups to see oneself in racial terms is a deeply 
ingrained feature that cannot be wished away, as Loury emphasizes:  
                                                 
7 Of course, this kind of colorblind individualism is at odds with some of the more extreme hereditarian 
voices—e.g., Kershnar (2000) and Levin (1997a, 1997b)—who argue for the moral significance of race 
but, on the question of where our moral commitments should lie, reach a conclusion directly opposite the 





The implicit assumption of advocates of race-blindness is that, if we would 
just stop putting people into these boxes, they would oblige us by not 
thinking of themselves in these terms. But this assumption is patently false. 
(Loury, 2002, p. 142) 
This critique of race-blind individualism is of course consistent with the idea that race is a 
“socially constructed” category that, had history been different, we might have done 
without—or might yet do away with. Perhaps at some point in the far future, we will reach 
a point where the very idea of racial identity does drop out of the moral equation. The 
rejection of colorblind individualism, then, is “not a principled rejection; it’s historically 
contingent. It’s a rejection based upon the specific facts of our society and the way in which 
people see themselves” (Loury, 1999). But owing to the actual historical and current 
conditions in which racial identities are formed, this rejection is necessary for the time 
being. 
6.4 Conclusion 
If what I have said in this chapter is correct, then accepting the core hereditarian 
claim (i.e., HED: genetic differences between races make social equality, for all practical 
purposes, impossible) would come at great moral cost. Again, however, the question of 
whether this claim is true is ultimately an empirical one, and however much we might 
lament its moral consequences, the truth of the claim is an independent matter. So the moral 
considerations I have outlined cannot ground an outright, in-principle rejection of 
hereditarianism. But these considerations do imply that if we have at our disposal a means 





in policy deliberations—we ought to pursue it. This is what I aim to provide in the next 
chapter: an explanatory framework that, if adopted, may obviate the moral quandaries that 








 CHAPTER 7: HERITABILITY, MECHANISMS, AND NATURE/NURTURE 
DEBATES 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the contrasts between behavior-genetic and mechanistic 
approaches to studying the ontogeny of complex human behaviors. The behavior-genetic 
approach is favored by those researchers—philosophers and scientists—I am calling 
“hereditarians,” who argue that observed racial differences in socially-desirable traits (such 
as intelligence, altruism, and self-control) are genetic in origin and irremediable. Since I 
am concerned to resist such claims, this chapter argues for methodological shortcomings 
in the hereditarians’ preferred explanatory strategies, and for the superiority of mechanistic 
approaches. However, in keeping with the explanatory pluralism defended in Part I, I will 
not be arguing for the unqualified superiority of mechanistic explanation. Indeed, I will 
argue that behavior-genetic modes of explanation are perfectly adequate for some 
explanatory purposes. But our pragmatic interests in the context of group IQ differences 
dictate a preference for mechanistic strategies. 
To briefly review the arguments of the previous two chapters: hereditarians take 
the evidence for claims about “innate” racial differences to be sufficiently decisive that we 
are rationally required to take such irremediable differences as empirical premises in social 
policy deliberations. However, an exploration of some of the policy implications that might 





arguments seriously would be morally defective. We therefore have powerful moral 
reasons to resist the claim that racial differences are irremediable, and to instead seek 
interventions that will eliminate observed racial gaps in socially-important traits. 
Picking up this thread in the argument, the present chapter argues that the analytical 
methodologies used by hereditarians in pursuing nature-nurture questions are poorly suited 
to discovering such interventions. Moreover, I demonstrate that an alternative explanatory 
framework, one with the goal of developing detailed mechanistic models of psychological 
development, is significantly more likely to yield information that will facilitate the 
discovery and implementation of interventions that can eliminate observed racial 
differences. Mechanistic strategies are therefore a promising route to averting the moral 
calamity of a society characterized by permanent racial inequality. 
Since I believe (see Chapter 1) that the adequacy of scientific explanations is 
context-dependent, and that practical and moral considerations play a role in fixing 
explanatory contexts, I believe that the superiority of mechanistic explanations of 
development in guiding intervention design makes them overall better scientific 
explanations in the contexts we inhabit (or at least, ought to inhabit). However, these 
assumptions are not essential for most of the arguments laid out in this chapter. I am 
primarily concerned to establish the narrower thesis that differences between behavior-
genetic and mechanistic researchers ultimately reflect pragmatic rather than empirical 
differences, and that mechanistic analyses are much better suited to the design of 





Thus, in this chapter I will be concerned with the conceptual issues that divide 
hereditarians and a particular class of their opponents, those who might be termed 
interactionists given their emphasis on the complex interrelations between genetic and 
environmental factors in development. Sometimes these theorists have been key players in 
the race-IQ debates (e.g. Lewontin, 1974), but in many cases these critics have been more 
centrally concerned with the nature of explanation in developmental science, and have 
argued for methodological deficiencies within the entire field of behavioral genetics 
(Gottlieb, 1991, 1995; Wahlsten, 1990; West & King, 1987).1 
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 7.2 reviews the basics of behavioral-
genetic analysis and discusses two types of developmental complexity (gene-environment 
correlation and gene-environment interaction) that present prima facie challenges to the 
applicability of behavioral-genetic analysis to racial-difference debates. In Section 7.3 I 
examine in detail the debates between hereditarians and their opponents in order to draw 
out the differing explanatory interests of the two sides; in particular I consider the question 
of how we should delineate the range of relevant environmental conditions for 
development, and I argue that hereditarians have taken an overly simplistic approach to 
this question. Finally, in Section 7.4 I demonstrate how the mechanistic approach to 
explaining developmental outcomes affords better opportunities for control and 
manipulation than the behavioral-genetic alternative. 
                                                 
1 Given their focus on the complexity of gene-environment interplay in development, the class of 






7.2 Heritability and Behavioral-Genetic Analysis 
Recall that a key article of evidence cited by hereditarians arguing for racial 
differences in genetic propensities for intelligence is the relatively high degree of 
heritability that measures of intelligence (e.g., IQ tests) exhibit—typically from 0.4 to 0.8 
(Herrnstein & Murray, 1996; Jensen, 1969; Rushton & Jensen, 2005). The use of 
heritability estimates has long been subjected to strident critiques, with many researchers 
suggesting that most uses of heritability measures are based on fundamental confusions 
and hence have very little to contribute to our understanding of how phenotypes develop 
(for classic critiques, see Block & Dworkin, 1976; Block, 1995; Jencks et al., 1972; 
Lewontin, 1974). One sticking point is whether heritability analyses and ANOVA can 
provide causal information about development, either at the level of the individual 
organism or at the population level (e.g., Lewontin, 1974; Northcott, 2006; Sesardic, 1993; 
Sober, 1988). Another point of contention is whether, given a high level of heritability for 
a trait in two separate populations—indicating that within those populations, genotypic 
variation plays a large role in generating phenotypic variation—it is legitimate to infer that 
genotypic variation plays a large role in generating phenotypic variation between those 
populations. 
For our purposes, these debates don’t much matter. We can allow, as hereditarian 
philosophers like Sesardic (1993, 2005) and Levin (1997b) insist, that heritability does give 
us information about causes—i.e., that high heritability within populations can ground 
inferences about the causes of between-population differences, and that high heritability 





than its environment.2 Nevertheless, I will argue, merely causal characterizations of the 
role of genes in producing phenotypes are too impoverished to serve the goals we bring to 
the table in studying individual and group variations in human behavior (Darden, 2013). 
7.2.1 Heritability’s limitations and the IQ gap 
Two features of heritability measures, however, will be especially salient for the 
ensuing discussion:  
1. Heritability can only be estimated for a trait in a particular population in a 
particular environment. That is, the heritability of a trait in one population may 
be different from the heritability of that trait in a genetically-identical population 
in a different environment.  
2. Heritability measures are often insensitive to the presence of genotype-
environment correlation (rGE) and genotype-environment interaction (G×E). 
These concepts are explained below. 
These two limitations help us to identify two ways in which the “core hereditarian claim” 
(HED: genetic racial differences will cause unequal racial outcomes in all practically 
possible human environments) might be false. One such possibility (call this Hypothesis 
1) follows from the first limitation of heritability mentioned above: present phenotypic 
differences between Black and White populations stem purely from environmental 
differences between the populations—that is, Black and White populations are genetically 
identical with respect to those genes that are relevant to intelligence, and if environmental 
conditions for Black and White populations were the same, these populations would exhibit 
                                                 
2 While I am willing to allow such claims for the sake of the present argument, recall that I do offer arguments 





identical mean phenotypic intelligence. But, Hypothesis 1 holds, Black and White children 
do not develop in identical environments; rather there are substantial differences in the 
environmental conditions of Blacks and Whites. Possible environmental differences were 
reviewed in previous chapters and include racial stigma resulting in stereotype threat, self-
fulfilling prophesies about Black underperformance, and so on. 
Picking up on the second limitation of heritability, an alternative hypothesis 
(Hypothesis 2) suggests that there are in fact genetic differences between Blacks and 
Whites with regard to genes affecting intelligence—such that even if White and Black 
populations developed in identical environmental conditions, differences in phenotypic IQ 
would still be observed—but that HED is still false because there are some environments 
in which mean phenotypic IQ would be equal across both populations. In other words, 
Hypothesis 2 holds Black and White populations have equal genetic potential for 
intelligence, but that genetic differences between the populations are such that the optimal 
environments for IQ development are different across groups. If Hypothesis 2 is correct, 
then a society could equalize mean IQ scores across racial populations—thereby 
eliminating what is, by hypothesis, the primary cause of differences in social outcomes 
between racial groups—by providing more targeted environmental manipulations to 
different citizens.3 This possibility arises as a consequence of the phenomenon of gene-
environment interaction. 
                                                 
3 This hypothesis suggests, in other words, that there will be some correlation between racial group 
membership and optimal IQ environment, and the precise practical recommendations will depend on the 
strength of that correlation (an empirical question). But the basic idea would be that racial group 
membership would count as defeasible evidence that a particular child will benefit from a particular 





I wish to suggest that if we are concerned with eliminating the race-IQ gap—i.e., if 
we are as committed to racial equality as we ought to be—it doesn’t really matter whether 
Hypothesis 1 or Hypothesis 2 is correct. Both of these possibilities are conducive to 
designing interventions that will raise Black IQ and reduce or eliminate racial inequality, 
provided that we understand the mechanisms by which people end up with the IQs that 
they do.4  
7.2.2 Two complexities in developmental science: rGE and G×E 
Objections to the use of heritability in nature-nurture debates (including the race-
IQ debate) often stress two phenomena that pose conceptual and methodological challenges 
to inferences drawn from heritability statistics. The first is gene-environment correlation 
(rGE), while the second is gene-environment interaction (G×E). Both of these phenomena 
come in multiple forms, and at least some forms of each are thought to reveal conceptual 
difficulties with the ways in which methodological tools used in behavioral genetics (i.e., 
ANOVA or heritability) partition genetic and environmental sources of phenotypic 
variance, as well as methodological shortcomings that limit the utility of behavioral-genetic 
analyses. Specifically, in theory a properly-conducted heritability analysis should detect 
phenotypic variation due to rGE and G×E and count them as additional sources of variance 
beyond genetic and environmental sources. Crude applications of the formulae for 
                                                 
4 A perhaps surprising result is that even if Hypothesis 1 is false—that is, if anti-hereditarian theorists are 
wrong in thinking that the current Black-White IQ gap owes entirely or even chiefly to such factors as 
cycles of poverty and stigma among African-Americans—we may still be obligated to invest heavily in 
social interventions designed to raise Black IQ, for we may well be able to reduce or eliminate racial 
stratification by conducting targeted interventions even in contexts that would not meet our ordinary 





calculating heritability, however, will be insensitive to these phenomena, and, what’s more, 
will tend to count rGE and G×E as components of genetic variance, thus inflating the 
influence of genetic factors in generating phenotypic differences. 
In terms of our current questions—about population differences in IQ and other 
socially-relevant traits—the relevant question is whether rGE and G×E play any role in 
generating the presently observed disparities between populations—or whether they might 
be expected to do so in environmental conditions we might reasonably bring about. If so, 
then, as I argue below, our prospects for eliminating observed differences are significantly 
greater. Hereditarians have typically suggested that rGE and G×E play at most minimal 
roles in generating the IQ gap (or at any rate, that any such role is of no practical import), 
but, as I argue, this stance reflects a particular explanatory perspective rather than a 
straightforward empirical hypothesis. 
7.2.2.1 Gene-environment correlation 
 First, let’s discuss gene-environment correlation. Gene-environment 
correlation (rGE) refers to circumstances in which environmental variables causally 
influence the development of the phenotype, but in which certain genotypes are more likely 
than others to encounter certain environmental conditions. The problem rGE poses for 
heritability is that the statistical tools used to generate heritability estimates will (at least if 
applied crudely) be blind to the mediating influences of the environment, and simply 





Since we’ll be considering cases where genetic influences on phenotypes—
particularly IQ—are said to be more or less “direct,” we should try to have a clear sense of 
what this means. A number of ways in which genes might influence phenotypes, and their 
respective levels of “directness” will be considered in detail below, but it will help to begin 
by describing a limiting case of direct genetic influence. In this vein, suppose it were the 
case that there is a linear relationship between intelligence (as measured by psychometric 
tests) and some well-defined low-level neural property—say the rate of firing of neurons 
in the cortex—and that the causal pathway between particular sets of genes and particular 
neuronal firing rates is roughly as “direct” as that between genes and eye colors in humans.5 
For simplicity’s sake, we can suppose there is some combination of a handful of alleles 
shared by all individuals with the neural processing speed associated with IQ 100, and that 
every polymorphism at each of these sites is reliably associated with a specifiable increase 
or decrease in processing speed. This would, I take it, constitute a clear case of a maximally 
“direct” genetic influence on IQ. In what follows, therefore, when I speak of “direct genetic 
influences on IQ” or “genes that directly influence IQ,” the reader should imagine the kind 
of limiting case just outlined. 
The actual prevalence of rGE in biological development is controversial, with 
theorists disagreeing about whether rGE occurs frequently in nature, and if it does, how it 
should be incorporated into scientific explanations of phenotypic differences in a 
population. The matter is complicated by the fact that the general phenomenon of gene-
                                                 
5 Recall that, as argued in Chapter 2, so far as we know there are very few, if any, explanatorily relevant 





environment correlation can encompass a wide and diverse variety of developmental 
processes. Scarr (1992) divides instances of rGE into three types, each of which calls for a 
separate analysis; Sesardic (2005) helpfully names and explicates these: 
(i) Passive rGE, in which the correlation between genotype and environment is, in 
terms of local causal factors in development, essentially an accident. For instance, 
individuals who are possessed of genes that predispose them to develop high IQ 
may be more likely to live in areas where there are high-quality, resource-rich 
schools. In that case, children who receive high-IQ genes from their parents will 
also, statistically speaking, develop in environments more conducive to 
developing high-IQ. But the environmental and genetic influences are 
independent causal factors that happen to be statistically correlated. 
(ii) Reactive rGE, wherein individuals with particular genotypes (reliably associated 
with particular phenotypes) are consistently treated in particular ways by others 
in their environments. The classic (hypothetical) example is from Jencks et al. 
(1972): suppose that children with red hair are systematically singled out for 
discriminatory and abusive treatment, such that they consistently develop low 
IQs.6 In this case, there is a causal chain from genotypic differences to phenotypic 
differences (as opposed to the accidental correlation observed in passive rGE), but 
it seems counterintuitive to the point of absurdity to say that the reliable 
                                                 
6 A real-life example of reactive rGE is the rat pup case discussed in Chapter 3. Variation in the genes 
controlling certain hormones is reliably associated with variation in adult sexual behaviors, but this is only 
because of the way mothers respond (i.e., through licking) to the phenotypic traits (the hormones) that are 
produced by the relevant genes. Interestingly, Sesardic says that in non-human animals “for obvious 
reasons, the complex interactions characteristic of…scenarios like the red-haired children example do not 
come into play” (2005, p. 97). Presumably what Sesardic means is that non-humans do not utilize complex 
social categories in directing different types of treatment at different individuals. But, pace Sesardic, there 
doesn’t seem to be any reason not to classify what goes on in the rat pups case as a paradigmatic example 





association between genotypes and phenotypes here amounts to “a genetic 
difference causing a phenotypic difference,” or that genes that causally produce 
red hair in some way constitute “genes for low IQ.” 
(iii) Active rGE, which occurs when individuals with particular genotypes are more 
likely to seek out or even create environmental conditions that influence their 
phenotypes. The usual example here is a situation in which some children have 
genes that (in a broad range of environments at least) lead to their being more 
likely to seek out intellectually challenging environments (reading more books, 
playing chess rather than pinball, etc.), thus boosting IQ. As with reactive rGE, 
there is a causal chain from genotype to phenotype, but it is perhaps more 
plausible to suppose in this case that the influence of gene-environment 
correlation can be counted as a “genetic” source of phenotypic variance (though 
causal intuitions in these cases are rather slippery, as will be discussed more fully 
below). 
Despite substantial disagreement on the proper interpretation of rGE as a whole, 
there is actually some agreement on the conceptual status of types (i) and (ii) (passive rGE 
and reactive rGE). It is widely agreed by both hereditarians and interactionists that counting 
the influence of passive rGE and/or reactive rGE as part of the “genetic” component of 
phenotypic variance is misleading and scientifically illegitimate: while a mechanical 
computation of heritability might place rGE among the genetic sources of variance, all 
parties agree that passive and reactive rGE should be counted as distinct sources of 
variation in addition to purely genetic and purely environmental causes. To the extent that 





controversy, it is over the methodological challenge they seem to pose for hereditarianism: 
crude applications of formulas for estimating heritability, without attention to potential 
mediating environmental factors, will end up collapsing these forms of rGE together with 
any direct genetic influences into an amorphous chunk of “genetic causes” of IQ variation 
(i.e., since genes that produce red hair are reliably associated with low IQ, a heritability 
analysis will essentially treat genes for red hair as “genes for low IQ”).  
As Sesardic (2005) emphasizes, there are ways of empirically testing for passive 
and reactive rGE, so in principle it is possible to avoid collapsing such effects into the 
“genetic” component of phenotypic variance. However, conducting such tests requires that 
researchers know what sorts of correlations to look for (i.e., what environmental conditions 
might be accidentally or indirectly associated with particular phenotypic outcomes) and 
there is no guarantee that the associations will be sufficiently intuitively obvious that 
researchers will think to look for them. I return to this point in Section 7.3 below, but for 
now the point is simply that should we discover that passive and/or reactive rGE contribute 
to the IQ gap, it would be illegitimate to say that the differences are “genetic in origin,” 
and doubly illegitimate to insist that because the differences are genetic, nothing can be 
done about them. 
 There is, however, considerable disagreement on the empirical and conceptual 
status of active rGE, and the differences in the interpretation given to active rGE helps to 
illuminate the importance of pragmatic explanatory contexts to nature-nurture debates. 
Some behavioral geneticists argue that active rGE should be counted as a source of genetic 





hereditarian scientists and philosophers. The argument goes that there is a stark intuitive 
contrast between passive/reactive rGE and active. Passive and reactive rGE, on the one 
hand, involve environmental factors over which the organism has little or no control, and 
on which the organism’s genotype has at most only a very indirect causal influence. In 
cases of active rGE, in contrast, the genotype causes the organism to structure its 
environment in a way that has predictable phenotypic effects, such that these phenotypic 
outcomes are “more or less inevitable result[s] of genotype” (Jinks & Fulker, 1970, p. 323; 
cf. Roberts, 1967). Thus, while they acknowledge the formal distinction between active 
rGE and more “direct” genetic causes, hereditarians insist that for all practical purposes, 
we should consider phenotypic differences arising from active rGE to be “genetically-
caused” differences. And from here it is a short step for the hereditarian to dispense with 
the relevance of active rGE to their arguments: even if active rGE plays some role in 
generating observed racial differences, these differences should still be considered just as 
fixed and irremediable as if they were due entirely to genetic differences (e.g., Sesardic, 
2005, pp. 93–95).7 
Notice, however, that whether “we should count” active rGE as a component of 
genetic variation for all practical purposes is not an empirical question! One’s stance on 
                                                 
7 It is worth pointing out that hereditarians who are inclined to count many cases of active rGE as genetic 
causes of variation typically assume that genes that cause individuals to influence their environments in 
ways that affect the development of a trait will always or usually co-occur with genes that influence the 
trait directly and in the same direction (i.e., those children who already have genes that directly lead to 
higher IQ—via faster neural firing speeds or whatever—will also have genes that lead them to seek out or 
create IQ-enhancing environments, and those children with low-IQ-producing genes will seek out/create 
environments that depress IQ, or at least fail to enhance it; in a phrase: “the rich get richer”). But there is 
no reason, in principle, why this should always be so—it could well be the case that different genes 
influence neural processing speeds and tendencies to seek out enriching environments, and that these genes 





this question reflects instead a judgment about the explanatory relevance of the sorts of 
causal factors at work in a case of rGE. To illustrate: suppose it were the case that 
intellectually stimulating environments in development (more book reading and chess 
playing, less reality TV and video games) lead to higher IQs across all genotypes, but that, 
indeed, individuals with a certain genotype (G1) are (under present environmental 
conditions at least) more likely to seek out such environments than some other genotype 
(G2). So as a matter of fact G1’s exhibit higher IQs than G2’s. Arguing that under such 
circumstances, the difference ought to be classified as genetic, Jinks and Fulker ask, “to 
what extent could we ever get a dull person to select for himself an intellectually 
stimulating environment as a bright person might?” (1970, p. 323). Jinks and Fulker 
evidently intend the question to be rhetorical, but clearly their question is an empirical one. 
And moreover, it is a question to which some of us would very much like to know the 
answer: even if, under present environmental conditions, these different genotypes 
manifest their “natural” tendencies towards constructing high- or low-IQ-creating 
environments, are there environments in which G2’s could be induced to read more books 
and play more chess?  
To be sure, the issue of what we might do to ensure that all genotypes end up in 
properly stimulating environments admits of considerable nuance—what if, for example, 
we could only bring this about by imposing draconian measures that force G2 children to 
spend hours a day at the chess table despite finding every moment of it miserable? But the 
point is we cannot appeal to intuition to settle a priori the question of whether and how 





perhaps more importantly, whether we are disposed to count active rGE as part of the 
(unmodifiable) genetic variance for a trait is underdetermined by the empirical facts of the 
case, and reflects in part our interest in controlling or manipulating, rather than simply 
predicting developmental outcomes. Certainly the ability to predict outcomes is a virtue 
for a scientific theory and in many circumstances this will be all that is required to meet 
the needs of the explanatory context. In those cases subsuming rGE under genetic variance 
may well be acceptable. But it remains a pragmatic decision nonetheless. 
7.2.2.2 Gene-environment interaction 
The term “interaction” is prone to cause confusion here, so it will be worth taking 
a moment to clarify. There are, broadly speaking, two different notions of gene-
environment interaction at play (for discussion, see Griffiths & Tabery, 2008; Jensen, 
1974; Keller, 2010; Longino, 2013). One is the commonsense idea of causal interaction: 
genetic and environmental factors must interact to create phenotypes, for neither is causally 
sufficient on its own. The other is the more technical idea of statistical interaction, which 
arises when the impact of particular environmental manipulations on phenotype is different 
for different genotypes (symbolized as G×E). In these cases, the genetic and environmental 
contributions to population variance are non-additive, and the presence of this sort of 
interaction effectively nullifies the informativeness of applying an analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) to the phenotypic variation in a population. 
An example of G×E may be seen in Figure 7.1 below (from Gray, 1992). As we 





for different genotypes within this species of plant: increases in elevation sometimes result 
in a taller plant, sometimes shorter. 
 






More formally, the idea of statistical interaction between genes and phenotypes can 
be understood through the concept of a norm of reaction, which is a graph depicting the 
phenotypic values for one or many genotypes across a range of environmental conditions. 
The curve for any particular genotype across a range of environments can be linear or non-
linear, and the curves of different genotypes may or may not cross, as demonstrated in 
Figure 7.2 below.  
 
 
Figure 7.2: Hypothetical reaction norms for a genotype (from Lewontin, 1974) 
 
If the curves of different genotypes do not cross, then it is said that genetic and 
environmental variances are “additive,” and additivity is a precondition for conducting an 
analysis of variance to partition sources of variance; when the curves do cross, we have 





satisfied. Intuitively speaking, if norm of reaction curves are non-linear, and if the curves 
of different genotypes cross, then it is not possible to say that, in general a particular 
environmental manipulation increases or decreases phenotypic values across the board: the 
answer to the question of whether increasing altitude (say) will increase or decrease height 
is: it depends.  
For a real-life example of G×E in human behavioral development, consider the now 
well-known case of gene-environment interaction in the development of anti-social 
personality disorder, or ASPD (Caspi et al., 2002). A genetic polymorphism in humans 
results in differential levels of the enzyme monoamine oxidase A (MAOA), which 
metabolizes certain neurotransmitters. Thus, there are low-MAOA and high-MAOA 
individuals in the population.  
Under most conditions, the incidence of ASPD among both low-MAOA and high-
MAOA individuals is low, with high-MAOA variants being slightly more prone. However, 
among people who have been victims of maltreatment between ages 3 and 11 (including 
neglect and physical and sexual abuse), a dramatic asymmetry emerges: among high-
MAOA variants, the incidence of ASPD rises slightly, while among low-MAOA variants 
it increases sharply, to as much as 85 percent among victims of serious abuse. Thus, 
whether a low- or high-MAOA variant is more likely to develop ASPD depends on 
environmental conditions. Similar effects have been observed in the effects of 
maltreatment on the incidence of depression, with polymorphisms for genes that control 





also for the effects of cannabis use on the incidence of schizophrenia, which depends on 
genes that regulate levels of catecholamines in the brain (Caspi et al., 2005). 
It should be noted that for each of these behavioral outcomes, there was a main 
effect of environment but no main effect of genotype. That is, the effects of the 
environment, considered independently of the genome, were statistically significant, while 
the effects of the genotype, considered independently of the environment, were not (see 
Rutter, 2006). Thus, although environmental measures can, to some degree, be used to 
predict such outcomes, such measures are significantly impoverished when compared to 
the predictive power of combining genetic and environmental information. The upshot is 
that given two individuals with different genotypes—say, a low- and high-MAOA 
variant—it is impossible to say which is more likely to develop ASPD without considering 
environmental variables.  
Returning to the question of the IQ gap, we can ask: to what extent might G×E play 
a role in generating the IQ discrepancy between Black and White populations? 
Hereditarians have correctly pointed out that at present there is little evidence that G×E 
plays much of a role in generating IQ differences, racial or otherwise. In other words, the 
norms of reaction for different genotypes do not appear to cross when it comes to IQ. But 
a clear lesson that emerges from the concept of the reaction norm is that while norms of 
reaction might appear to be parallel within a particular environmental range, extending the 
range out further—i.e., observing the development of genotypes in new environments—
may well reveal the existence of G×E (Gottlieb, 1991, 1995; Griffiths & Tabery, 2008; 





reaction for “Black” and “White” genotypes have remained separated in the environments 
we have observed so far, they might well meet under hitherto unobserved environmental 
conditions. The key questions, then, are: how broad a range of environments have we 
observed, and to what extent are we licensed to infer that new environments will exhibit 
the same patterns we have observed in existing ones? These questions I take up in the next 
section. 
7.3 Environments and Environmental Ranges 
Recall from Chapter 5 that my quick-and-dirty characterization of the hereditarian 
thesis is that currently-observed racial differences will manifest in the full range of relevant 
environmental conditions. I have deferred up to this point two crucial questions raised by 
this characterization, namely, what is a range of environments, and how is it determined 
which environments are the relevant ones? This section addresses these questions, and I 
will offer two general conclusions. The first conclusion is that a close reading of the debate 
between hereditarians and their critics reveals differences in the explanatory interests of 
the two camps. Specifically, hereditarians consider possible but unobserved environmental 
conditions to be irrelevant to their explanatory projects, whereas such potential 
environments are central to the explanatory aims of their critics.  
The second conclusion is that hereditarians have misconstrued our present 
epistemic position, and have therefore been overconfident about what we can infer about 






7.3.1 Preliminaries: the “relevant” environments 
It will help to begin with an example of the sort of argument the hereditarian wishes 
to make about the heritability and malleability of IQ, one less complicated than IQ itself. 
The hereditarian wishes to claim that intelligence is like height (Levin, 1996, p. 257; 
Plomin & Bergeman, 1991, p. 415; Rushton, 1997, pp. 47–48). Height is clearly a trait 
affected by both genes and environment: modern humans are much taller, on average, than 
humans were just a few generations ago, and people in developed countries, where food is 
plentiful and all necessary nutrients are readily available, are significantly taller than people 
in developing countries. So clearly environmental factors play a role in determining height.  
However, two related facts about height are notable. The first is that as affluence 
increases in a region, so does the heritability of height. This should not be surprising: it is 
a necessary truth that as the degree of environmental variation decreases, the proportion of 
total variation that is due to genetic variation will increase (e.g., in the limiting case, where 
there is no environmental variation at all, all variation in the population must be due to 
genetic variation). Since in developed countries there is significantly less variation in the 
environmental conditions that affect height, more of the phenotypic variation—indeed 
almost all of it—is due to genetic variation (height is about 90% heritable in the developed 
world).  
The second, related point is that it seems quite reasonable to speak of “genetically-
determined limits” on an individual’s height. It is likely true that many people in 
impoverished conditions could have been six inches taller if they’d had access to better 





or better healthcare, or more stimulating toys, or any other environmental manipulation 
that plausibly (or even not-so-plausibly) makes a difference to height. Given the extremely 
high heritability of height in our population, it is likely that most of us are about as tall as 
we could have been in just about any environment—in other words, the conditions of the 
modern-day, developed world seem to approximate the optimal environment for human 
height development. 
I say “just about” any environment, because clearly there are some environments in 
which I (for example) might have been significantly taller. For example: an environment 
in which I undergo a surgical procedure that inserts an extra few inches of bone into my 
shins and thighbones. It seems (at best) debatable whether such an environment ought to 
count as part of the “relevant” range, or at any rate whether the existence of such an 
environment presents any serious challenge to the claim that, once nutrition and healthcare 
rise above some threshold level, variation in height is due almost entirely to genetic 
variation, and that there are fairly strict limits on the height potential of any given genotype. 
So for now, let me concede that we should exclude the massively-invasive-surgery 
environment from the space of relevant ones.  
In that case, a height-hereditarian seems on relatively firm ground if she insists that 
in our population, height is genetically determined, in the sense that within a broad range 
of environments, differences in environment do not lead to differences in height. Now 
again, the hereditarian wishes to claim that IQ exhibits the same pattern. It is not that there 
are no known environmental variables that affect IQ; to the contrary, the list overlaps 





education, and the presence or absence of physical and emotional abuse. When there is 
substantial variation in a population with respect to these environmental conditions—as 
there was throughout most of human history and still is in the developing world—the 
heritability of IQ will be lower and there may be significant opportunities to raise IQ by 
improving the environment. But—just as with height—once the environment, as measured 
by these variables, surpasses some threshold, further improvements to the environment will 
no longer yield improvements in IQ—the present environment already approximates the 
optimum, such that, in many cases, it “maxes out” the genetic potential for intelligence 
possessed by each genotype. 
With this characterization of the hereditarian perspective in mind, let’s return to the 
question I set aside before, namely: how should we actually go about defining the 
“relevant” range of environmental conditions? What is it about extra calories and vitamins 
that make these components of a “relevant” set of environmental conditions, and what is it 
about shin-lengthening surgery that seems to require that we leave it outside the relevant 
range of environments? Returning to the IQ case, imagine someone who, fresh from 
reading Harrison Bergeron and completely missing the point, concludes that the way to 
get rid of the Black-White IQ gap is to take all White children and subject them to several 
years of malnutrition, social isolation, and abuse, so that their IQs are suppressed and the 
White mean aligns with the Black mean of 85. So here we have an environment in which 
the “IQ gap” vanishes, but presumably neither hereditarians nor their opponents would 





(HED). Given these intuitions about what should and shouldn’t count as part of the relevant 
range, what principles might be given for making this determination? 
One possibility is that we should restrict our attention to environments that are 
considered “normal” or “natural” for a species. Levin (1997b, p. 86), for example, suggests 
that “calling a phenotype natural for an organism [means] that the organism will display it 
in environments like those in which its ancestors evolved.” Similarly, behavior geneticist 
Sandra Scarr (1992), borrowing a term from Hartmann (1958) has argued that 
developmental scientists should be primarily concerned with developmental trajectories in 
the “average expectable environment” for that type of organism, and she similarly 
characterizes the relevant environmental conditions in terms of the organism’s 
evolutionary ancestors. But this does not appear particularly promising, for as we are all 
aware the environments in which most humans now develop are profoundly “unnatural.”  
And more importantly, it’s hard to see why we should feel obligated to discount 
environmental manipulations that help us achieve some desirable outcome simply because 
they require us to instantiate “unnatural” environments. Take the case of phenylketonuria 
(described in detail in Section 7.4.1 below). Surely by Levin’s and Scarr’s evolutionary 
criteria, a diet free of phenylalanine is unnatural for human beings, so if we wanted to we 
could conclude that it is “natural” for people with the genotype for phenylketonuria to 
exhibit cognitive defects. But given that we can prevent this outcome by putting people 
with this genotype into an unnatural environment—and we have very good reasons for 
wanting to do so—it would be difficult to argue that this environment should lie outside 





identify the relevant range of environments, how else might we do so? Answering this 
question requires considering what we mean by the notion of a range of environments in 
the first place. 
7.3.2 What is an environmental range anyway? 
The question of how to define a range of environments is relatively straightforward 
in certain circumstances, for instance when investigating the phenotypic heights of 
different genotypes in a species of plant at different altitudes. Since in this case is there is 
a single parameter along which environments differ, one that can be easily measured and 
precisely quantified, a range of environments can be easily delineated: we can ask, for 
example, what are the reaction norms for a series of genotypes as elevation ranges from 
30m to 3000m? For simplicity, let us suppose that the norms of reaction for the different 
genotypes are identical and all are linear, such that height for all genotypes increases with 
elevation across the full range. We could then characterize the different altitude 
environments in this range as being more or less favorable to growth.  
In principle, we could do likewise for IQ in humans: we could characterize 
environments as being more or less favorable to IQ development (more or less 
“intellectually enriching,” we might say), and plot the phenotypic IQs of different human 
genotypes against these environments.8 The hereditarian hypothesis, then, is that 
environments can be ranked from more to less facilitative of IQ development, and that the 
                                                 
8 In principle, this process can be done where “genotype” refers either to a single polymorphism, a group of 
them, or an individual’s full genotype. Where one or a few genes are considered, we would assume that 





norms of reaction of “Black genotypes” within those environments will differ from those 
of “White genotypes.” In particular, the curves for both genotypes will rise as the 
environment becomes more favorable to IQ development, leveling off as conditions reach 
those approximating those of the modern developed world, but with the “Black” curve 
situated significantly below the “White” curve. Thus, the situation might look something 
like the (hypothetical) Figure 7.3, with the different curves representing different racial 
groups.  
 
Figure 7.3: Hypothetical reaction norms for IQ (from Gottesman, 1963) 
 
As we can see, the curves remain about the same distance apart throughout the 





differences, then we should expect that as environments become more “enriching,” we 
might expect to see, up to a point, overall gains in IQ among all groups, but the gaps will 
remain roughly constant. 
Alternatively, we might think that the graph above does not reflect the nature of IQ 
differences, in which case we would expect that at some point, the curves for different 
genotypes (i.e., racial groups) will meet or cross—i.e., there might be significant G×E 
effects. The intuitive thought here is that improvements in, for example, economic stability 
and access to early-childhood education for historically-underprivileged groups might 
improve IQ levels among those groups to the point where they are equal with other groups 
(while leaving IQ levels of privileged groups unaffected). In other words, we might 
suppose that reducing disparities in social conditions between groups will constitute 
exposing all genotypes to a new environment, one in which all genotypes manifest similar 
IQ levels. 
The usual hereditarian response to this optimistic line of thought is to insist that we 
have already tried the interventions described above, and that they have failed (the alleged 
failure of the Head Start program to make lasting differences in intelligence among Black 
children is frequently cited here—e.g., Herrnstein & Murray, 1996; Levin, 1997b). Thus, 
the hereditarian insists, there is no reason to expect that improving education, economic 
stability, nutrition, or any other variable will eliminate the IQ gap, because we have 
observed this gap in such a broad range of environmental conditions that we are licensed 
in making an inductive inference about what will happen in future environments. The 





with the same nutrition and education from early in childhood as White children would 
essentially be the same as our present environment, at least with regard to its bearings on 
IQ in different populations. (Many hereditarians, recall, are inclined to believe that 
variation in IQ is mostly attributable to genetic variation once environmental conditions 
reach modern developed-world standards, much as is the case with height—i.e., they 
suggest that our current situation is like the right-most portion of Figure 7.3.)  
The question of what we can infer about future environments from what we have 
observed so far relates to a common criticism of heritability mentioned at the beginning of 
this chapter, namely, that it is a local statistic—that is, heritability measures only the 
relative contributions of genetic and environmental variance to phenotypic variance in 
particular population in a particular environment. In a different environment, critics argue, 
the heritability of a trait might change drastically (Lewontin, 1974; D. S. Moore, 2008). 
Defenders of heritability (e.g., Sesardic, 2005, p. 78) respond that if heritability really 
provided no information whatsoever about the causes of phenotypic variance in 
environments other than the one measured, it is hard to see why scientists would have 
invested any effort whatsoever into performing such analyses. And indeed, several 
behavior geneticists have defended the generalizability of heritability measures to 
environments beyond the one originally measured (Loehlin, Lindzey, & Spuhler, 1975; 
Plomin & DeFries, 1976). How, according to these theorists, are we to determine whether 
the heritability of a trait observed in one population/environment is likely to be 





The answer, unsurprisingly, is that the more similar a new (hypothetical or actual) 
environment is to a previously-observed one, the more likely it is that the heritability of a 
trait in the new environment will be close to that of the old: “[heritability] values found in 
other populations under other circumstances will be more or less the same according to 
whether the structure of the population and the environmental conditions are more or less 
alike” (Falconer, 1989, p. 164, italics added).  
This seems entirely plausible. The problem, however, is that we may often be in 
the dark about which environments are relevantly similar to which other environments. 
Predicting what will happen to a system under new, previously unobserved conditions 
requires some causal knowledge about how the system behaves. The more complex the 
system, the more detailed the causal knowledge required to ground inferences about the 
system’s behavior under new conditions. For systems that are sufficiently complex (as, for 
example, human cognitive development), it is only through having detailed causal 
knowledge about a system that we can say with any confidence whether a change in some 
condition will make a difference to the outcome. 
In other words, the idea of an “environmental range” implies a series of adjacent 
points (i.e., adjacent points along the horizontal axis of a reaction norm). And this makes 
sense when we are talking about environmental variables that are linear, continuous, and 
well-defined, such as temperature or altitude. If we have observed the behavior of a 
developmental system in a range of temperatures from -100° to 100°, we can perhaps be 
confident (though not certain) about how the system will behave at 103°, even without 





phenotypes, it is not so clear that we are in a position to say which environments are “next 
to” each other in the developmental landscape. 
Applying this observation to questions about environment and IQ, my suggestion 
is that because we do not understand in any detail the mechanisms by which genes interact 
with environments to produce IQ, we are not in a position to say which interventions are 
likely to make a difference. This is the hereditarian’s mistake: the hereditarian looks at a 
half-century or so of interventions designed to improve Black IQ and eliminate the racial 
IQ gap, and believes we are licensed in viewing proposals for further interventions (e.g., 
the interventions targeting working memory discussed in Chapter 5) as “more of the same.” 
The hereditarian believes we have already observed phenotypic outcomes for Black and 
White genotypes under a broad range of environmental conditions, and are therefore 
licensed in thinking that we are unlikely to see anything new. But if what I have said is 
correct, we will not be in a position to say how broad or narrow the observed range of 
environments is until we understand a great deal more about how genes interact with 
environments to produce IQ. In particular, we will require mechanistic information about 
the development of IQ. 
7.3.3 Explanatory interests and the delimitation of environments 
As I noted in the sketch of my arguments given in Section 5.4, I believe that a 
difference in explanatory interests underlies much of the debate between hereditarians and 
their opponents. Here I wish to back up that assertion by demonstrating that hereditarians 





importance they assign to phenotypic outcomes in environmental conditions that are 
possible but have not yet been instantiated or observed (for similar arguments, see Griffiths 
& Tabery, 2008; Longino, 2013; Tabery, 2009).  
Critics of hereditarianism emphasize that because heritability is a local statistic (i.e., 
it applies only to the population observed, and leaves open the possibility that the 
partitioning of genetic and environmental sources of variation could go quite differently 
for the same genotypes observed in a different environment), the high heritability of a trait 
does not rule out the possibility that interventions to establish alternative environmental 
conditions might yield different results. Hereditarians, though generally more optimistic 
about the prospects of extrapolating observed heritability scores to new conditions, 
typically concede this point, but insist that its scientific significance is minimal: of course 
it is possible that by extrapolating development out to entirely novel conditions, we will 
observe different outcomes, but this possibility should not distract us from the business of 
explaining the world as we find it. Science is in the business of explaining the actual world, 
not in speculating about possible ones. And in the actual world, heritability analyses assign 
a large proportion of phenotypic variance to genetic factors, and so we have succeeded in 
explaining—i.e., identifying the relevant causes of—phenotypic variation.  
Consider the following statements from hereditarians. Herrnstein, for example, 
states that “For me, it is no disgrace if my argument holds merely for existing societies, not 
necessarily all possible ones” (1976, p. 300, emphasis added). And Sesardic is particularly 





Speculation about these remotely conceivable situations may then begin to 
dominate the picture so much that we witness the curious triumph over the 
possible over the actual. We should resist this and try to interpret the 
heredity-environment discussion so that it deals with our real world, not 
with uncontrollable “might-have-beens” and counterfactuals gone wild. 
(Sesardic, 2005, pp. 84–85, emphasis in original) 
Even psychologist Earl Hunt, a comparatively moderate voice in the IQ debates, states 
quite matter-of-factly that “epidemiological [i.e., heritability] studies are likely to be of 
much more help than laboratory studies, because we are concerned not with what might 
happen but with what actually does happen in our society” (1997, p. 544, emphasis added).  
But it is difficult to see what grounds these theorists’ confidence that describing the 
patterns of phenotypic variation we observe under present conditions should take 
precedence over developing and testing hypotheses about the outcomes of novel 
interventions. Indeed, it is notable that hereditarian thinkers with a preference for 
restricting the space of explanatory relevance to the “real world” generally assert rather 
than argue for this stricture. And notice, too, that these thinkers do not even attempt to 
defend their circumscription of the space of relevant possibilities on empirical grounds—
rather, they quite explicitly frame the injunction in pragmatic terms, i.e., in terms of what 
we are concerned with.  
Now contrast the hereditarian perspective with the approach evident in the research 
of developmentalists, which consists in experimental studies that allow for observation of 
developing systems under a wide range of controlled but specific interventions, many of 
which push the system outside of the range of environments that might be considered 





developmentalists are—in theory at least—able to characterize the behavior of the 
developmental system in more robust (i.e., mechanistic) terms, just as Celia Moore has 
accomplished with the rat pups discussed in Chapter 2. The information gleaned from such 
experimental work arguably constitutes a significant advancement in our scientific 
knowledge than would have been possible merely by partitioning the genetic and 
environmental sources of variation in a population under preexisting conditions. So why 
should behavior-geneticists be so dismissive of endeavors to expand our knowledge in this 
way? 
In the behavior-geneticist’s defense, it is true that pursuing an experimental 
approach to behavioral research—one that seeks to develop mechanistic models of 
development that can support robust predictions about the outcomes of novel 
interventions—is a much more daunting proposition than carrying out behavioral-genetic 
analyses. For one thing, the experimental model—at least as developmentalists have 
pursued it in their animal laboratories—is (for ethical reasons) of limited use when studying 
human beings. For another, the developmentalist/experimental approach forces us to 
acknowledge and account for considerably greater complexity in our models of the causes 
of developmental outcomes—i.e., we must be comfortable admitting to a great deal more 
ignorance about development than we would if we were to accept the output of heritability 
analyses as fully explanatory. And finally, it is true that for any explanation that one might 
try to offer in any domain of science, it is always possible that observed regularities will 





practice of scientific explanation hostage to the necessarily limited nature of the conditions 
that we can observe. 
On these grounds, it is perhaps not unreasonable for the behavior-geneticist to 
question whether the developmentalist’s approach is properly scientific, in that it makes 
the ideal of perfect scientific knowledge the enemy of good workaday explanation (Scarr, 
1995). So perhaps we cannot begrudge behavior-geneticists a preference for the 
comparatively clean explanatory strategies of partitioning observed phenotypic variation 
into a handful of components.9 But at the same time, we should recognize that behavior-
geneticists have ultimately not put forth any particular reason for thinking that it is 
illegitimate to be concerned with outcomes in unobserved possible environments, as many 
developmental biologists clearly are, and as I suggest we ought to be when it comes to the 
race-IQ gap. In short, when the hereditarian says that “we” are not concerned with 
developmental possibilities outside a narrowly-defined range centering on our present 
circumstances, we can respond: what do you mean WE, kemosabe? 
7.4 Advantages of a mechanistic approach 
The discussion in the previous section raises the question of why one might prefer 
one explanatory approach to behavioral development (e.g., a developmentalist or 
mechanistic perspective) over another (e.g., hereditability). I have alluded to what I take to 
be the primary difference here, but I now defend it explicitly: while heritability analyses 
                                                 
9 In the next chapter I will, however, consider the possibility that those behavior geneticists (i.e., 
hereditarians) who have explicitly defended the irrelevance of novel environments in the case of the race-





may be sufficient for explaining or predicting outcomes given existing environmental 
conditions, mechanistic models provide all this plus significantly greater opportunities to 
control or manipulate the system in question. A mechanistic understanding of the 
development of a system affords greater opportunity to intervene in the operations of that 
system to produce a desired result. And this is true, it turns out, for intellectual 
development. Understanding in detail how genetic factors causally interact with non-
genetic factors to produce brains that display intelligent behavior gives us greater potential 
to design interventions that change outcomes.  
To illustrate this point, I discuss an example of how a mechanistic understanding 
of a “genetic disorder” (phenylketonuria, or PKU) has improved our ability to exert 
influence on the outcomes of a developmental process. These insights, I argue, would not 
have come about from adopting only a behavior-genetic perspective that identifies genetic 
and environmental sources of variation in the population. 
7.4.1 Phenylketonuria 
Phenylketonuria is a metabolic disorder characterized by inability to synthesize the 
metabolic enzyme phenylalanine hydroxylase (PAH). Inheritance of PKU follows an 
autosomal recessive pattern, and is linked to any of a number of mutations in the gene for 
PAH. The absence of the PAH enzyme results in an inability to metabolize the amino acid 
phenylalanine (Phe) into tyrosine (Tyr). Phenylalanine is a common nutrient found in 
animal protein and starchy foods, and in the absence of the PAH enzyme, any Phe that a 





other amino acids—which are crucial for the synthesis of neurotransmitters—compete with 
Phe for uptake in the developing brain, elevated Phe levels reduce the availability of these 
other amino acids, and brain development is disrupted, with lifelong cognitive deficits as a 
result.  
Children with the PKU mutation are thus born physically and cognitively normal, 
but are slow to develop, and without the appropriate interventions, will suffer lifelong 
cognitive impairments. Fortunately, a simple environmental manipulation has proved 
incredibly effective in preventing the symptoms of PKU from manifesting. Neonatal 
screenings (which are standardly performed in the developed world) are able to detect 
elevated levels of Phe and high ratios of Phe to Tyr, indicating the absence of normally-
functioning PAH (due to the presence of the PKU mutation). Infants with PKU are 
immediately placed on Phe-restricted diets, and if this diet is maintained through the 
lifespan, brain development proceeds normally and children can grow up without any 
significant cognitive impairments.10 
Now let’s consider how hereditarian vs. mechanistic analyses might approach the 
case of PKU. The historical story of the discovery of PKU and its treatment is interesting 
(see Centerwall & Centerwall, 2000), but for the purposes of my analysis I’ll imagine the 
story had gone somewhat differently, in order to highlight the methodological points that 
are relevant for assessing the hereditarian case for irremediable racial differences in IQ. 
Suppose that prior to the discovery of the biochemical basis for the cognitive deficits 
                                                 
10 There is some evidence that even on a Phe-restricted diet, some outcomes for PKU patients are 
“suboptimal” (Enns et al., 2010; MacLeod & Ney, 2010; van Calcar et al., 2009). Research into the use of 






associated with PKU, researchers had conducted a heritability analysis. They would have 
discovered that the heritability of the cognitive deficits associated with PKU was 
essentially 1 (i.e., all of the variation in the symptoms would be explained by variation in 
the genotype—specifically, in the presence or absence of the mutated PAH gene).  
Now let’s imagine that researchers had inferred the presence of the genetic 
polymorphism responsible for the cognitive deficits associated with PKU, but knew little 
or nothing about the mechanisms by which the mutation results in microcephaly and other 
developmental abnormalities.11 We can imagine that a few unsophisticated hereditarians 
about PKU might have declared the case closed: PKU is a genetic cognitive disorder, with 
mental disability manifesting for the PKU genotype in all relevant environments (where 
“all relevant environments” means simply “the environments we have observed so far”).  
Critics of such crude hereditarianism would surely have objected, and pointed out 
that the high heritability of the cognitive deficits may not hold under other environmental 
conditions—the reaction norm for the PKU genotype might be such that under certain 
environmental conditions, cognitive functioning improves or even equalizes with that of 
non-PKU genotypes. Suggestions might have been made for improving the cognitive-
developmental outcomes of people with the PKU mutation. It might have been thought, for 
example, that children with the PKU mutation simply need better overall nutrition (e.g., 
more calories or more vitamins), or more intensive education, or more encouraging and 
nurturing caregiving, and so on. Absent more specific information, these are all plausible 
                                                 
11 This, I would suggest, is not unlike our present situation when it comes to understanding the development 
of IQ: some genetic markers have been identified—though only tentatively (see Chabris et al., 2012)—
that have small associations with IQ, but little is known about the mechanisms by which these genetic 





ways of improving an individual’s cognitive development. These interventions, however, 
would not have been effective in improving cognitive development in PKU patients, 
because they would not have made a difference to the operation of the mechanism that 
produces cognitive abnormalities (i.e., the crowding out of neurotransmitter-building 
amino acids by excess Phe).  
At this point, a more sophisticated class of hereditarians might have said: “Look, 
we’ve tried a number of plausible interventions and exposed PKU children to a wide range 
of environments, but nothing works. Of course it is possible that in some hitherto-
unobserved environmental condition, radically different from any environment any human 
has ever experienced, PKU children will exhibit normal cognitive development. But in 
science we must be concerned with actual conditions, or at least those that are normal for 
the species. It is time to accept that PKU mutations cause cognitive deficits in the full range 
of normal human environments.” (For hereditarian arguments to this effect regarding racial 
differences in IQ, see Levin, 1997; Scarr, 1992; and Sesardic, 2005.)  
These hereditarians would have been right about one thing: antecedently, there is 
no particular reason to count Phe-restricted diets as part of the “normal,” “natural,” or 
“relevant” environmental conditions of human development. Certainly Phe-restricted diets 
were practically nonexistent in the environments in which modern humans evolved, and 
only a tiny fraction of humans consume such diets today. By these standards, Phe-restricted 






I sincerely doubt, however, that anyone would seriously suggest that the 
developmental trajectory of humans with the PKU mutation outside of the “normal” human 
environmental range (e.g., on a Phe-restricted diet) is of no scientific interest. Clearly, the 
details of how the PKU mutation eventuates in cognitive deficits is not only theoretically 
relevant, but practically and morally important as well. Therefore, behavior-genetic 
analysis that simply associates the presence of the mutation with cognitive deficits is 
inadequate.  
We are fortunate that this is not how the discovery of PKU and the development of 
its treatment actually went. Rather, because a sketch of the mechanism was available 
(again, I’m idealizing the historical record to some degree), an intervention could be 
designed. Consider the mechanism sketch in Figure 7.4: 
 






This sketch allows us to target particular parts of the mechanism, such as the build-
up of Phe, for interventions. We can predict that by restricting the intake of Phe, 
neurodevelopmental abnormalities will be averted. And knowing that Tyr deficiency 
contributes to lingering symptoms even among patients on a Phe-restricted diet allows us 
to predict that dietary supplements will further improve outcomes.  
This sort of information, in contrast, is absent under a behavioral-genetic analysis. 
If all that is known is that a genetic factor is correlated with (or even causes) a particular 
phenotypic outcome in certain environments, then if we wish to manipulate that outcome 
our only option (other than trying to manipulate the genotype directly) is to randomly 
attempt intuitively-plausible interventions and hope they work. But with even a fairly 
abstract sketch of the relevant mechanisms, we can seek to target our interventions to 
specific entities or activities that are likely to make a difference to the outcome.  
7.5 Conclusion: Mechanisms, interventions, and group differences in IQ 
Now let us apply these lessons to arguments for the ineliminability of racial 
differences in IQ and other traits. Hereditarians, again, treat the persistence of such 
differences under observed conditions—in spite of various interventions directed at 
eliminating them—as evidence that these differences will manifest in all “practically 
possible” environments (Levin, 1997b, p. 89). But if I am correct, this conclusion is at best 
premature. For just as it would have been a mistake for our hypothetical PKU-hereditarians 





phenotype, prior to specification of the relevant mechanisms, it is a mistake to assume that 
we know whether the interventions that have been directed at closing the race-IQ gap have 
been aimed at the right entities or the right activities.  
What is needed, then, much like with PKU, is a detailed understanding of how 
different genotypes interact with different environments to influence traits like intelligence 
and personality. The mechanisms by which an individual develops a particular degree of 
intelligence, say, will operate at multiple size levels, and will include such concrete entities 
as DNA sequences and the proteins they synthesize, ingested nutrients, hormones produced 
in response to environmental stimuli (e.g., stress-inducing dangers or affection from a 
caregiver), and more abstract entities like representations of linguistic entities in the 
environment and the working memory system. 
Needless to say, modeling the mosaic, multi-level mechanisms that underlie the 
development of complex human behaviors is a daunting task, much more so than modeling 
the mechanisms of PKU. Yet it is only with these kinds of mechanistic models that we 
would be in a position to say which sets of environmental conditions are causally similar 
to which others, and hence whether a novel intervention is likely to yield different results 
from other, previously-attempted interventions. I conclude, then, that insofar as we are 
concerned with eliminating racial IQ gaps—and as I have argued, I think we should be 
very concerned with this—we have all-things-considered reasons to prefer mechanistic 





 CHAPTER 8: IS RACIAL SCIENCE RACIST? 
8.1 Introduction 
It is frequently alleged, in both academic and popular contexts, that certain kinds of 
scientific investigations of race constitute a form of racism (often called “scientific racism”). 
Specifically, the charge of racism is frequently levelled at the sorts of scientific investigations 
discussed in the previous three chapters, those that investigate the possibility of “innate” or 
“genetic” average racial differences in important behavioral traits (e.g., IQ, aggression, parenting 
behaviors, etc.). For the purposes of this chapter, I’ll refer to such research programs collectively 
as “racial science.”1  
Perhaps surprisingly, allegations of racism directed at racial science are typically made 
without explicit appeal to any particular definition of “racism.” Rather, it is apparently assumed 
that racism—whatever it is—can be unambiguously recognized, and that the description of some 
aspect of racial science on offer makes it plain that it qualifies as racist. My purpose in this chapter 
is to subject such claims—claims that investigation of potential racial differences is (either 
inherently or de facto) racist—to careful and systematic analysis by examining the institution of 
racial science through the lens of established philosophical theories of racism. My project here is 
largely exploratory: I aim to shed further light on the moral status of racial science by asking what 
                                                 
1 Note that this focus on psychological investigations is a somewhat narrow usage of the broad term “racial science,” 
which in other contexts could mean the scientific investigation of whether the facts of human biodiversity license 
divisions of the species into “races,” or scientific investigation of physiological differences (including those of 
medical import) between human populations. Many of the same issues discussed in this chapter may also apply to 





sort of case can be made that racial science is racist under several different theories of what racism 
is. However, my analysis tentatively concludes that although charges of racism are often more 
difficult to sustain than many have supposed, many aspects of racial science are indeed deeply 
morally problematic. I begin with a description of the motivations for pursuing this question, 
followed by an evaluation, in Section 8.2, of the suggestion that it is racist—or in some other way 
morally censurable—to so much as pose and investigate the sorts of questions that are at the core 
of racial science. Section 8.3 then considers whether racial science may be counted as racist under 
each of three recent philosophical analyses of racism: racism as pernicious belief, racism as an 
institution, and racism as race-based ill-will or disregard. 
8.1.1 Motivations 
Below I will discuss several reasons why a careful consideration of whether racial science 
should be counted as racist is an important project. I would like to begin, however, by motivating 
the topic of this chapter in a slightly different way. Specifically, I would like to present some rather 
striking statements that have recently been offered by some of the more daring practitioners of 
racial science. While this may seem like a cheap emotional appeal, my intent is not to shock the 
reader into agreeing that these scientists are very bad, very racist men. Rather, these statements are 
intended to prompt reflection on how we might distinguish between empirical scientific claims 
that we perhaps find distasteful or mildly irresponsible, and claims about race that so flagrantly 





First, consider the remarks of Donald Templer (a former professor of psychology) at the 
2004 conference of the White nationalist2 organization American Renaissance. A reporter at the 
conference provides the following account of Templer’s address: 
Many psychologists recommend psychological therapy for black prisoners, but 
Prof. Templer disagrees: ‘They need 60 hours a week of work therapy. That would 
give them less time for manufacturing alcohol and weapons, trafficking drugs, and 
giving each other AIDS.’ (Jobling, 2004, emphasis added) 
Next, consider the words of a thinker we have encountered several times before, the late 
Canadian psychologist J. Philippe Rushton. In 1999, Rushton mailed 40,000 copies—
unsolicited—of an abridged version of his book Race, Evolution, and Behavior to North American 
academics. The book contains the following passage: 
In Africa, the female-headed family is part of an overall social pattern. It consists 
of early sexual activity, loose emotional ties between spouses and sexual union and 
the procreation of children with many partners. It includes fostering children away 
from home, even for several years, so mothers remain sexually attractive. Males 
likewise compete more for females and fathers are less involved in child 
rearing…In Black Africa and the Black Caribbean, as in the American underclass 
ghetto, groups of pre-teens and teenagers are left quite free of adult supervision. 
(Rushton, 2000, p. 16)3 
                                                 
2 For those who are innocent of such matters, note that there is a distinction between White supremacist views and 
White nationalist views (Swain & Nieli, 2003). White supremacists believe that northern Europeans and their 
descendants constitute a “master race” fit to dominate all other groups. White nationalists, in contrast, believe that 
it is legitimate for members of each race to band together to promote their own interests against those of other races; 
hence Whites should maintain solidarity in order to direct a greater share of social and economic influence out of 
the hands of non-Whites and into the hands of Whites (while recognizing that other racial groups have the right to 
do likewise).  
3 It is worth pointing out the irony of Rushton’s dismissive attitude towards Black parenting styles (see also Levin, 
1997b, p. 371) given that hereditarians persistently argue that differences in parenting behavior have virtually no 





Lest there be any doubt about what these racial scientists are claiming, note that it is clear 
from the context of both men’s work that these statements are intended to express the view that 
the behaviors ascribed to Blacks are not the result of local cultural forces, but rather reflect Blacks’ 
“genetic programming.”4  
It is safe to assume, I think, that most decent-minded people will find both Templer’s and 
Rushton’s words deeply offensive. And while there is perhaps something distasteful about any 
claim that posits “innate” and immutable racial differences there is (it seems to me at least) a stark 
qualitative difference between the force of the two statements quoted above and some of the claims 
we considered in the previous three chapters—for example, the “core hereditarian claim” (HED) 
that Blacks will exhibit lower IQs than Whites across all relevant environmental conditions. The 
latter seems at least plausibly defensible as a legitimate scientific claim, whereas Templer’s and 
Rushton’s statements—while appearing to express a series of empirical claims—immediately 
strike us as outside the bounds of acceptable ways for a scientist to express an empirical 
proposition.  
Now, I do not wish to lean too heavily on intuitions about these two statements—what I 
have to say in this chapter will, I believe, be just as plausible (or not) even if the reader’s intuitions 
about these statements are completely at odds with my own. But on the assumption that the 
reactions described above on not entirely idiosyncratic, I think the words of Templer and Rushton 
should serve both to illustrate and to motivate the questions I take up in this chapter. To wit, 
something is very clearly wrong with what these scientists are saying about race. And yet much of 
what surrounds these claims (in Rushton’s case, at least—Templer’s informal remarks are a 
                                                 





somewhat different matter) looks like ordinary scientific practice: Rushton’s book, while 
interspersed with claims like the above, also summarizes and synthesizes a wide array of empirical 
studies found in peer-reviewed scientific literature.5 So while we might have our doubts about 
Rushton’s scientific inferences, it seems we would need something more than just these doubts to 
elevate a critique of Rushton (or Templer) beyond a mere empirical disagreement and into the 
realm of serious moral criticism. 
Thus, part of the challenge taken up in this chapter will be to determine whether it is 
possible to articulate what is wrong with the sorts of statements presented above, while preserving 
the belief (rejected by some, but assumed here) that the state of scientific evidence regarding 
“innate” or “genetic” racial differences is something about which reasonable people may disagree. 
With these reflections in mind, let us now consider some more formal motivations for addressing 
the question at hand, viz., is racial science racist?  
Firstly, in contemporary society, racism is rightly regarded as one of the most serious moral 
ills we face, and a charge of racism is one of the gravest moral critiques that can be leveled at a 
person. It is thus important to know whether this very serious charge is warranted by the institution 
of racial science and those who practice it, if for no reason other than the importance of dispensing 
serious moral criticism where it is warranted, and withholding it where it is not.  
Secondly, and relatedly, several authors (Blum, 2002; Miles, 1989) have expressed concern 
over the possibility of “conceptual inflation” in applications of the term “racism.” These authors 
                                                 
5 This is certainly not to say that Rushton’s methodologies should be assumed trustworthy; indeed his methods have 
been widely criticized (including among those we might deem “moderate” voices in the IQ debates—Cronshaw, 
Hamilton, Onyura, & Winston, 2006; Hunt & Sternberg, 2006; Wicherts, Dolan, Carlson, & van der Maas, 2010). 
These scholars have been particularly critical of Rushton’s persistent reliance on extremely low estimates of average 
IQ in sub-Saharan Africa—estimates that were generated using unrandomized convenience samples, and seemingly 





point out that if the definition of “racism” is allowed to expand too freely, and accusations of 
racism made too indiscriminately, the word will quickly lose its force as a serious condemnation 
of a grievous moral ill. Thus, we must be cautious in our application of the term, and we must 
ensure that accusations of racism are constrained by a coherent theory of what racism is and is not. 
Thirdly, it should come as no surprise that practitioners of racial science forcefully deny 
that they or their work are in any way racist. Plausibly, much of the divergence of opinion on this 
question owes to different conceptions of what “racism” is held by proponents and detractors of 
racial science. The possibility of such crosstalk highlights the importance of specifying in precise 
terms different notions of racism and assessing their plausibility on independent grounds. By 
making our commitments regarding the nature of racism explicit, we can be sure that we are 
embarking on a clear and productive endeavor when we ask whether racial science is racist. 
Moreover, we can minimize the extent to which critics of racial science can use accusations of 
racism as a cheap polemical cudgel, and we can also ensure that practitioners of racial science are 
not given an “easy out” by way of adopting (explicitly or implicitly) an inordinately weak or 
narrow conception of racism.  
Finally, there are many questions of great practical import in the vicinity of racial science. 
As we have seen throughout the last several chapters, the questions addressed by racial science are 
relevant to public policy in the domains of education, employment, and criminal justice, among 
others. But in addition, there are also more immediate questions regarding the extent to which 
racial science should be pursued, funded, encouraged, tolerated, and popularized. To the extent 
that racial science is genuinely racist, this would provide strong pro tanto reasons for marginalizing 





8.1.2 Two caveats 
With these motivations on the table, let me briefly mention two caveats about my aims in 
this chapter. The first is that my chief concern in this chapter will be to examine what case can be 
made for public accusations of racism. Plausibly, a much higher evidential standard is required to 
justify a public pronouncement that a person or institution is racist than to speculate privately that 
this might be so. Because such public accusations are already quite common—even in relatively 
sober academic and journalistic publications—clearly many believe that such evidential standards 
are met. It is therefore of particular importance that we seek to resolve—or at least shed some light 
on—whether such pronouncements are justified. 
The second caveat is that while in previous chapters I offered some discussion of the 
plausibility of certain claims about racial differences given current evidence and methodologies, 
in this chapter I aim to stay as neutral as possible on any factual claims about racial differences as 
they are investigated by racial science; my goal is to assess the justification for accusations of 
racism without begging any questions about how the empirical matters will turn out. As we will 
see, questions about the potentially racist nature of racial science cannot be entirely separated from 
the empirical content of the relevant theories and the state of the evidence. But I will endeavor to 
establish, so far as I can, what sort of case can be made for the racist nature of racial science even 
if we remain agnostic about the substantive empirical claims currently debated in the field. 
8.1.3 Defining racism 
I should also clarify from the outset my approach to the question of what racism is, and 





determine whether racial science is racist, we must have a theoretical account of what racism is. 
So what is a “theoretical account of racism” or a “theory of racism”? As I use these and related 
terms here, I take these accounts to be good old-fashioned conceptual analyses of the word 
“racism.” That is, I will be treating these theoretical accounts of racism as attempts to systematize 
and clarify folk beliefs about what racism is in accordance with ordinary usage of the term. Thus, 
these theories should specify what sorts of entities (people, attitudes, institutions, etc.) can properly 
have “racism” predicated of them, provide reasonably clear criteria (if not necessary and sufficient 
conditions) for something’s being racist, illuminate any inherent normative implications of the 
word, and so forth, all while preserving some critical mass of intuitions about proper applications 
of the term “racism.” 
Importantly, however, the discussion below is not meant to identify the One True Theory 
of racism, nor even to compare the relative merits of the various theories on the market (though I 
will mention advantages and disadvantages of each theory as relevant). Like other commenters on 
racism (Blum, 2002, 2004; Faucher & Machery, 2009), I endorse a pluralist position on what 
racism is: there are multiple understandings of racism that are applicable in different contexts. 
Similarly, I endorse pluralism about what sorts of things can be properly called racist. Thus, 
people, beliefs, attitudes, jokes, symbols, and institutions can all be racist, though they will be so 
in somewhat different ways (cf. Blum, 2002, Chapter 1).  
One particular distinction is important here, one that is frequently blurred in public 
discourse surrounding racism: I will assume that there is a distinction between, on the one hand, 
racist persons and, on the other hand, racist attitudes, motivations, or actions. That is, an attitude 





For example, telling a racially insensitive joke might qualify as a racist action, yet the person who 
tells it may well not be a racist person if, for example, she tells the joke because she thinks it will 
impress her friends and not because she is motivated by genuine antipathy towards the targets of 
the joke. For present purposes, we may define a racist person roughly as someone for whom racist 
motivations and attitudes form a central component of his moral character (Blum, 2002). We 
should bear this distinction in mind as we explore the possibility that certain aspects of racial 
science may be racist—arriving at an affirmative answer does not necessarily entail that any racial 
scientists are racist people. 
While I am generally neutral on most questions regarding conceptual constraints on a 
theory of racism, I do adopt one fundamental commitment about what “racism” means: racism is 
necessarily morally wrong. There are definitions of “racism” that hold otherwise (Mills, 2003; 
Shelby, 2002), but it seems clear that everyday usage takes racism to be a serious moral ill, and—
most germane to our purposes here—accusations of racism leveled at racial science are quite 
clearly intended to be moral condemnations.6  
Finally, note that in evaluating the applicability of philosophical theories of racism to racial 
science, I do not intend to take the success or failure of these theories at counting racial science as 
racist as a litmus test for their adequacy. In other words, I am treating the racist nature of racial 
science as an open question rather than as a datum. My aim in applying each of these theories to 
racial science, rather, is to “cast a broad net” over the question of whether racial science is racist, 
                                                 
6 I should note here that I will be sidestepping—as much as possible—questions arising in normative ethics regarding 
the “best” moral theory (however this might be defined). In particular, for present purposes I am agnostic about 
whether all morally wrong actions share some particular feature (such as failing to maximize utility or 
demonstrating lack of respect for persons). Rather, I will be proceeding from the assumption that we can clearly 





by asking whether and to what extent any of the theories of racism that have had some traction in 
the literature provide good grounds for attributing racism to racial science.  
8.2 Is it racist to ask the questions? 
Before taking up individual theories of racism and their applicability to racial science, we 
should first consider one approach that would classify racial science as racist right out of the gate. 
As we have seen, there is much to worry about, morally speaking, when it comes to the possibility 
of racial differences in important psychological traits, and so one response to these moral 
quandaries would be to insist that research exploring the possibility of racial differences should 
not be performed at all—indeed, one might suggest that to even take up the question of whether 
there are such racial differences is an inherently racist endeavor. Louise Antony, for example, 
refers to Herrnstein’s investigations of race and intelligence as his “racist undertakings” (1993, p. 
144). And, while stopping short of suggesting that pursuing racial science is racist, neuroscientist 
Steven Rose (2009) argues that research on intelligence and race (or gender) should not be 
performed because, as he titles his article, “science and society do not benefit.”  
At first blush, this perspective seems inconsistent with the way science is generally 
practiced, and with the way we usually think about how scientific research can contribute to the 
formulation of policy. That is, so long as we concede it is possible that racial and ethnic groups 
differ in intelligence (genotypic or phenotypic), and that the possibility of such differences is 
(prima facie) relevant to the construction of social policy, what reasons could we have for declining 
to investigate this empirical question, using the best methods we have for investigating empirical 





require showing that they are morally defective in some way. Yet we might ask: how could 
executing an empirical investigation of a non-trivial empirical question be ipso facto morally 
condemnable? On what grounds can thinkers like Antony and Rose condemn such practices? 
Well, the Antony/Rose strategy is to mount an accusation of racism against racial science 
by emphasizing the biological non-reality of race. The argument goes like this: science is 
concerned with, among other things, identifying relationships among naturally-occurring 
properties (e.g., between mass and gravitational attraction, between bacteria and disease, and so 
forth). But if race is not an “objective” biological category—i.e., if studying the things we call 
races fails to “carve nature at its joints”—then the usual reasons for directing scientific attention 
to correlations among properties do not apply. Therefore, absent some further explanation, it would 
be a mystery why questions about correlations between race and other properties (intelligence, 
altruism, and so forth) continue to be the subject of so much scientific attention and effort. Faced 
with this situation, one might hypothesize that racism constitutes the “further explanation” for the 
continued interest in racial science: it is because scientists (and perhaps the public) harbor racist 
attitudes of some sort that the question of whether “races” differ in intelligence seems like an 
interesting or even reasonable question to ask. As Antony puts it: 
[I]f such classifications as race fail to reflect deep regularities in human biology, 
and reflect instead only historically and culturally specific interests, then there is 
no reason, apart from racist ones, to investigate the relation between race and some 
presumably biological feature of human beings…even from [an extreme empiricist] 
perspective it must be an arbitrary choice to investigate one set of such correlations 
rather than another. Why intelligence and race? Why not intelligence and number 





While I think there is something right about these questions that Antony, Rose, and other 
scholars have raised about racial science, in the end I think there are significant limitations to these 
critiques. Throughout the rest of this section, therefore, I will first note some points of agreement 
and highlight some important considerations to which these criticisms draw our attention, after 
which I will explain why, even so, I think that possible relationships between our racial/ethnic 
categories and important psychological characteristics are in fact legitimate subjects of scientific 
study. It follows from this that the modern institution of racial science is not inherently racist. 
Nevertheless, I close this section by expanding upon the insights of Antony, Rose, and others, in 
order to show why the superficiality (and perhaps artificiality) of racial categories does still 
undermine the moral legitimacy of racial science to some extent. 
8.2.1 The contingency of race and of racial science 
First, recall my arguments from Section 5.5: I endorse the claim that race is not an objective 
biological category. Rather, racial categories are arbitrary divisions imposed on continuous human 
biological variation. While there are clearly systematic differences in genetic structure among 
human populations (where “populations” can range in size from a few villages to an entire 
continent), our common-sense “racial” divisions do not have any particular explanatory 
significance among the myriad ways we could partition genetically distinguishable populations. 
Thus, while there are legitimate scientific reasons to study differences among genetically distinct 
groups, we do not get any particular inferential payoff from using racial groups. So Antony is 
correct that the choice to study relationships between behavior and race, as opposed to other 





does this establish that the use of race as a theoretical parameter in scientific inquiry is without 
justification, and should be discarded? Antony and Rose seem to think so. But neither gives us a 
clear picture of what alternative they have in mind, of what the scientific study of human behavior 
(and in particular, human behavioral differences) might look like in the absence of race. So it will 
be instructive, I think, to begin with the biological non-reality of race and then spell out what a 
“race-free” behavioral science might look like.  
The easiest way to do this, I think, is to turn back the clock and imagine an alternative 
history in which the notion of race simply never emerges. The story goes like this: because race is 
not a real biological property—out there in the world waiting to be discovered, like blood types or 
viruses—our use of the particular set of racial categories we’ve settled on (and indeed, our use of 
the concept of race at all) seem to be contingent, in a way that our reliance on other, genuine 
biological properties is not. That is, idealizing somewhat, we can suppose that by doing halfway-
decent science for long enough, our species was bound to discover certain elements of the 
biological furniture of the world, like blood types, viruses, and so on. But (by hypothesis) not so 
with race: if race is not the sort of category that can be discovered through biological inquiry, then 
we can imagine that in our alternative history, all the facts about human genetic and somatic 
variation are the same, and the development of the biological and behavioral sciences through time 
is more or less the same, but no race concept emerges—it simply never occurs to anyone to impose 
upon human variation the peculiar kind of structure that characterizes our racial way of thinking 
(i.e., dividing people up into a small, discrete number of geographic groups).7  
                                                 
7 Of course, it is possible that our tendency to “think racially” might be inevitable (or nearly so) even if race is not a 
category discoverable through scientific inquiry, if there is some universally shared innate mechanism that 





In this world, then, the somatic characteristics that now form the basis of our racial 
categorizations (such as skin color, hair texture, and so on) simply never become imbued with the 
deep significance that we (as racial thinkers) assign to them. We need not suppose that in this 
alternative history, people would be completely blind to various perceptually salient somatic 
differences among people of different continental ancestries, but we can imagine that these 
characteristics came to have no greater significance than, say, traits like height or eye color—
things we notice but do not use to divide people up in any serious way.  
Now, had this been our history, what might our behavioral sciences look like? Well, most 
obviously, “race” would not be a theoretical parameter in the study of human behavior. But in 
other ways, I suggest, things might look very much the same. We can suppose, for example, that 
in this alternative history the field of behavior genetics emerges, similarly populated by scientists 
who are interested in the relationship between genetic variation and behavioral variation.8 
Eventually these behavior geneticists would get around to studying the genetic correlates of the 
very same sorts of traits to which we are accustomed (intelligence, alcoholism, “big five” 
personality factors, and so on). And, at some point these behavior geneticists might well see fit to 
investigate whether and how genetic differences among people with different geographical origins 
are associated with behavioral differences. Perhaps such studies would find associations between 
the genes prevalent in particular geographic populations and particular behaviors, and perhaps not. 
                                                 
2012; Machery & Faucher, 2004), but I believe Adam Hochman provides persuasive arguments against it 
(Hochman, 2013; see also Kurzban, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001).    
8 It may be that by introducing this possibility, I am straying from what Antony and Rose actually have in mind. That 
is, perhaps the alternative they envision is a world in which the nature and causes of human differences are simply 
not seen as particularly urgent matters for science to investigate (this is perhaps especially plausible regarding 
Antony, given her Chomskyan emphasis on the theoretical importance of similarities among individuals and of 
human universals). Whether or not this is what Antony and/or Rose have in mind, it strikes me as a rather far-
fetched (if admirable) suggestion—the impulse to understand how and why we differ from one another appears 





Either way, whatever language they might use to describe their hypotheses and their results, these 
behavior geneticists would lack the vocabulary of race. And not only would it never occur to them 
to think of themselves as studying “racial differences in behavior,” it also would never have 
occurred to them to divide people up using the categories we think of as races. From their 
perspectives, and the perspective of their audience, they would simply be investigating differences 
among individuals. 
Now that we have a picture of what behavioral science might look like devoid of the 
concept of race, two questions arise about the scenario I have sketched. First: is this state of affairs 
an improvement, morally speaking, over our familiar system that treats race as an important 
theoretical parameter? Second: Can we get there from here? That is, given that the history sketched 
above is not our history, and we do have a concept of race, could we, as Rose and Antony suggest, 
do away with race as a theoretical parameter? 
It is tempting to say “yes” to the first question. For we might think that whatever ills might 
accompany the investigation of individual differences in this alternative society, at least these 
investigations would not be saddled with the heavy moral baggage that comes with our particular 
history with race. However, the moral status of this alternative society is exceedingly difficult to 
assess given the sheer unruliness of the counterfactuals we would need to consider. How far would 
we have to turn back the clock to reach a time before people thought in racial terms?9 How would 
                                                 
9 There is disagreement about just when the modern notion of race arose in the course of human history. One popular 
view is that the idea of race was absent in the ancient world but emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
as Whites sought to reconcile enlightenment ideals with slavery and colonialism (Blum, 2002; Smedley, 1999; 
Zack, 1996). On the other hand, those concerned to argue for the biological reality and fixity of race (Miele & 
Sarich, 2005) also claim that the modern idea of race has existed for as long as different continental populations 
have been in contact. There is no need to settle this question here; rather, the key point for our purposes is that 
imagining a world in which neither scientists nor laypersons developed the notion of race—as we now understand 
it—requires imagining a world where most of the events of at least the last several hundred years—and perhaps 





our society be structured? How would we conceive of matters like social inequality? So I am 
pessimistic about the prospects of a satisfactory answer to this question, and it is by no means 
certain that studying human variation without the bogeyman of race would have raised any fewer 
moral quandaries in the end. However, even if we grant that yes, it would have been better had we 
never devised the artifice of race and built it into our social science, we must ask whether it is 
possible, now that we’ve got it, to actually dispense with it. 
8.2.2 The contingent necessity of racial science 
In responding to this question, the first thing to note is that even if race it not a legitimate 
biological category, it is clearly an important social category, in that our assignations of people—
ourselves and others—to racial categories clearly do a good deal of explanatory work when it 
comes to accounting for both interpersonal relations and the structure of society as a whole. This 
being the case, it is difficult to imagine how we could ignore questions about how race—however 
arbitrary the notion might be at the end of the day—relates to other important aspects of social 
behavior, including intelligence, violence, poverty, and so on. 
The essential problem for the Antony/Rose suggestion of abandoning race as a theoretical 
parameter in social science is that in the here and now, we cannot help but see the world in racial 
terms. And what’s more, in the here and now, racial science is an established institution. The 
pervasive social inequality among the groups we call races is highly salient to us (most of us, 
anyway), and racial science has stepped forward to offer explanations for this inequality. It would 





little choice but to continue to seek a more complete understanding of why those classified as 
Black do worse than those classified as White, and how we might change the situation.  
Given these considerations, it is unclear what alternative Antony and Rose might offer us. 
Suppose that tomorrow the world’s scientists unanimously agree to abandon race as a variable. 
How are we to know if we are making progress towards ensuring that members of all groups are 
allowed to develop to their full cognitive potential? Clearly, with circumstances being what they 
are, the decision to use race as a theoretical parameter in scientific inquiry cannot be—as Antony 
borders on suggesting—inherently racist. Indeed, it would be difficult to accuse those scholars 
who acknowledge the existence of an IQ gap, but who study its contours for the express purpose 
of figuring out how to eliminate it (Flynn, 1999; Fryer & Levitt, 2004; Nisbett, 2009) of engaging 
in “racist undertakings.” 
I conclude, then, that studying the relationship of race with behavioral outcomes (including 
intelligence) is something that should be done, at least in the near-term. And, a fortiori, pursuing 
such questions is not necessarily a racist or even morally objectionable endeavor; So, as concerns 
the question posed in the title of this chapter, racial science is not automatically racist science.  
8.2.3 Racial preoccupation and the moral evaluation of racial science 
However, it does not follow from the above discussion that nothing is out of bounds in 
pursuing scientific research into the possibility of differences among human groups. To return to 
Antony’s original point: we must keep in mind that race/ethnicity is but one (or at most two) out 
of a very large number of variables that we might choose to include in our scientific investigations 





disproportionate degree of attention directed towards questions of race over other potential 
correlates of behavioral differences we might study. In addition to Antony’s fanciful (but incisive) 
example of “number of hair follicles,” Rose (2009) points out that little scientific attention is 
directed towards measured IQ differences among geographic regions in Wales, and Loury (2002, 
pp. 85–86) makes similar observations regarding regional IQ variation in the United States and the 
tendency of IQ to decline with age (we will return to Loury’s observations in Section 8.3.3 below).  
These examples should give us pause in considering the common defenses that racial 
scientists offer for dedicating time and energy to studying racial differences. These scientists 
typically justify their investigations by pointing to the intrinsic value of knowing the truth of the 
matter, or the indispensability of this knowledge to the development of effective policy, or both. 
The question of whether truth is intrinsically valuable is a complicated one that I cannot address 
here,10 but as we have seen I am in agreement with the latter, at least in principle. So there are 
legitimate scientific and social justifications for studying race and behavior. And, I would argue, 
the principle of charity demands that we (for the most part) take racial scientists at their word that 
their reasons for studying race and intelligence are among the legitimate ones. Crucially, however, 
we can also recognize that every scientist-hour dedicated to investigating the relationship between 
race and behavior is time spent not studying potential behavioral correlates of a multitude of other 
social and biological categories, some of which, it would seem, are of equal theoretical and 
practical importance (and so ought to have equal claim on our attention). So, while racial scientists 
might be forgiven for choosing race over number of hair follicles, the neglect of intra-racial 
geographic and age variation seems more difficult to explain away.  
                                                 





The worry here is that by dedicating a disproportionate amount of energy and attention to 
the relationship of race to behavior, racial science tips its hand, revealing that its motivations are 
not so pure and disinterested after all. In other words, it is all well and good for a community of 
racial scientists to insist that they do what they do because it is essential that we find out the truth 
about whether and how the races differ. But this response may appear disingenuous when we begin 
to take into account all the other potential research parameters that might shed light on some policy 
question or other—and this is especially true given the clear risk of harm attached to racial science 
because of the discipline’s sordid history.  
Of course, spelling out exactly what is a “proportionate” amount of attention to direct 
towards questions of race as opposed to other categories will not be an exact science. But 
nevertheless we can advance the following principle: to the extent that racial science exhibits a 
disproportionate preoccupation with race to the exclusion of alternative ways of studying 
differences in human behavior, it cannot be defended on the grounds that it is nothing more than 
an attempt to gain some worthwhile knowledge about the world. If race-IQ connections are 
doggedly pursued while geographic and other potential covariates go largely unexplored, then we 
can demand an answer to the question: why race? If there is no satisfactory answer to this question, 
then there are prima facie grounds for moral disapproval of this institution that goes out of its way 
to gather scientific data that (irrespective of its truth value) stigmatizes and belittles groups that 
have been subjected to quite enough of that sort of thing already.11 Moreover—and this bears 
                                                 
11 This is not necessarily to impugn any particular researcher: as I have argued, the relationship of race to behavior 
is—in present circumstances at least—something worth studying and writing about. Hence, if a particular scientist 
decides that race is a more interesting subject to explore than age or geography, this certainly does not automatically 
imply ill-will or any other fault. But given the eminent salience of moral concerns about racial science, it does not 
seem unreasonable to expect those who would pursue such research to carefully weigh their intrinsic interest against 





emphasizing, since the point is evidently lost on many racial scientists—we can mount this moral 
criticism even though we might concede that gathering data about race and behavior is, in the 
abstract, a legitimate scientific endeavor.12  
To sum up the discussion so far, then: proposals like Antony’s that seek to establish the 
inherently racist nature of racial science do not stand up to scrutiny. Relatedly, the suggestion, à 
la Rose, that we ought to pull the plug on all racial science forthwith fails to grapple with the 
constraints imposed by our present circumstances—the attempt to abandon racial science at this 
point presents us with the altogether unpromising business of trying to stuff various genies back 
into their bottles and cats back into their bags. It seems, then, that there is no alternative but to 
continue the scientific study of how racial categories (ontologically artificial as these categories 
may be) relate to important aspects of social behavior. And if some researchers pursuing such 
questions genuinely find that the evidence draws them to some “unpleasant truths” about racial 
differences, that must be acceptable. But for all that, we can and should point to the moral 
deficiencies inherent in any scientific community whose pursuit and publicization of “unpleasant 
truths” manages only to heap the unpleasantness upon one or a few already-stigmatized racial 
groups.  
                                                 
12 In fairness, I should point out here that perhaps the most popular whipping boy for critics of racial science—
Herrnstein and Murray’s The Bell Curve—is not nearly as preoccupied with race as its detractors often insinuate. 
The vast majority of Herrnstein and Murray’s argument regarding the relationship between genes, IQ, and success 
is built upon analyses of all-White samples, and the discussion of racial differences occupies a comparatively small 
portion of a large book. Murray and other supporters of the book have, reasonably I think, complained that popular 
treatment of the book has misrepresented it as a work primarily about racial differences. However, it also seems 
fair to point out, as does Randall Kennedy (1994), that the publicity campaigns that accompanied the book gave 
pride of place to Herrnstein and Murray’s claims about racial differences (though of course we do not know what 
level of influence the authors had over such decisions), and the controversality of these claims in particular plausibly 





To conclude this section: I have established that while it is too hasty to condemn all racial 
science as ipso facto racist, and while it is naïve to think we can abandon racial science cold-
turkey, there may still be grounds for moral condemnation of much racial science, even without 
engaging in detailed analysis of its claims and methodologies. My claim is that it is sufficient for 
moral condemnation that racial science privileges—without scientific or moral justification—the 
investigation of racial differences over other potential objects of study, and in so doing 
disproportionately and unjustifiably burdens members of racially stigmatized groups with 
additional layers of insult. Note, however, that establishing that there are grounds for moral censure 
of racial science does not yet answer the central question of this chapter, which is whether racial 
science is racist. It is to that question I now turn. 
8.3 Theories of racism and their applicability to racial science 
8.3.1 Racism as inferiorization or pernicious belief 
Lawrence Blum (2002) suggests that a core type of racism is inferiorization: claiming or 
implying (in word or in deed) that some racial groups are inferior to others.13 Thus, for Blum, 
“Blacks are intellectually inferior” is a paradigmatically racist proposition (2002, p. 21). The 
notion of racism as inferiorization comports well with much ordinary discourse about racism: 
expression of a belief that one racial group is inferior to another in any serious way is generally 
taken to be grounds for an accusation of racism. So, applying Blum’s idea of racism as 
inferiorization would seem to count much of racial science as racist right off the bat: indeed, the 
                                                 





distinguishing feature of the sort of scientific claims I’m here considering is that they make claims 
about the superiority and inferiority of various racial groups along various important psychological 
dimensions. But although Blum’s proposal works reasonably well as an account of what many 
ordinary folks mean by “racism,” it is not particularly helpful for settling questions about whether 
racial science is racist. 
There are two related problems with using Blum’s inferiorization account as a basis for 
charging racial science with racism. The first is that this move appears to be question-begging in 
the present context. The very reason why racial science is controversial is that it so frequently 
makes claims about the relative average endowments of members of different racial groups with 
regard to important psychological characteristics; in effect, assignation of superior and inferior 
positions in a racial hierarchy.14 And yet it is the position of the racial scientists that their research 
enterprises are not racist. Thus, insofar as conducting such research and disseminating the results 
requires making claims that certain racial groups are, on average, inferior, holding that 
inferiorization is ipso facto racism leaves the racial scientist with no hope of avoiding the charge 
(except by halting the research or concealing its results). In other words, practitioners of racial 
science simply deny that engaging in inferiorization amounts to racism. 
The second problem for Blum’s suggestion is that it is not clear whether beliefs or 
statements can be racist if they are true, or at least justified. For racism (again, at least as the term 
                                                 
14 One might deny that the claims of racial science genuinely inferiorize groups. Levin (1997b), for example, argues 
at considerable length that because there is no objective, universal standard by which to measure human 
characteristics, saying that Blacks are less intelligent than Whites (or, as Levin also holds, that Blacks are less 
motivated, less autonomous, and less altruistic than Whites) does not amount to saying that Blacks are “inferior.” I 
see no particular reason to disagree with Levin about this: “superior” and “inferior” are, plausibly, inherently 
evaluative notions, which are not necessarily entailed by claims about greater or lesser degrees of intelligence—
strictly speaking such claims are evaluatively neutral. However, conceding this point does not render Blum’s 
account any less plausible. It seems sufficient for Blum’s theory that most people treat claims about differing levels 





is normally used) is necessarily a moral fault, and, plausibly, it cannot be a moral fault to believe 
what one has good evidence for believing. As Levin puts it: “to say that blacks are genetically less 
intelligent and more impulsive than whites is not racist, since racism is by definition bad, and facts, 
however unwelcome, are morally neutral” (1996, p. 306). So this might seem to settle the matter: 
insofar as racial science makes factual assertions about racial inferiority, these claims are not 
subject to the moral evaluation—much less moral criticism—that would be required to sustain 
charges of racism. 
There are two nuances here, however, that might re-open to possibility of directing moral 
criticism at the inferiorizing statements put forth by racial science. First, there is the matter of the 
empirical justification for these claims. Clearly, beliefs or statements that are woefully unjustified 
will not be immune from moral critique in the same way that well-supported ones are. That is, we 
might amend Blum’s proposal and suggest that a belief might be racist if both of the following 
conditions are satisfied: (a) it inferiorizes a particular group, and (b) no reasonable person could 
believe it. Thus, a belief that Jews ritually drink the blood of infants cannot be defended on the 
grounds that it is a reasonable belief about an empirical matter, and so it is, plausibly, a racist 
belief. And indeed, some have taken the claims of racial science to be so dramatically deficient in 
empirical support that belief in them is hopelessly irrational (e.g., Dummett, 2004).  
This raises the rather tricky issue of how to distinguish between rational and irrational 
belief. For just as there is disagreement (both among racial scientists and between these scientists 
and their critics) about whether the available evidence supports particular empirical claims about 
group differences, there is also meta-disagreement about the range of the “reasonable” positions 





disagreements (see Warfield & Feldman, 2010). So it seems quite possible that very few, if any, 
claims in racial science will turn out to be like the claim of Jewish neonate hematophagy, so 
obviously without empirical support that no rational person could possibly believe them (research 
in racial science is, after all, generally published in peer-reviewed scientific journals and academic 
presses). It is therefore by no means obvious that legitimate charges of racism can be premised on 
the indisputable irrationality of endorsing the conclusions of racial science.15 Note, however, that 
the arguments just presented only establish that it is not racist to believe claims of racial science 
(if that is the belief one takes to be best supported by the evidence); it remains possible that making 
public pronouncements (whether in general or in particular contexts or particular ways) that 
endorse such propositions is racist or otherwise morally censurable. 
Second, we might of course mount a moral critique of certain beliefs or claims if it is the 
case that prejudicial attitudes play a causal role in one’s coming to adopt such beliefs (for example, 
a person is drawn to accept claims about lower Black IQ in order to justify her irrational dislike 
for Blacks). Many have also made this claim about racial science, its practitioners, as well as non-
scientists who publicly and privately endorse the claims of racial science (Richardson, 1984; 
Sarkar, 1998). That is, some have claimed that those who conduct experiments and analyses that 
purportedly show Blacks to be inferior are motivated by a dislike for Blacks, and are thereby led 
to design experiments that will show Blacks to be inferior, and they subject their results to less 
                                                 
15 Of course, a full consideration of this issue would require examining in detail the empirical bases for a range of 
racial science claims. An interesting test case is psychologist Kevin MacDonald’s claims that Jews have an innate 
disposition towards “ethnocentricity” that drives them to practice in-group eugenics and to organize to promote 
Jewish interests against those of other groups—often through surreptitious means. The case that MacDonald’s 
claims are racist (on grounds that they are so absurd that belief in them is morally censurable) is, plausibly, much 
stronger than the equivalent case regarding claims that the Black-White IQ gap is partly genetic in origin (which 
has traditionally enjoyed mainstream support among psychometricians—see Gottfredson, 1997; Snyderman & 





critical scrutiny than they would if they were found to support conclusions which the researchers 
were not already motivated to believe. In that case, the adoption of the inferiorizing beliefs would 
be morally censurable, since they could be causally traced to a censurable attitude (i.e., a 
prejudicial dislike for Black people).  
However, establishing that a researcher or a consumer of racial science has such prejudicial 
attitudes, and that these attitudes are the reason why they have adopted this belief—rather than a 
genuine assessment of the available evidence—requires a very high evidential standard, one that, 
I submit, observers not intimately familiar with the persons in question will rarely be in a position 
to meet. Thus, this is not a promising avenue for answering our central question of whether there 
are grounds for public attributions of racism to racial science. This is not to deny that to the extent 
that it is in fact true of an individual that her endorsement of racial differences is (in part) motivated 
by immoral attitudes, this is a moral defect and she is worthy of moral criticism; my point is that 
such assumptions about the workings of an individual’s psychology will rarely be legitimate 
grounds for public denunciations of racial science (or racial scientists) as racist.  
8.3.2 Racism as an institution 
The term “institutional racism” (made popular by Carmichael & Hamilton, 1967) generally 
seeks to draw attention to the ways in which broader social structures can systematically 
disadvantage particular groups, even in the absence of overt and deliberate acts of interpersonal 
racism (Headley, 2000).16 Let us say that an institution is racist if it systematically disadvantages 
                                                 
16 Although, again, my aim is not to adjudicate among competing theories of racism, I will note that I am sympathetic 
with what appears to be the majority opinion among philosophers, namely that while the notion of institutional 





members of particular racialized groups, i.e., leaves those groups worse off than they would be if 
the institution were absent or structured differently. Racial science is plausibly a racist institution 
in this sense, since widespread publicization of claims that Blacks have been “scientifically 
demonstrated” to be, on average, less intelligent, more dangerous, and less dedicated parents than 
Whites will almost certainly make Blacks worse off in a number of ways, as I argued at length in 
Section 6.2.3. Thus, it seems there may be good grounds for classifying racial science as a racist 
institution. 
However, as we saw earlier, the normative status of these outcomes (inequality, licensed 
discrimination, and so forth) is up for debate, and some would maintain that nothing is amiss with 
any of these results—they are simply signs of a well-functioning and economically efficient 
meritocracy. And if this is so, then the case for racial science as a racist institution is significantly 
undermined, since it is now no longer clear that there is anything wrong with racial science after 
all. In other words, it would seem that undergirding the theory that a racist institution is one that 
makes certain groups worse off is an assumption that those groups do not deserve to be worse off, 
or that their being worse off is in some way an unjust state of affairs. But if certain hereditarians 
are right in both their empirical and normative stances, this condition does not hold in the 
“hereditarian society.” 
Of course, I reject the premise that these outcomes are morally acceptable, but the key point 
for present purposes is that characterizing the effects of racial science as morally bad (which is 
necessary in order to classify it as a racist institution) now requires taking on a number of 
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substantive empirical and/or normative assumptions. That is, in order to characterize racial science 
as not just something that makes people of color worse off, but is also morally condemnable on 
those grounds, one must take on significant empirical assumptions and/or contentious theoretical 
commitments about notions like desert or merit, about the value of economic efficiency as 
compared to other social goods, and so forth. Thus, it will be very difficult to land an accusation 
of institutional racism against racial science without begging the question about some key 
normative issues. In order to sustain the charge, one would need to engage in a protracted defense 
of rather specific theses concerning much broader ethical questions. So, as with racism as 
pernicious belief, this line does not appear particularly promising. 
8.3.3 Racism as ill-will or disregard 
A final view is one that divorces racism from the reasonableness of empirical propositions 
about racial differences or the racially disparate consequences of social institutions. This 
account—defended, in various forms, by Jorge Garcia (1997, 1999), Lawrence Blum (2002), Paul 
Taylor (2004), and Joshua Glasgow (2009)—characterizes racism as a kind of a stance or an 
attitude towards people of different races. The account is most associated with Garcia, so I will 
focus on his formulation here. According to Garcia, the “heart” of racism is in the possession of 
ill-will or moral disregard towards the well-being of particular groups of people. Garcia proposes 
that we conceive of racism as:  
fundamentally a vicious kind of racially based disregard for the welfare of certain 
people. In its central and most vicious form, it is a hatred, ill-will, directed against 
a person or persons on account of their assigned race. In a derivative form, one is a 
racist when one either does not care at all or does not care enough (i.e., as much as 





certain racial group, where this regard is based on racial classification (Garcia, 
1999, pp. 399–400, emphasis added).17  
Because, again, I am mainly concerned with grounds for public assertions about the racist 
nature of racial science, I do not think we will get much mileage out of the idea of ill-will, as it 
would be difficult to establish that someone conducting racial science actually feels antipathy 
towards or wishes harm upon a particular group, even while he might fiercely maintain that group’s 
genetic inferiority.18 However, it seems to me that at least some racial science is plausibly 
classified as racist under the notion of indifference or disregard, as I will now argue.  
I am inclined to argue that the sort of indifference or disregard of which Garcia speaks is 
evident in much of racial science. This indifference takes the form of a resignation to the prospect 
of racial inequality discussed at length in Chapter 6. Recall that when racial scientists argue for a 
“genetic” basis for group differences, they are evincing a particular explanatory framework, one 
that gives us little reason to continue inquiry into the mechanistic details of development that may 
lead to inequality-rectifying interventions. And this privileging of genetic causes, in turn, renders 
permanent racial inequality a seemingly unavoidable outcome—an outcome we must, the racial 
scientist insists, accept with equanimity.  
While I am wary of imputing any particular attitude or motivation to any particular 
scientist, some examples are necessary to elucidate the sort of statements I have in mind. Consider 
the following statement from Rushton and Jensen at the end of a long article arguing for 
                                                 
17 Note that this conception of racism has the advantage of potentially subsuming another kind of case we have 
encountered, namely beliefs about racial inferiority that are motivated by ill-will. In such cases, the ill-will/disregard 
theory would hold, the person is guilty of holding a racist attitude, but it is not the belief that is racist, but rather the 
ill-will which is a necessary condition for the formation of the belief. 
18 The matter may be quite different, of course, when it comes to laypersons who are consumers of racial science, and 
who use the findings as a tool to heap denigration upon stigmatized groups—some of whom this author has had the 





genetically-based IQ differences between racial groups: “Ultimately, the public must accept the 
pragmatic reality that some [racial] groups will be overrepresented and other groups 
underrepresented in various socially valued outcomes” (2005, p. 283, emphasis added). Similarly, 
recall Jensen’s statement (discussed in Chapter 6) that if focusing only on individual merit—
without regard for the status of groups—leads to disparate group outcomes, “so be it.”  
I would like to suggest, in contrast to the disposition these thinkers exhibit, that proper 
concern and regard for disadvantaged racial groups should precipitate an extreme reluctance to 
accept conditions of racial stratification. Indeed, the mere suggestion that the current and long-
standing regime of racial inequality will continue indefinitely should, it seems to me, occasion 
profound sorrow and empathy for the plight of those who would be consigned to the social ladder’s 
lower rungs. And with this regret should come a fierce and dogged commitment to finding viable 
alternatives to the racially stratified society. (I have laid out one set of strategies for pursuing such 
alternatives in the previous chapter—strategies which, as we have seen, hereditarians reject as 
detached from science’s proper concern with “describing the real world.”) But to react to the 
possibility of permanent racial inequality by shrugging one’s shoulders and pronouncing “so be 
it,” or to counsel levelheaded detachment as we accept this “unpleasant fact,” is, I submit, to exhibit 
insufficient regard for the welfare of marginalized racial groups. 
This is not to say that racial scientists are entirely uncaring or devoid of concern for 
individuals in socioeconomically disadvantaged positions. It is just that their insensitivity to the 
moral salience of the status of groups—which I demonstrated in Chapter 6—evinces an attitude 
that falls short of the moral regard one ought to have for members of historically-stigmatized 





inadequacy of responding with indifference to circumstances in which there is wide group 
disparity, but where individual injustices are absent: 
What does…abstract individualism…suggest that we do now? Throw up our 
hands? Declare that no questions of justice are raised? Scratch our heads and say 
that we don’t quite know what to do? Too bad, we lament, but…There is, I believe, 
a gaping hole in any normative framework that can provide us with no better 
answers than those. (Loury, 2002, p. 124, emphasis added) 
To put the matter another way: I argued at length in Chapter 6 that there are significant 
moral costs to disseminating claims about “innate” racial inferiority—even if those claims are 
correct as measured against one particular explanatory framework. One need not buy any 
particularly controversial assumptions in order to acknowledge this much. Although hereditarians 
are typically reluctant to address the issue, it seems impossible that they could deny that public 
claims about Black intellectual inferiority are hurtful to Black persons. These are, if you will, eggs 
the hereditarian believes must be broken in pursuit of the omelet of Truth. And perhaps they are 
correct that at a certain point we must accept a certain degree of insult to Blacks’ self-image as 
part of the cost of doing scientific business. And yet, if my arguments in Chapter 7 are correct—if 
there is a viable alternative explanatory framework that affords the possibility of intervening to 
eliminate racial differences—then there is a course of action we may yet take that will not require 
us to simply live with these costs. To reject this course of action—to reject the further pursuit of 
inquiry in favor of declaring the matter settled—is not merely to advance an empirical hypothesis, 
but to make a value judgment about the scale and significance of the moral costs involved—costs 
borne entirely by non-Whites.  
I suspect this point is lost on many hereditarians, who speak as if the only relevant question 





or not? Having answered that question to their satisfaction, they are content to accept whatever 
follows. Interestingly, however, Levin acknowledges the possibility of gene-environment 
interactions (G×E) playing a role in racial IQ gaps, such that although heritability analyses might 
allow for the difference to be attributed to genetic differences under current environmental 
conditions, this would not be the case under other conditions. In short, Levin acknowledges the 
possibility of environmental conditions that would eliminate racial inequality. And yet, he still 
explicitly rejects the idea that society (or at least, White people) need put forth any effort to 
instantiate such environments: 
Whether or not there are environments in which the attainments of the races would 
be equal, if in fact, in the environment(s) in which blacks and whites have actually 
functioned, the extant race difference in attainment was caused by genetic factors 
rather than white misdeeds, this difference is not an injury, hence not an injury for 
which whites are to blame, hence not a condition whites are obliged to remedy. 
(Levin, 1997b, p. 261, emphasis in original) 
It is difficult to read this in a way that does not suggest a certain degree of disregard for Black 
individuals, in the form of an utter complacency and indifference to the moral costs—again, costs 
shouldered entirely by non-Whites—of a racially stratified society, even when we know there is 
something we could do about it. 
Before I close this discussion, allow me to appeal to one more of Loury’s observations, one 
that, in addition to driving home the point about disregard, will reconnect our conversation to the 
concerns about hereditarian rhetoric that I raised at the beginning of this chapter (recall the quotes 
from Rushton and Templer). I have said that by discounting the psychic harm done to Black 
persons as a result of promulgating racial science—by and urging that we all do likewise—racial 





particular, how do we know what degree of moral concern is sufficient? Why suppose that 
accepting subordinate social status for people of color implies a unique disregard for their 
wellbeing? Well, for starters we might ask how we would approach the matter if it were not Black 
people but some other population that was the target of these scientific investigations. Loury offers 
the following trenchant comparison:  
The American population is aging, and it is known that intelligence declines as a 
person ages, after some point in the life cycle. It is a demographic certainty that 
there will be relatively more older people in the American population in the years 
to come, and it is a legal fact that laws against age discrimination have abrogated 
mandatory retirement. These things taken together imply, as a mathematical 
necessity, that the American workforce is going to be made “dumber” by those baby 
boomers who insist on staying in the workforce beyond one’s prime years. Where 
can one read about the dire consequences of this development for the productivity 
of the American economy? Nowhere. Why not? The reason, I suggest, is that those 
older, soon-to-be-less-intelligent workers are our mothers and fathers. We are not 
about to set them to one side and engage in an elaborate discourse about their 
fitness. (Loury, 2002, pp. 85–86)19 
To push Loury’s point a bit further: imagine that a group of academics calling themselves 
“age realists” began publishing a series of books and articles boldly proclaiming that old people, 
as a matter of immutable biological principle, are just not as smart as younger people. Imagine 
further that these writings were bursting with the same rhetorical devices common in hereditarian 
works about race: it is time that we stop pretending that differences in cognitive ability between 
                                                 
19 Of course, there are reasons to question Loury’s syllogism: even if IQ does decline with age, the sort of intelligence 
measured by IQ tests may not be all that important for job success, or perhaps older workers might compensate in 
other ways—for example by bringing a wealth of experience to work-related activities. But notice—as I suspect 
Loury does—that these are precisely the sorts of moves that hereditarians reject when it comes to the relationship 
between race, IQ, and economic productivity and success. Whenever it is suggested that the Black-White IQ gap 
might not matter so much, because a high IQ is not necessary to succeed in the workforce or in life (e.g., Chomsky, 
1972), the idea is immediately dismissed, and the status of IQ as the best predictor of employee productivity is 





the young and old do not exist; we must swallow the “unpleasant truths” that science has delivered 
to us about the productivity of older people in the workforce; the elimination of mandatory 
retirement constitutes a wasteful sacrifice of economic prosperity and meritocratic principles upon 
the altar of political correctness; it’s really too bad if old people’s feelings are hurt by persistent 
messages that science has proved that they are getting dumber, but only greater harm can result 
from keeping silent about the cognitive deficiencies of seniors in the workforce; and so on.20 
Loury’s intuition—and mine—is that we would not stand for this. The reason, I think, is 
that to speak in such a way about “our ‘dumb’ moms and dads” (Loury, 2002, p. 86) would seem 
disrespectful. Even if there are intractable biological forces at work here, we might say, we owe 
our elders better. But note that there is no discernable reason why the older members of our society 
should deserve greater respect than the people of color.21 Therefore, if the way that racial science 
frames the narrative around racial differences falls short, in any way, of what we would consider 
acceptable regarding the cognitive changes besetting our mothers and fathers, then we ought to 
conclude that racial science exhibits lesser regard for people of color than morality requires—and 
this, again, is at the core of Garcia’s account of racism. 
To conclude our discussion of ill-will/disregard and its relation to racial science: even if I 
am wrong about the particular cases considered above, it seems to me that the following overall 
approach is promising: to the extent that insufficient moral regard for some group(s) contributes 
                                                 
20 By the way, Loury’s estimation that there is “nowhere” one can read about the economic effects of cognitive decline 
in an aging workforce appears to be largely correct. An admittedly cursory search on Google Scholar yields at most 
a handful of related papers (seemingly only one—Skirbekk, 2004—that mentions productivity losses due to 
declining cognitive ability among the more senior elements of the workforce). 
21 We might of course afford older persons a certain kind of unique respect, in recognition of the wisdom of their lived 






to a theorist’s (or anyone’s) readiness to accept the moral costs of permanent racial inequality, then 
the adoption of a narrow hereditarian framework exhibits some degree of racism. I conclude, then, 
that while the first two popular conceptions of racism—racism as pernicious belief and as 
oppressive institution—lack the resources to count racial science as racist, this third option—
racism as disregard—provides an understanding of racism according to which a fair amount of 
racial science is indeed racist, at least to some degree. 
8.4 Conclusion: What to do? 
At this point, it would be quite reasonable for a practitioner of racial science—or anyone, 
for that matter—to pose the question of how, exactly, we are to proceed if what I have said about 
the morally problematic character of racial science is correct. After all, I have conceded that 
scientific investigation into the causes of observed racial differences is permissible, and indeed 
necessary, for the time being at least.  
I confess to being short on answers here, and this will need to be a topic for further research. 
The discussion above suggests that the morally deleterious features of racial science can be 
mitigated by undertaking these investigations while holding the proper moral regard and respect 
for those who stand to endure the most harm—something I think we can safely say present 
manifestations of racial science have failed adequately to do. But further work will be required to 
spell out exactly how we might put this general stance of respect and regard into practice. I hope 
to have at least established, however, that adopting this stance—and using it as a guiding star in 
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